


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MORALE AND DISCIPLINE
IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMAND
1945 - 1949



OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES

Historical Division

European Command

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

APO 403
10 March 1950

SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series


TO : All Concerned

1. The Department of the Army under current regulations requires the preparation of annual historical narratives of the activities of the U.S. Army of Occupation in Germany. The preparation of the narrative history of this headquarters is the responsibility of the Chief, Historical Division, European Command. Histories of the U.S. Air Forces Europe, and the U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, are prepared by those organizations.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, published by the Historical Division, EUCOM, consisting of consecutive narratives, special studies, and monographs constitutes an official history. Each publication in the Series is based upon study of appropriate documentary sources and interviews with responsible officials. Before publication each manuscript is reviewed for accuracy and completeness by the appropriate staff divisions or subordinate command having a primary interest in the subject.

3. The publications in this Series endeavor to furnish a factual and complete account of leading problems and their solutions, major operations, and lessons learned in the course of the occupation. They are, therefore, immediately valuable in orienting key personnel arriving for duty in the Command. They also serve as source material for current instruction in Command and Staff schools of the Army, and eventually will be used in the preparation of a definitive history by the Department of the Army.

4. In order that the Series may be of maximum value to the Command and to the National Defense Establishment, persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward comments and criticisms to the Historical Division, European Command, APO 403, U.S. Army.


THOMAS T. HANDY
General, USA
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**Morale and Discipline
in the
European Command**

1945 - 1949

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Headquarters, European Command.

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P R E F A C E

On 25 April 1946 General Joseph T. McNarney, theater commander of what was then the European theater of operations, presented to a press conference his views on the importance of discipline and morale for the performance of satisfactory work by military and civilian personnel of the occupation forces. "It is a pretty general rule," he remarked, "that the good work has been done by the members of those organizations where discipline and high morale combined with a sincere spirit of pride-of-service are found to prevail. Where discipline is weak, morale low, and the sense of duty and service impaired, the results are poor."

While expressing satisfaction with the work of the majority of soldiers and military employees in the theater, General McNarney went on to say that a minority had obstructed the attainment of the highest standards of performance. This was illustrated by the not uncommon participation of personnel in black market activities, by drunkenness, and by the high rates of venereal disease, automobile accidents and absence without leave that prevailed in the command. Untidiness in personal dress and military discourtesy also attested to an attitude of complaint and resentment on the part of some toward constituted military authority and the duties essential to the maintenance of high standards of soldierly efficiency.

The reasons for shortcomings in morale and discipline, said General McNarney, were well known. The recent redeployment of troops had been a serious drain on experienced manpower in the theater. The frequent need to change the station of individuals and units had often delayed or impaired the development of teamwork and in some cases had adversely affected the morale of a unit. The rapid turnover in personnel had, furthermore, tended to break down mutually respectful relations among fellow workers and comrades and in the case of inexperienced replacements, had hindered the speedy development of desirable relations with their chiefs.

Certain corrective measures, General McNarney concluded, had been adopted to improve discipline and to punish offenders. Commanders of major organizations had been acquainted with proof of poor discipline and had been instructed to take prompt steps to remedy shortcomings. New training programs for troops had been devised, offering greater participation by enlisted men in varied tasks and setting new standards of soldierly achievement. Since a

high standard of off-duty conduct was always a mark of a well-disciplined organization, firm measures had been adopted to eliminate unofficial clubs and "hideouts." For those who felt the need of a balanced ratio of daily work and planned relaxation, there had been provided travel tours, athletic schedules, and educational opportunities. Troops had been warned that lawlessness and mistreatment of German civilians and officials would be punished promptly. Since the maintenance of law and order in the larger German communities was mainly the concern of the German police, it was planned to promote close liaison between military and civilian police in situations involving American personnel and the native population. To assist in the apprehension of habitual lawbreakers a "taps-check" was being instituted in the American Zone. More rigid controls of firearms were also being devised, with the aim of preventing accidents and discouraging the illegal use of weapons when off duty. Finally, expanded programs of German youth activities had been inaugurated with the purpose of encouraging harmony between U.S. forces and the youth of occupied Germany.

The following study traces the history of some aspects of the program for the improvement of discipline and morale from V-E Day to 30 June 1949.

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
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MAJOR CRIMES PER 10 000 TROOPS* 1945 - 1946



* FIGURES BASED ON CRIMES
INVESTIGATED BY CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS AGENTS,
OFFICE OF THE THEATER
PROVOST MARSHAL.

SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE THEATER PROVOST MARSHAL, REPORT OF OPERATIONS, 1 JAN-31 MAR 1946.

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CHAPTER I

Crime Rates

1. Crime in Relation to Morale and Discipline

A cardinal factor compelling the formulation of a broad program for the improvement of the discipline and morale of occupation personnel in the years covered by this study, 1945-49, was the grave crime rate in the first year of the period.

2. Crime Trends Immediately after V-J Day

Despite the sharp and continuing reduction in troop strength in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), brought about by mass redeployment following V-J Day, the number of crimes committed by U.S. military personnel in the theater failed to show any comparable decline. On the basis of the 31 March 1946 report of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) on the incidence of crime in ETO, it appeared that the rate per 10,000 troops of major crimes (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery, larceny, black market offenses, etc.) rose, in keeping with the accompanying chart (Chart 1), from 3.7 in August 1945 to 11.1 in January 1946.¹ January marked the peak of offenses committed between August 1945 and April 1946. Black market transgressions, larceny, and robbery headed the list of crimes deemed of major seriousness. After January there was a decrease in all offenses, with the exception of rape, to a point where the nadir was reached in March 1946.²

¹TSFET OTPM Rept of Opns, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, p. 58. CONFIDENTIAL.

²Ibid., p. 57.

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3. Comparison of Crime in Liberated and Occupied Territory

Until March 1946 U.S. personnel crime percentages for the occupied zones of Germany and Austria were lower than those for the liberated areas. In some months they were very much lower. Thus in September 1945 only 18.7 percent of the total crimes committed in the ETO were perpetrated in occupied territory.³ In January and February 1946 the relative total figures were more nearly equal, while in March 1946 the total number of crimes committed in the occupied zone exceeded for the first time that for the liberated areas:⁴

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Total</u>
Totals	<u>468</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>997</u>
Liberated area	246	175	62	483
Occupied zone	222	152	140	514

4. Crime in Occupied Territory

The number of crimes committed by all types of U.S. personnel in Germany and Austria during the last five months of 1945, though constituting a lower percentage of the total than that for the liberated area, showed small promise of significant decline. The crime rate for December was almost as high as that for August 1945:⁵

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Total offenses:	786	942	805	1,076	762

Offenses committed by U.S. military personnel alone in the same area varied as follows:⁶

<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>
88	122	212	255	246	222	152	140


³Ibid., 8 May - 30 Sep 45, I, A, p. 9. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴Ibid., 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, p. 59.

⁵Ibid., 1 Oct - 31 Dec 45, p. 14. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶Compiled from Ibid., Annex IV, Appendix F, Tabulation of Offenses Committed by U.S. Military Personnel in Occupational Area, Aug - Dec 45 (UNCLASSIFIED), and TSFET OTPM Rept of Opns, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, p. 59.

CHART OF STOLEN AND RECOVERED PROPERTY



MONTHLY SURVEY - STOLEN \$ 116,377.57 \$ 251,794.02 \$ 168,174.55 \$ 198,188.47 \$ 147,674.88 \$ 327,930.31 \$ 108,713.53 \$ 45,335.92
 RECOVERED \$ 92,404.85 \$ 176,720.90 \$ 146,500.04 \$ 165,656.71 \$ 113,519.62 \$ 201,857.11 \$ 127,499.74 \$ 82,449.57

SOURCE: Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, Report of Operations, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 1946.

Available figures show that the tendency was for the incidence of crime in occupied territory to increase in ratio to that for the liberated area.

5. Reasons for Increase of Crime in Occupied Territory

Among the plausible reasons suggested for the relative increase in crimes committed by U.S. personnel in Germany and Austria were: the continuing deactivation and closing of U.S. installations within liberated areas and consequent shifting of troop concentrations; greater speed in processing redeploying personnel through staging areas; the reduction of leave quotas to liberated areas; and a new willingness of Germans actually to report to authorities offenses by U.S. personnel against their persons or property.⁷

6. Pilferage

Juridically speaking, pilferage is normally a petty crime; but because in the first year of occupation it was widely practiced by U.S. personnel and their German confederates, it assumed an abnormal gravity. It often involved large quantities of supplies, entailing a substantial aggregate loss to the U.S. government. The general redeployment had not only jammed the railways, and especially the port areas, with troops, thereby increasing the normal danger to theater depot stocks in the vicinity; but it had also greatly reduced the strength of railway security units and had deprived the CID of needed trained personnel.⁸ The resulting inefficiency of preventive measures and of the operations of the CID invited numerous thefts. Likewise, the coming of winter with its hardships and privation probably drove many natives and displaced persons to burglary and theft, often in collusion with soldiers and U.S. civilians.⁹ The peak of the wave of pilferage was reached in the month of January when nearly \$330,000.00 worth of government property was stolen.¹⁰ This compared with the figure of \$198,188.47 for November, the beginning of the cold season.¹¹ By March, however, the low point in pilferage was reached for the eight months following 1 August 1945, when \$43,000.00 worth of property was

⁷Ibid., 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, p. 59.

⁸Ibid., 8 May - 30 Sep 45, Annex I, A, p. 7. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹Ibid., 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, p. 59.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 61.

¹¹Ibid., 1 Oct - 31 Dec 45, Supporting Documents, IV, Appendix F, Monthly Rept of CID, Nov. 1945. UNCLASSIFIED.

stolen and more than \$75,000.00 worth was recovered.¹² (Chart 2) Although thereafter the figures for stolen property remained until the end of June 1947 at a low level and a good portion of what was stolen was subsequently recovered, pilferage continued to occasion concern. This is evident from the following excerpt from the Provost Marshal's report for April - June 1946:¹³

The total in dollars of known pilferages discovered by the Railway Security amounted to approximately \$100,000.00 during the Second Quarter of 1946. While this figure represents in itself a great decrease from totals pilfered during the two previous quarters, it nonetheless demonstrates the critical need for intensified security measures. Due to the extensive black market throughout Europe with its insatiable demands for rare (on the European civilian market) items as well as to chronic and ubiquitous poverty, it is essential that every train carrying supplies "sensitive" to pilferage be heavily guarded.

7. Robbery, Homicide, and Black Marketing

During the cold weather months from November 1945 through February 1946 there was a sharp increase in robbery, homicide, and black marketing. (See Chart 1.) Robbery reached a peak during November 1945, and homicide in January 1946. Black market activities constituted an especially ubiquitous and pernicious type of crime because many U.S. personnel refused in the first place to admit that such dealings actually were criminal and because the offenders were commonly indifferent to the fact that the black market posed a grave threat to the standard of living of the native population. It is worth noting that, with the exception of September 1945, black market offenses led all others in number during the period from August 1945 to April 1946. Food, coffee, cigarettes, clothing, vehicles and gasoline, -- in fact every article that really was or was presumed to be in popular demand and scarce supply -- was pumped into the black market. The illicitly traded merchandise was naturally mainly American and comprised Army supplies, personal property and mailed packages. Items pilfered from U.S. trains soon reached the black market either directly or through devious channels. There was no lack of U.S. personnel and their native confederates who were tempted to this type of crime by large rewards of "easy money." No real success was achieved by the authorities until the German Railway Police was organized and placed

¹²TSFET OTPM Rept of Opns, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, p. 61.

¹³Ibid., 1 Apr - 30 Jun 46, p. 40.

at the disposal of the Railway Security Division as auxiliaries in guarding supplies. Then, the combination of these police, used as static guards in marshalling yards, and American troops, used both on trains and as static guards, led to a diminution of the volume of merchandise pouring into the black market and consequently to a reduction in the number of associated offenses.¹⁴ But as for really stamping out the black market, this seemed impossible to accomplish. In its December 1946 report the CID observed that the 'institution' appeared to be "here to stay," and that, judging by the concerted and unrestrained support it was getting, its complete eradication could not possibly be expected until more normal commercial relations had been established.¹⁵

8. Currency Violations

During the second and third quarters of 1946, the CID investigated some aspects of the incidence of currency violations among U.S. personnel. It was discovered that a larger number of currency offenses were committed by U.S. military and civilian personnel recently arrived in or returned to the ETO than by personnel who had been in the theater for some time.¹⁶ It was found that many new arrivals came to Europe carrying large sums of United States currency on their persons.¹⁷ Efforts were later made to orient personnel leaving the United States for Europe in matters of currency control and in practices that were deemed criminal and punishable at law. But the chaotic state of many European currencies long baffled the best efforts of the authorities to discourage illegal monetary operations.

9. Crimes against Persons

In the second half of 1946 a new trend in major crimes put in its appearance. Whereas hitherto the most common offenses, after black marketing, had been larceny and robbery, a steady rise in homicide and rape now brought these two into second and third places. Statistics compiled by the Serious Incidents and Statistics Section of the MP Intelligence Branch indicated that the number of

¹⁴Paragraph based on materials in TSFET OTPM Repts of Opns, May - Sep 45; Oct - Dec 45; Jan - Mar 46; Apr - Jun 46; Jul - Sep 46, Security Sections. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁵CID "Summary of Operations for the Quarter of April, May, June," dated 10 Jul 46. AG 319.1/3 PMG - CID.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷TSFET OTPM Rept of Opns, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 46, p. 39. CONFIDENTIAL.

crimes against persons had increased, while those against property had remained fairly constant. Disorders had also decreased considerably, but the number of "other incidents," principally vehicle accidents, had grown. These same tendencies continued throughout the following year up until June 1947, and particularly as respects the number of crimes committed against persons. In the January - March 1947 quarter, crimes against persons were more than double the figure of the preceding quarter in the case of white troops; in the case of Negroes they had well high quadrupled. In the following April - June quarter the rate decreased somewhat for the Negroes but increased for white troops. Rape cases made up a good proportion of these offenses. The following total figures on rape from V-E Day through June 1947 are of interest:¹⁸

<u>Period</u>	<u>White Troops</u>	<u>Negro Troops</u>
Total	<u>622</u>	<u>346</u>
May-June 1945	86	214
July-September 1945	63	46
October-December 1945	65	26
January-March 1946	31	8
April-June 1946	78	3
July-September 1946	101	16
October-December 1946	76	12
January-March 1947	44	8
April-June 1947	78	13

10. Negro Offenders


Only about 10 percent of all troops in the ETO were American Negroes, but the number of crimes of violent nature, such as murder and rape, committed by this minority in the first months of the occupation was disproportionately great. In the last half of 1946 there were numerous incidents involving Negro soldiers, particularly in and around the towns of Mannheim and Giessen where large numbers of them were stationed. These incidents included hold-ups, assault and battery, and rape. During the early part of 1947, as has been noted, the rate of crimes committed against persons by Negroes increased markedly, especially in cases involving assault, murder, stabbing, and the carrying of concealed weapons.¹⁹

¹⁸CID "Summary of Operations for the Quarter of April, May, June," dated 10 July 1946. AG 319.1/3 PMG - CID.

¹⁹Ibid.

SERIOUS INCIDENT RATES
RATE PER THOUSAND MEN- U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
AS REPORTED BY MAJOR COMMANDS, EUROPEAN THEATER

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MP INTELLIGENCE
 OTPM-USFET

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-1946-

SOURCE: SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS

11. Establishment of Field Contact Division

The high rate of misconduct on the part of Negro troops led to the establishment of the Field Contact Division under the Office of the Provost Marshal in March 1947. Lt. Col. Hyman Y. Chase, senior Negro officer in the theater, comprised the entire division and also acted as general liaison officer with Negro troops in the field for Headquarters, EUCOM. It was the mission of the Field Contact Division to promote improvement in the behavior of the EUCOM Negro soldier by means of a series of lecture-discussion tours on the part of the Field Contact Officer, Colonel Chase. The lecture-discussions had the aims of familiarizing enlisted men with the behavior and conduct of Negro troops throughout the command, ascertaining the causes of recent misbehavior and misconduct, and inculcating in each individual the desire to improve his own conduct and help keep his comrade under control.²⁰ The effectiveness of this program is shown by Chart 3.

12. Reduction in Crime Rate

After the high postwar figures, the crime rate among members of the occupation forces fell until it compared favorably with that for any large city in the United States. With the return of a more nearly normal atmosphere, and especially with the arrival of dependents in the theater, violent crimes committed by U.S. personnel decreased, and cases of moral turpitude were greatly reduced. Only black marketing continued on an impressive scale. Nevertheless, the serious crime rate during the first year of the occupation had one salutary result. It impelled the authorities to take vigorous action for the institution of an extensive and variegated program for improving discipline and morale. That program is described in some detail in the following pages.

²⁰EUCOM OTPM Rept of Opns, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47, pp. 123 - 24.

CHAPTER II

Operation of the Army Court-Martial System from V-E Day to the End of 1949

13. Status of the Court-Martial System at the End of the War

Ultimate sanction for the maintenance of discipline and morale in the armed forces was the court-martial system. In the main it had not greatly changed since 1928 when a new Manual for Courts-Martial had been published. Administration and operation of the system were supervised by the Military Justice Section of the Theater Judge Advocate who had over-all responsibility for the administration of military justice and for the prompt, uniform and efficient superintendence of disciplinary action.¹ Procedure and policy governing courts-martial on the eve of V-E Day were still based on the 1928 manual, the changes effected in it by Section III, War Department Bulletin 6, 10 April 1943 and by Circular 105, War Department (WD), 19 April 1943, besides other appropriate Army Regulations (AR) and the Articles of War (AW).²

14. The Restatement of June 1945

On 4 June 1945 a new circular pertaining to military justice was issued by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA).³ With the exception of the addition of annexes

¹See Articles of War 46 and 70; GO No. 43, Hq ETOUSA, par. 2; ETOUSA and USFET TJA, Rept of Opns, 4 Apr 42 - 30 Apr 46, pp. 2 - 3; Memo for Col Derrick, JAD, 12 Feb 51, sub: Functions of the Judge Advocate, EUCOM.

²Cir 76, Hq ETOUSA, 4 Jun 45, sub: Military Justice, p. 7. In ETOUSA and USFET TJA, Rept of Opns, 4 Apr 42 - 30 Apr 46, App. II - E.

³Cir 76, Hq ETOUSA.

relating to military justice in the liberated and occupied countries, this was in large part merely a restatement of the essential provisions of the 1928 manual and of Circulars 72 (9 September 1943) and 105. No fundamental changes in the court-martial system resulted from this directive.⁴ What revisions, consolidations or insertions were made in the new circular were introduced at the behest of the theater judge advocate. Circular 76 reiterated the desirability of inflicting prompt company punishment under AW 104 for minor offenses so as to avoid excessive numbers of court-martial trials, and directed that where charges had to be preferred they should be "referred to the lowest court-martial capable of imposing suitable punishment with the greatest economy of court personnel." Economy in the number of courts was recommended, as was also efficiency in trial proceedings and prompt disposition of cases. It was specifically stated that "unnecessary delays in investigating or carrying any case to final conclusion will not be tolerated." The circular restated the regulations and law, as they had long existed throughout the Army, relative to the introduction and custody of evidence, types of cases referable to general courts-martial, functions of courts, and proceedings. In connection with offenses committed within the European Theater, it was advised that while sentences of convicted persons should be appropriate to the offense, consideration should be given "to the times and to the fact that these forces are in an actual theater of operations on foreign soil...." Assurances were given that all offenses alleged to have been committed by occupation personnel or members of the European Command either in an occupied or liberated country would be promptly investigated for appropriate action. Likewise, to ensure the success of the mission of the U.S. forces in Europe, if not to encourage the respect of liberated and ex-enemy peoples, members of the European Command were exhorted to aid indigenous civil authorities in connection with coroners' inquests and prosecutions before civil and service courts whenever the evidence of any member of the command was solicited. Where offenses had been committed against the peace and tranquility of a European civil community, trials were to be held in open court and, if possible and not prejudicial to U.S. security, in the immediate vicinity of the alleged offense.

15. Sentences of Courts-Martial

It had long been the policy of the Army to hold confinements for strictly military offenses to a minimum, for obvious reasons of

⁴See p. 1, Rev of draft of this MS, attached to IRS, JA Div to C/Hist Div, 21 Feb 51, sub: Hist MS, "Morale and Discipline, etc." SECRET.

economy of manpower.⁵ In cases where forfeiture of pay was ordered by a court, this did not affect Class "F" deductions, except in cases of dishonorable discharge with forfeiture of all pay and allowances.⁶ Sentences to confinement not involving dishonorable discharge were normally accompanied by partial forfeiture of pay for the same number of months. Army personnel were not entitled to the extra pay for foreign service while in confinement. Civilians who were subject to the Articles of War were ordinarily sentenced to fines payable at a future date or in installments. The sentence usually provided for a period of confinement at hard labor if the fine was not paid.⁷

16. Pre-Trial Confinement Period

Failure to try promptly cases of individuals held in restraint would have made the Army vulnerable to the criticism that its system of court-martial deprived U.S. citizens of elementary civil rights. Criticisms of this nature could not have failed adversely to affect the morale of enlisted men. Consequently the theater commander and the theater judge advocate were vitally concerned with reducing the period of pretrial confinement of prisoners held by the various commands exercising general court-martial jurisdiction.

The unduly long period of pretrial confinement pending the hearing of court-martial cases was the subject of a conference on 15 September 1945 between representatives of the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, Theater Service Forces, European Theater (TSFET), the G - 1 Divisions of TSFET and U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), and the theater judge advocate's office. It was decided to request all major subordinate commands to inform the theater judge advocate of the names of all men confined for fifteen days without charges or for thirty days without trial. The provost marshal obtained similar information from the base sections. Results of the consolidated reports submitted on 25 September 1945 to the commanding general of theater headquarters indicated a generally unsatisfactory situation in regard to length of pretrial confinement.⁸

Two factors were largely responsible for the delay in bringing prisoners to trial: (1) the critical shortage of qualified

⁵USFET, Rept of the Gen Bd, Study No. 84, sub: The Military Offender in the Theater of Operations. File 250/2.

⁶AR 35 - 5540, 5 Jan 44, par. 38.

⁷Cir 76, pp. 4 - 5.

⁸Memo, TSFET OTPM, 24 Jan 46, sub: Excessive Pre-Trial Confinement.

personnel in staff judge advocate offices of the commands, which resulted from redeployment and the reduction in the occupational troop basis; and (2) the many difficulties encountered in securing service records and other essential data on accused persons who were apprehended only after the inactivation or return to the United States of their units. Notwithstanding those unavoidable difficulties, however, marked improvement was made in reducing the length of pretrial confinement. The following tabulation lists the number of persons held for eight or more days without charges and twenty or more days without trial, by each of the major commands as of 1 October 1946 and 1 March 1947.⁹

<u>Command</u>	<u>Persons Confined on</u> <u>1 October 1946</u>		<u>Persons Confined on</u> <u>1 March 1947</u>	
	<u>8 days</u> <u>w/o chgs</u>	<u>20 days</u> <u>w/o trial</u>	<u>8 days</u> <u>w/o chgs</u>	<u>20 days</u> <u>w/o trial</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>270</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>45</u>
Berlin Command, OMGUS	0	13	0	27
Continental Base				
Section.....	40	91	0	4
European Division ATC	0	2	0	1
Headquarters Command,				
EUCOM.....	1	3	3	3
Third U.S. Army Area.	3	58	-	-
U.S. Air Forces in				
Europe.....	2	24	0	1
U.S. Forces Austria..	1	19	0	0
Western Base Section.	21	41	0	3
1st Military District	-	-)	8	22
2d Military District.	-	-)		

17. Preparation of the Defense

Although the pretrial period was often inordinately long, dissatisfaction was also voiced occasionally over the shortage of time allotted to the accused in which to prepare his defense. To meet this criticism, theater headquarters on 31 May 1945 directed all officers exercising general court-martial jurisdiction to appoint only competent defense counsel and to permit them a minimum of at least five days in which to prepare their cases

⁹(1) USFET OTJA Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 46. (2)
EUCOM OTJA Rept of Opns, 1 Jan 31 - Mar 47.

adequately.¹⁰ In instances in which military necessity required trial by court-martial in less than five days after the serving of charges, the reasons for the undue haste were to be included in the record of trial. The theater judge advocate disapproved sentences of death and ordered a rehearing of the cases reviewed under Article of War 48 whenever it appeared possible that the accused had been denied proper counsel or whenever charges were filed less than five days prior to the court-martial.¹¹

18. Transfers Awaiting Court-Martial

Upon the deactivation or redeployment of their units, prisoners charged with desertion or absence without leave were transferred to a reinforcement depot for confinement in the depot stockade. To ascertain whether enough evidence could be produced to justify trial by court-martial, all records available at the depot, including the individual's record of interview, were searched for information. If sufficient evidence was obtained, the court-martial was convoked as quickly as possible, as regulations provided that the confinement period of such prisoners should not exceed twelve days without extenuating circumstances. If sufficient evidence upon which to base a trial was not located within the time limit imposed, the prisoner was released and processed at the reinforcement depot for reassignment in the theater.¹²

19. Use of Evidence

Requests for evidence required in court-martial proceedings were sent by the fastest means available direct to the furnishing authority instead of through regular Army channels. The first person to receive an item of tangible evidence connected with an alleged offense was required to mark it for future identification. Thereafter, the evidence was handled by as few persons as possible, each of whom presented a receipt upon taking custody of an evidential item. When a member of the command was charged with an offense against a person outside Army jurisdiction, the civil authorities kept custody of tangible evidence connected with the case, surrendering it only to the trial judge advocate¹³ who prepared the

¹⁰Cable EX 51620, ETOUSA sgd Eisenhower to maj comds, 31 May 45. In USFET SGS file No. 250.4 (1945), Vol. I, sub: Courts-Martial.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²USFET Cir 155, 17 Nov 45, Sec. VII.

¹³The trial judge advocate is an officer appointed for each general or special court-martial who prosecutes in the name of the United States and, under the direction of the court, prepares the record of its proceedings (SR 320-5-1, August 1950, p. 245).

court-martial trial. Articles used as evidence against persons not of the command, but which were in the possession of members of the command, were delivered either to the local civil police authorities or to the officer in charge of civil affairs.¹⁴

20. Morning Reports as Documentary Evidence

Many trial judge advocates encountered procedural difficulties in introducing extract copies of morning reports as documentary evidence. The three principal factors responsible for the problems were: (1) the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the person who signed the document of the facts set forth therein; (2) defective preparation of the original copy of the morning report; and (3) improper preparation and authentication of extracts from the same. To rectify the difficulties, the General Board, USFET, in its study devoted to military justice recommended that a board of officers be appointed to study the problem and propose that the rules governing the admissibility of documentary evidence be liberalized.¹⁵

21. Certified Vital Records as Evidence

Both trial judge advocates and defense counsel occasionally required the use of documents or records such as birth certificates of foreign governments to prove various points in their cases. A federal law required the authentication of such a document by its custodian as well as the certificate of a resident consular officer that the authenticating agent was in fact the lawful custodian of the document. The board of review in the branch office of the Judge Advocate General held that the statute requiring authentication of records was applicable to court-martial trials, and that records lacking the certificate of a U.S. consul were consequently inadmissible as evidence. In many cases tried in the European theater it proved difficult for military counsel to obtain the required certification.¹⁶

22. Trial Jurisdiction in Great Britain

Shortly after the arrival of American troops in the United Kingdom the matter of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers

¹⁴ETOUSA Cir 76.

¹⁵USFET, Rept of the General Board, Study No. 83, sub: Military Justice Administration in Theater of Operations, pp. 56 - 57. JA Sec File 250/1. Under AW 38 only the President can promulgate rules of evidence.

¹⁶Ibid.

became an issue between the United States and the United Kingdom. The British rejected the American view that the United States alone had jurisdiction over its forces operating on the soil of a friendly and allied power. However, negotiations were inaugurated which resulted in 1942 in agreement between the two powers on the draft of an act of parliament applicable to the problem at issue. It was agreed: (1) that reciprocal rights would be granted to the British whenever their forces should be stationed in sufficient numbers in the United States; (2) that the Articles of War provided sufficiently for civil as well as military offenses; (3) that sentences imposed by American trials by court-martial would be as severe as those adjudged by British civil courts of law; (4) that U.S. troops punished for offenses counter to the British civil code would be tried in open court near the situs of the offense; and (5) that provision would be made for the collection and preservation of evidential material.¹⁷ On 6 August, the United States having agreed in effect to waive jurisdiction in certain instances in favor of the United Kingdom, the "Visiting Forces Act" passed Parliament and became law.¹⁸ In effect the act ousted the criminal jurisdiction of British courts over members of the military or naval forces of the United States, except where the U.S. Government specifically requested British intervention. This was done only twice during the entire time the U.S. Army was stationed in the United Kingdom.¹⁹ On the other hand, British citizens accused of torts or crimes, who were employed by the U.S. armed forces in England, although technically subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army or Navy and to the Articles of War by the act of Parliament of 6 August 1942, were, in practice, specifically excepted from the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the said act and were commonly tried by British courts.²⁰

23. Redeployment and its Effects on Respective Jurisdiction

On 25 October 1945, the theater commander expressed concern lest the rapid rate of redeployment of U.S. troops from English

¹⁷ETOUSA and USFET TJA, Rept of Opns, 4 Apr 42 - 3 Apr 46, p. 6. SECRET.

¹⁸UK, Act of Parliament, "United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942," 5 & 6 Geo. 6, CH 31, 6 Aug 42. In ibid, annex II-B.

¹⁹In the cases of Sgt. Peters and Pvt. Hulten. See USFET, Rept of the General Board, Study No. 83, sub: Military Justice Administration in Theater of Operations, p. 53. JA Sec File 250/1.

²⁰See p. 2, Review of draft of this MS, attached to IRS, JA Div to G/Hist Div, 21 Feb 51, sub: Hist MS, "Morale and Discipline, etc." SECRET.

soil might lead the British to repeal the Visiting Forces Act. He therefore suggested to the American ambassador, John G. Winant, that steps be taken to prevent the unilateral termination of the agreement by either the United States or the British Government.²¹ The ambassador stated on 13 November 1945 that the British would not undertake such a move without prior consultation with the United States Government.²² In order to comply with provisions of the Visiting Forces Act, a detachment of military police was stationed in London to receive from the British authorities any American servicemen who were accused of breaking the British civil code. Such persons were sent to the theater for trial by Army court-martial. By the end of 1946, the number of troops in the United Kingdom had decreased to such a point that the Military Police Detachment was sending to the Continent an average of only four offenders a week.²³

24. Trial Jurisdiction in France

The U.S. Army also enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over its troops which were stationed in France, as the result of an agreement between the United States and British Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation.²⁴ That agreement, relating to administrative matters, provided that the Allied service authorities would have sole jurisdiction over the members of their respective forces and civilian nationals employed by the latter. The French police were authorized to arrest Allied troops for offenses against the French civil law and to detain them until they were taken into custody by the appropriate Allied service authority. The certificate of an Allied officer of field rank sufficed to establish the identity of a member of his forces. Allied military authorities notified the French of any action taken against members of the Allied forces who were charged with offenses against persons under French jurisdiction.²⁵

²¹Ltr, ETOUSA, Gen D. D. Eisenhower to His Excellency the Hon J. G. Winant, 25 Oct 45.

²²Ltr, J. G. Winant to General of the Army D. D. Eisenhower, 13 Nov 45.

²³USFET, Theater Comdr's Wkly Staff Conf No. 52, 17 Dec 46, Sec. VIII.

²⁴Annex "A," to Memo No. 1 relating to Administrative and Jurisdictional Questions (Agreement between the United States and British Govts and French Committee of National Liberation), undated. For copy see Appendix II-D of the Report of the Theater Judge Advocate, ETOUSA and USFET, 4 Apr 42 - 30 Apr 46, p. 28.

²⁵Ibid.

25. Procedures Applicable to all Liberated Countries

The circular of 4 June 1945 also outlined court-martial procedures in liberated countries in the European theater.²⁶ U.S. military authorities were directed promptly to investigate all offenses allegedly committed by members of the command, which were brought to their attention by law enforcement agencies of the countries concerned. The officer in charge of civil affairs usually aided the ensuing investigation by obtaining the necessary information and statements either from the local civil officials or from commanders of Allied forces. When practicable, court-martial trials for disturbing the peace and quiet of a community were held in open court, as in England, near the scene of the offense. It was the practice for the appointing authority to notify by letter the civilian agencies and others directly concerned of the results of courts-martial for offenses against the peace and quiet of a community or against persons who were not members of the U.S. military or naval commands.²⁷

26. Offenses Against Foreign Nationals

On 9 April 1946, the War Department directed the theater commander to supply information on all trials by general or special court-martial involving persons under Army jurisdiction who were charged with committing offenses against foreign nationals or agencies of foreign governments. In making the request, the War Department explained that inaccurate accounts in the foreign press of the procedure and results of U.S. military courts-martial presented distorted facts and unfavorable impressions in foreign countries, thus necessitating the issuance of official statements of United States and War Department policy to the government and people concerned. The letter further read:²⁸

The responsibility for stating correctly and without delay the official views of the War Department in such cases falls upon the diplomatically accredited representative of the War Department in those countries. The lack of the necessary factual information required to make a statement of position at such times has been detrimental to the best interests of the United States and the high plane of its international relations.

²⁶ETOUSA Cir 76, Annex B.

²⁷ETOUSA SOP No. 35, 16 Jul 44, Sec. II, par. 6.

²⁸Ltr, TAG, 9 Apr 46, sub: Courts-Martial Involving Offenses Against Foreign Nationals by Personnel Under Jurisdiction of U.S. Army. AGAO-S-B-M 250 - 4 (5 Apr 46).

27. Implementation of WD Directive of 9 April 1946

In implementing the directive, the theater commander requested all officers having general or special court-martial jurisdiction in each of the major commands to supply Headquarters, USFET, with the following information on each trial by general or special court-martial involving offenses against foreign nationals: (1) name and serial number of the accused; (2) location of the alleged offense; (3) nature of the charges and specifications; and (4) type of court-martial invoked (special or general).²⁹ On 17 July 1946, the theater commander was requested to forward the information on such courts-martial to the military attache or attaches involved, concurrently with the notification to the War Department, and to provide the attache with any additional information he might request on a specific trial.³⁰

28. Instruction on the Court-Martial System

At the weekly staff meeting of the theater commander on 10 December 1946, Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, Chief of Staff, declared that a number of persons, many of them ill-informed, had attacked the Army court-martial system in somewhat sensational publicity stories. General Huebner added that all members of the command should be well informed on the modus operandi of the court-martial system in order to be able to refute such criticism. He considered that confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the system was an important factor in the morale of enlisted men of the command, and they should therefore be fully informed regarding the functioning of courts-martial.

29. Trial Procedure

Except for photographers, cartoonists, and other illustrators, newspaper correspondents were admitted to all court-martial trials which were held in open court. Special provisions were made even for attendance by representatives of the press who were not accredited to theater headquarters. In no instance, however, was it permitted to take pictures or make drawings of the scene of the trial or of persons in any way involved in it. The president of the court warned all persons attending in any capacity a closed session of a court-martial that they were forbidden to disclose to unauthorized persons any information whatever on the proceedings. The fact that

²⁹USFET 1st Ind, 20 May 46, to WD ltr, sub: as above. AG 250.4 GAP - AGPB (9 Apr 46).

³⁰Ltr, TAG, 17 Jul 46, sub: as above. AGAO-S-B-M 250.4 (16 Jul 46).

the warning was made was included in the official record of the trial. Courts-martial were held in closed session when the defendant was charged under Article of War 66 or when he was charged with mutinous or seditious conduct under another Article of War.³¹ Unless for some reason a higher classification was required, all records of court-martial cases and their accompanying documents were classified as restricted.

30. Payment of German Participants

Regulations providing for the payment of German civilian witnesses at U.S. Army court-martial cases in the European Command were prescribed on 18 April 1947.³² German witnesses not employed by the Army, by military government, or by German authorities were compensated at the rate of five Reichsmarks (RM) for each half day or part thereof which they spent in attendance at the trial or en route to or from the court. Unless transportation was furnished by the Army, witnesses were paid ten Reichspfennigs for each kilometer traveled to and from their residences to the situs of the hearing. If the distance prohibited a witness from returning home during the course of the trial and if subsistence and lodging were not furnished, he was granted a subsistence allowance of seven RM lodging and ten RM for food for each day he spent at court or in travel. Considered as direct employees of the U.S. Army during attendance at the trials, German witnesses were supplied the same midday meals as were given to working prisoners-of-war. Army units were authorized to provide them, without surrender of ration points, sandwich meals from U.S. stocks for consumption on their home journeys. German civilian witnesses who were employed by the Army, military government, or German authorities were normally granted only subsistence, lodging, and mileage. But those classified as "expert witnesses" were paid at twice the regular rate. The trial judge advocate of the general or special court-martial or the summary court officer prepared and authenticated a certificate containing an itemized statement of the amount due to German civilians who appeared at the trial. A qualified purchasing and contracting officer then issued a requisition receipt form in order to effect payment.³³

31. Distribution of General Court-Martial Orders

On 5 October 1945, Headquarters, USFET, complained that the

³¹Cir 76, 4 Jun 45, pp. 2 - 3. In ETOUSA and USFET TJA, Rept of Opns, 4 Apr 42 - 3 Apr 46, Appendix II-E.

³²EUCOM Cir 18, 18 Apr 47, Sec. II.

³³Ibid.

slowness of delivery of copies of general court-martial orders to the place of confinement was unduly delaying the release of prisoners whose sentences had been disapproved or remitted.³⁴ Convening authorities were therefore instructed to keep theater headquarters informed as to location of prisoners whom they had tried but whose court-martial orders had not yet been published. Also, commanders exercising general court-martial jurisdiction were advised to insure the prompt and accurate distribution of court-martial orders. The publishing headquarters was requested to send seven copies of general court-martial orders to the prisoner's place of confinement. In addition, regulations provided that the commanding officer of the place of confinement should be notified by teletype or other means of rapid communication of the publication of orders suspending execution of a sentence or restoring a prisoner to duty.³⁵

32. Continued Delay in Executing General Court-Martial Orders

In spite of instructions issued by theater headquarters, delay continued to occur in executing general court-martial orders, inasmuch as these were tardily received by commanding officers of the prisoners concerned. Accordingly, the Confinement and Rehabilitation Division, established in the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal in June 1945, cabled all commanders having general court-martial jurisdiction to furnish the division with the names of the men of their command who were being confined without orders and to forward them immediately upon publication. Although many court-martial orders were received in compliance with this request, approximately one thousand men were still being improperly confined as of 1 July 1945 at disciplinary training centers throughout the theater. The theater provost marshal endeavored to find a remedy for this state of affairs by suggesting on 26 September 1945 that no general prisoners be accepted without orders at the disciplinary training centers, but this solution was rejected as impracticable by the G - 1 Divisions of USFET and TSFET.³⁶ Thereupon, theater headquarters on 20 January 1946 repeated its enjoiner that general court-martial orders be sent promptly to the training centers. Commanders of prisoners in question were again directed to notify commanding officers of the places of confinement whenever

³⁴USFET ltr, 5 Oct 45, sub: Distribution of General Court-Martial Orders. AG - 250.4 GAP - AGO.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Memo, TSFET OTPM, 25 Jan 46, sub: Non-Delivery of General Court-Martial Orders.

orders had been issued for the release of said prisoners and to ascertain whether, in fact, the orders had been received and acted upon.³⁷

33. Sentences of Officers

An oft-repeated criticism of the court-martial system was that it punished officers less severely than enlisted men for the same or similar offenses. As announced on 18 May 1945, War Department policy on uniformity of sentences passed by courts-martial contained the following statement:

Marked disparity in general court-martial sentences similar in nature, unless justified by factors individually peculiar, is highly undesirable. Such disparity within a single judicial system tends to discredit it and is not clear. Unduly severe sentence not only fails to accomplish the desired deterrent effect and accordingly serves no useful purpose, but subjects those charged with the administration of military justice to severe public criticism.³⁸

The War Department recommended that company officers should not be tried by general courts-martial if disciplinary punishment could be effected under Article of War 104, and that standards of punishment used in sentencing servicemen to confinement were equally applicable in sentencing officers.

A study of court-martial orders which were published in the European theater during 1945 indicates that sentences adjudged against officers were somewhat more lenient than those against enlisted men. In 30 percent of the 185 sentences against officers imposed before 3 October 1945 and confirmed under Article of War 48, the theater commander manifested disapproval of the sentence as being too light. Sentences involving officers did not come to the attention of the theater commander unless they were severe enough to require confirmation; hence no figures are available on the frequency of inadequate sentences imposed for smaller offenses.³⁹

³⁷USFET ltr, 26 Jan 46, sub: Distribution of General Court-Martial Orders. AG 250.4 GAP - AGO.

³⁸WD ltr, 18 May 45, sub: Uniformity of Sentences Adjudged by General Courts-Martial. AG 250.4 (16 May 45) OB-S-USW-N.

³⁹USFET, Report of the General Board, Study No. 83, sub: Military Justice Administration in Theater of Operations. File 250/1.

34. Death Sentences

Fear of imposition of the ultimate penalty, death, probably restrained a certain number of personnel of the European Command from committing high crimes. But inasmuch as there were only two executions in the command since V-E Day,⁴⁰ a lengthy recital of the procedure for executions would have little value for an appreciation of problems of morale and discipline. A few facts will suffice. Courts-martial imposing sentence of death had the power to prescribe whether it would be by hanging or shooting. The time and place of execution were designated in general court-martial orders, issued by theater headquarters. No newspaper men or photographers were admitted to the premises, but at least five witnesses were required to attend each execution. A general court-martial authority passing sentence might, if he deemed it advisable, direct that for disciplinary reasons members of the unit and command of the condemned man witness the execution.⁴¹

35. Reduction of Excessive Sentences

Following V-E Day it was the policy of the War Department not to consider for clemency the court-martial sentences of offenders from overseas theaters because it was felt that the various theater commanders could best deal with the special disciplinary problems which they encountered in their respective areas of command. On 15 May 1945 Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, pointed out that the policy of the War Department made it especially important for prisoners to be returned from the European theater with sentences appropriate to the offense. He queried: "Is it not true that in many cases severe sentences, which were required for their deterrent effect upon other members of the command, should now be reconsidered in the interests of justice to the individual concerned, and that such action now would not affect discipline?"⁴² The theater commander stated in his reply that a total of 10,289 general prisoners had been sentenced in the theater to confinement for a term of six months or more. Of that number 2,807 men had been evacuated to the United States. Released from confinement for restoration to active duty in the theater were an additional 2,335

⁴⁰C/n 2 (e), Actg JA to Hist Div, 21 Feb 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs JA and Med Divs, 21 Feb 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-49." SECRET.

⁴¹ETOUSA SOP 54, 14 Dec 44, sub: Execution of Death Sentences Imposed by Courts-Martial.

⁴²Ltr, Under Secy of War, R. P. Patterson to Gen D. D. Eisenhower, Supreme Condr, ETOUSA, 15 May 45.

prisoners, of whom fifty-four proved to be recidivists. The remaining 5,147 general prisoners in the command were screened to determine whether they should be restored to duty in the theater or returned to the United States.⁴³

36. Powers of the Theater Commander

Until 19 January 1946, the theater commander exercised the powers vested in a "commanding general of an Army in the field"⁴⁴ in confirming and ordering the execution of certain sentences to dismissal or death adjudged by court-martial. Conferred only in wartime under Articles of War 48 and 49, those extraordinary powers enabled the theater commander to approve sentences to dismissal from the service of officers below the rank of brigadier general, and sentences to death for murder, rape, mutiny, desertion, and espionage. The President of the United States had granted those powers originally to the commanding general, United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) on 9 June 1942. The latter's successors had continued to exercise those rights until their revocation in January 1946.⁴⁵

37. Final Review of Records of Trial

Records of trial were exhaustively studied in the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate whenever the case involved a sentence of death or dismissal. A comprehensive and painstaking analysis of the evidence and legal problems presented by the records of trial was then taken personally by the judge advocate to the theater commander. Alternate forms of action were presented to the commander. After the latter had taken action in the case but before any sentence was executed, the board of review was required to examine the trial record as stipulated by Article of War 50 1/2 to determine whether the findings were legally sufficient to support the theater commander's sentence. If the board decided in the affirmative, the theater commander was then empowered to order execution of the sentence.⁴⁶

⁴³Ltr, Gen D. D. Eisenhower, CG ETOUSA, to the Hon R. P. Patterson, WD.

⁴⁴WD ltr, 9 Jun 42, sub: Powers with Reference to General Courts-Martial. WD 250.4 (5-27-42) MS.

⁴⁵ETOUSA and USFET TJA, Rept of Opns, 4 Apr 42 - 3 Apr 46, p. 34. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 34.

38. General Court-Martial Jurisdictions under EUCOM

Throughout the period under review the theater commander retained the right to appoint general courts-martial, a power that was also exercised by commanders under him. At the peak of operations, 115 separate general court-martial jurisdictions were functioning in the European theater, most of them without precise geographic definition. With the cessation of fighting, the number of jurisdictions did not decrease as rapidly as might be supposed. As of 6 June 1945 there were still more than one hundred general court-martial jurisdictions in the theater.⁴⁷ By 1 July 1947 general court-martial jurisdictions under EUCOM included the theater command and the commanding generals of the following: the First Military District, Headquarters Command EUCOM, Berlin Command, the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, the U.S. Constabulary (who also headed the Second Military District), the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, the European Air Materiel Command, the XII Tactical Air Command, the European Air Transport Command, the U.S. Forces in Austria, and the Zone Command of Austria.⁴⁸

39. Review of Trial Records

The Military Justice Section of the Operations Branch in the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate, USFET, examined those records of trial by court-martial, which, in accordance with Article of War 48, were forwarded for action by the theater commander as ultimate confirming authority. During the five months from V-E Day to 30 September 1945, the trial records of 330 courts-martial were submitted for such examination to the Office of the Theater Judge Advocate, a figure that accounted for 44 percent of the total number of records of trial received for this purpose since the activation of the European theater.⁴⁹ These 330 cases, however, represented only a small portion of the total general court-martial cases tried during those months, all of which were subject to review.⁵⁰ During the last three months of 1945, forty-four court-martial trials were reviewed by the theater judge advocate prior to final action by the theater commander. In the same period the

⁴⁷Ltr, Gen D. D. Eisenhower to Under Secy of War Robert P. Patterson, 6 Jun 45.

⁴⁸See p. 3, Review of draft of this MS, attached to IRS, JA Div to C/Hist Div, 21 Feb 51, sub: Hist MS, "Morale and Discipline, etc." SECRET.

⁴⁹USFET OTJA, Rept of Opns, 8 May 45 - 30 Sep 45, p. 3.

⁵⁰See p. 3, Review of draft of this MS, attached to IRS, JA Div to C/Hist Div, 21 Feb 51, sub: Hist MS, "Morale and Discipline, etc." SECRET.

branch office of The Judge Advocate General with USFET received ninety records of court-martial trials pursuant to Article of War 50 1/2 after action by the theater commander. The branch office found twenty-nine records of trial to be legally insufficient to support the findings of guilt.⁵¹

40. Revocation of Theater Commander's Power to Confirm Sentences of Death and Dismissal

On 19 January 1946 the President of the United States withdrew the power of the theater commander to confirm sentences of death and dismissal from the service, which the latter had exercised under Article of War 48; related powers under Article of War 49 and 50 were also revoked. From 1 January to 19 January 1946 the theater judge advocate examined sixteen cases involving sentences of death or dismissal from the service for action by the theater commander under Article of War 48. The revocation of the confirmatory powers of the theater commander resulted in the publication of numerous general court-martial orders by the War Department regarding persons tried in the theater.⁵²

41. The Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General

a. The authority to establish a branch office of The Judge Advocate General and boards of review was provided in the last paragraph of Article of War 50 1/2 which also stated the functions of those agencies:

Whenever the President deems such action necessary, he may direct The Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, with any distant command, and to establish in such a branch office a board of review, or more than one. Such Assistant Judge Advocate General and such board or boards of review shall be empowered to perform for that command, under the general supervision of The Judge Advocate General, the duties which The Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President.⁵³

⁵¹USFET OTJA, Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 45, p. 1.

⁵²Ibid., 1 Jan - 30 Mar 46, p. 1.

⁵³Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, rev ed, 1 Apr 1928.

Pursuant to that paragraph President F. D. Roosevelt as early as 14 April 1942 had instructed the Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office and a board of review with the U. S. Army Forces in the British Isles to examine all general court-martial records which did not require presidential confirmation.⁵⁴ Accordingly, Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer, The Judge Advocate General, had established the branch office and first board of review in England on 22 May 1942 under Brig. Gen. Lawrence H. Hedrick as Assistant Judge Advocate General. Three officers of the The Judge Advocate General's Department had been detailed to the branch office; three more were assigned to the board of review.⁵⁵ The branch office had started functioning on 18 July 1942;⁵⁶ thereafter it operated continuously until February 1946.⁵⁷ Functions of the office and its board of review were to examine and review the record of trial in all general court-martial cases in the European theater except when confirmation was required by the theater commander. Before the execution of any sentence to death, penitentiary confinement, unsuspended discharge, or dismissal from the service, the assistant judge advocate general in charge of the branch office reviewed the court-martial record of trial.⁵⁸

b. Originally located at Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, in England, the branch office employed a staff of seven officers. On 9 November 1942 the authority of the office and its board of review was defined to include all commands of the U.S. Army forces in the European theater of operations.⁵⁹ On 16 October 1944, the branch office moved from England to Paris, France. A second move on 8 July 1945 brought it to the Parc de Monretout at St. Cloud, France, about five miles from its former location. Assigned to the office and board on V-E Day were thirty-six U.S. Army officers and thirty-seven enlisted men, or a total of seventy-three military personnel.

⁵⁴Ltr, President F. D. Roosevelt to the Hon Henry L. Stimson, Secy of War, 14 Apr 42.

⁵⁵(1) WD Orders No. 96, 22 May 42. (2) ETOUSA BOTJAG, Order No. 1, 18 Jul 42.

⁵⁶ETOUSA GO No. 18, 18 Jul 42, sub: Branch Office of the Judge Advocate General.

⁵⁷WD cable UCL - 44525, 7 Feb 46.

⁵⁸Memo, WD JAGO for All Judge Advocates with US Army Forces in the European Theater of Operations, 1 Jul 42, sub: Establishment of Branch of The Judge Advocate General's Office in European Theater. File SPJGE.

⁵⁹Ltr, H. L. Stimson, Secy of War to CG, US Army Forces, ETO, 9 Nov 42, sub: Commands for Which Asst Judge Advocate General and Board of Review in the Branch of the JAG's Office, British Isles, are Empowered to Act.

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On 29 June 1943 Brig. Gen. Edwin C. McNeil had succeeded General Hedrick as assistant judge advocate general in charge of the branch office.⁶⁰

42. Establishment of Additional Boards of Review

A second board of review composed of three officers was established in the branch office of The Judge Advocate General with the ETO on 14 July 1944. Almost a year later, on 15 March 1945, the third board of review was created, also comprised of three members. Effective 9 June 1945, The Judge Advocate General instituted board of review No. 4, ETO.⁶¹ A fifth board of review was formed on 21 August 1945, with Lt. Col. John W. Hill as chairman and Maj. Joe L. Evins and Maj. Anthony Julian as members. Currently the position of Coordinator of the Boards of Review was established in the branch office, Col. Franklin Riter being appointed to that position.⁶² It was the function of the coordinator to integrate the decisions and perspectives of the five boards in order that their holdings be consistent. Under the chairmanship of the coordinator, members of the five boards held joint meetings weekly, at which time decisions were discussed and related to precedents in civil as well as military law. The coordinator of the boards also reviewed salient opinions, conducted research, correlated the work of the boards and conferred with individual members on difficult points of jurisprudence. Together with dissenting opinions, all decisions of the board were filed in the branch office library after having been submitted to the assistant judge advocate general.

43. Results of the Court-Martial Reviews

A study of the number and type of trials by general courts-martial reviewed by the branch office affords an understanding of the discipline problem posed by troops in the European theater. Lesser offenses punished by company action under Article of War 104, by summary and special courts-martial, and, in the case of officers, by reclassification proceedings are not included. Before its deactivation on 15 February 1946, the branch office reviewed 19,401 records of trial by general court-martial, of which 17,985 were completed after V-E Day. The 22,214 persons tried before the 19,401 courts-martial represented about .53 of 1 percent of the approximately 4,182,266 persons in the European theater who were subject

⁶⁰Orders No. 115, WD JAGD, 9 Jun 43.

⁶¹BOTJAG with ET, Orders No. 100, 9 Jun 45.

⁶²BOTJAG with ET, Orders No. 175, 21 Aug 45.

Table 1 -- Disposition of Cases Involving Death Sentences Received
by the Theater Judge Advocate under Article of War 48

9 June 1942 - 19 January 1946

<u>Offenses</u>	<u>No. Cases</u>	<u>No. Persons</u>		<u>Executed</u>		<u>Awaiting Execution</u>		<u>Confirmed in BOTJAG</u>		<u>Committed</u>		<u>Other Disp</u>		<u>Under Review</u>	
		*	**	*	**	*	**	*	**	*	**	*	**	*	**
Totals	385	454		70		8		0		319		44		13	
		263	191	16	54	1	7	0	0	209	110	29	15	6	7
Rape	114a	58	99	4	25	0	1	0	0	42	58	11	10	2	4
Murder	93b	38	62	11	29	1	6	0	0	20	23	3	4	0	3
AW 86. . . .	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
AW 75. . . .	28c	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	0	5	0	0	0
AW 66. . . .	1d	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0
AW 64. . . .	34e	28	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	7	1	1	1	0
AW 58. . . .	113	108	15	1	0	0	0	0	0	95	15	9	0	3	0

3 Officer (white); 1 WO (Negro); 450 EM

x 21 Rehearing
12 Mitigated
1 Killed by enemy action
1 Revision
6 Disapproved
3 Legally insufficient

a 1 convicted of rape & AW 64
not included under AW 64

1 convicted of rape & AW 58
not included under AW 58

1 convicted of rape & AW 86
not included under AW 86

b 18 convicted of murder & rape not included under rape	d convicted under AW 66 & AW 64 not included under AW 64
2 convicted of murder & AW 58 not included under AW 58	e 8 convicted under AW 64 & AW 58 not included under AW 58
1 convicted of murder & AW 66 not included under AW 66	* White
c 3 convicted of AW 75 & AW 58 not included under AW 58	** Negro
1 convicted of AW 75 & AW 64 not included under AW 64	

Source: Reports of the branch office of The Judge Advocate General with
the European theater.

to court-martial jurisdiction. Of the 22,214 offenders tried by general court-martial, 2,132 or 9.5 percent of the accused were acquitted.⁶³ Further, the reviewing authority disapproved the convictions of 307 additional persons; the sentences of 977 officers in the group as executed did not involve dismissal; and 1,765 persons other than officers received penalties light enough to have been adjudged by a special court-martial. Of the 22,214 individuals tried by general court-martial, only 16,987 men, accounting for 76.5 percent of the accused, received an approved sentence of death, dismissal, or dishonorable discharge from the service. The reviewing authority suspended sentences of discharge or dismissal levied against 11,893 men, of whom 1,109 were immediately restored to duty inasmuch as their confinement was also suspended. Practically all of the remaining 10,784 were sent to disciplinary training centers in the command; 7,249 of them had been restored to duty by 5 February 1946. Of the 454 men sentenced to death in 386 different courts-martial, only seventy men were actually executed between 9 June 1942 and 19 January 1946, and virtually all of these before V-E Day. In all but one of the executions, the crime that was expiated was rape or murder, the one exception being desertion. Table 1 shows the disposition of cases involving death sentences acted on by 19 January 1946. After that date those records of trial by general courts-martial involving sentences to death or dismissal were reviewed by The Judge Advocate General.⁶⁴

44. Opinions of the Court-Martial System

An unpublished report prepared by the Attitude Research Section of Headquarters, 7700th Troop Information and Education Group, indicated the attitudes and opinions of enlisted men in the European Command concerning the Army court-martial system. The report was based on the anonymous answers to a questionnaire distributed in December 1946 and January 1947 to a cross-section of 1,004 enlisted men so selected as to be representative of all soldiers in the command. The men queried showed considerable ignorance of the court-martial process, almost half of them saying they knew little or nothing about its operation. One fifth of them did not know that there were three kinds of court-martial, and two fifths were not aware that enlisted were not permitted to serve as members of a court. Three fourths of them stated they would appreciate more information on the subject. As to the fairness of courts-martial, 23 percent of the men expressed their satisfaction with the current system, 21 percent gave no opinion, while 56 percent

⁶³USFET, BOTJAG, History of the Branch Office of the Judge Advocate General with USFET, 18 Jul 42 - 1 Nov 45, Vols. I and II.

⁶⁴Ibid.

felt that it needed to be changed. A correlation was observed between the number of men who desired to see the court-martial system amended and their grade, length of service, and time spent overseas. About three fourths of them felt that enlisted men should serve on the jury when soldiers were being tried; and three fifths were of the opinion that they should be entitled to act as jurors even in trials of officers. Although only one quarter of the number queried considered themselves qualified from the standpoint of experience to sit on courts-martial, an additional 48 percent stated that they could qualify for the work after they had acquired more knowledge of court-martial procedure. Men in the upper educational brackets showed a greater tendency to be critical of the system, to urge its improvement, to wish to serve as members of the court, and to consider themselves as qualified for jury duty.⁶⁵

45. Reform of the Administration of Military Justice, 1949

Some of the criticisms set forth above were satisfied when on 1 February 1949, significant alterations of the administration of military justice went into effect. The amended Articles of War (Title II, Public Law 759, 80th Congress) and the revised Manual for Courts-Martial, 1949 contained at least three important reforms which affected the European Command: (1) the requirement that, upon demand by an accused enlisted man, one third of the members of a general or special court-martial sitting in judgment upon him be enlisted men, (2) provision for trial of officers by special courts-martial, and (3) authorization of imposition of bad conduct discharge.⁶⁶

46. Instruction of Military Personnel in Military Justice

In anticipation of the above-mentioned reforms, extensive preparations were made in the autumn of 1948 by the theater judge advocate for the institution of a general program of instruction in the changed Articles of War and Manual for Courts-Martial. A beginning was made on 1 October 1948 when a selected group of officers and noncommissioned officers were systematically briefed regarding the projected reforms and the rights and duties of military personnel thereunder. Officers of Headquarters, EUCOM, were then given special training along similar lines by personnel of the

⁶⁵EUCOM, 7700th TI/GE Group, Rept No. 4-19-88, 12 Sep 47, sub: Attitudes of Enlisted Men in the European Command Towards the Army's Court-Martial System.

⁶⁶EUCOM JAD, Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, p. 72. RESTRICTED.

Military Justice Branch during a period of fourteen hours. Two twenty-hour courses in military justice for enlisted personnel were also inaugurated. Meanwhile, in preparation for the general training program throughout the command, lesson outlines, examinations, and other pertinent educational materials were devised and assembled by the Military Justice Branch and distributed among commanders. In February the instruction of all Army personnel in the essential reforms and changes was begun; it was completed only by the end of 1949.⁶⁷

47. Publication of Military Justice Circular 122

The amended Articles of War and the revision of the 1928 Manual for Courts-Martial necessitated also the modification of Circular 74, EUCCOM, 1947, entitled "Military Justice." During the first half of 1949, the Military Justice Branch of the Judge Advocate Division devoted time to this task. The resulting revision was published in July.⁶⁸ It was a systematic exposition of the code and procedures of military justice in the European Command and embodied the essential changes in the system introduced in February of the same year.

48. Redefinition of Court-Martial Jurisdictions in EUCCOM

The two years preceding 1949 had witnessed profound changes in the European Command and the military government of Germany. Among other things, most pertinent for the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction had been the alteration of military post boundaries and the establishment of an air force command separate from that of the U.S. Army. The main general court-martial jurisdictions had, accordingly, to be redefined. General Orders No. 33, published in May 1949,⁶⁹ established twelve major jurisdictions in EUCCOM: (1) U.S. Air Forces in Europe, (2) U.S. Zone, Austria, (3) U.S. Army, Europe, (4) American Graves Registration Command, European Area, (5) 1st Infantry Division, (6) U.S. Constabulary, (7) Frankfurt Military Post, (8) Munich Military Post, (9) Nuremberg Military Post, (10) Wetzlar Military Post, (11) Berlin Military Post, (12) Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. U.S. Forces, Austria ceased to be a major court-martial jurisdiction of EUCCOM when on 23 May 1949 a Department

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 74 - 5.

⁶⁸ EUCCOM Cir 122, 1 Jul 49, sub: Military Justice. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁹ EUCCOM GO 33, 3 May 49, sub: Military Justice.

of the Army order established it as an independent command, directly subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁷⁰ With the exception of personnel of the U.S. Air Forces, the 1st Infantry Division, the U.S. Constabulary, and Headquarters, EUCOM, all individuals subject to military law were henceforth put under the competence of their respective military posts privileged to exercise general court-martial jurisdiction. With the exceptions indicated, the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army, Europe, extended to all persons stationed in Garmisch, Stuttgart, Heidelberg, Augsburg, and Wurzburg Military Posts.⁷¹

49. Expedition of the Processing of Trials

It had been the constant endeavor of the Military Justice Branch of EUCOM's Judge Advocate Division to reduce the length of time needed for processing general court-martial cases from initial restraint of the accused to passing of sentence and also from restraint to review. This lapse of time had always been regarded as a criterion for gauging the efficiency of the administration of military justice. Since the early postwar years there had been improvement in this respect. Initial critical shortages of trained personnel in staff judge advocate offices and the inaccessibility of service records and other pertinent data on accused persons, which had earlier obstructed justice, had largely been surmounted. By 1948 it took a court-martial case an average of 25.2 days to proceed from the initial restraint to the passing of sentence, and 42.7 days to proceed from restraint to final review. The improvement in 1949 in comparison with 1948, however, was altogether remarkable and exceeded the most sanguine expectations. The average processing times in EUCOM dropped in 1949 to 21.0 and 31.9 days respectively.⁷² This is all the more impressive when one reflects that of 727 records of trial by general court-martial forwarded from EUCOM to The Judge Advocate General for appellate review, only 7, or less than 1 percent, were held to be legally insufficient to support findings or sentence.⁷³

50. Statistics on Findings and Processing Times

During 1949 a total of 650 cases were tried before general

⁷⁰EUCOM JAD, Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, pp. 78 - 9.
RESTRICTED.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 79.

⁷²Ibid., p. 82.

⁷³Ibid., p. 83.

courts-martial. Their disposition and processing times are given below:⁷⁴

Month	No. Cases Tried	No. Accused Tried	Accused Acquitted	Average Number of Days Elapsed per Accused from Restraint or Charges to:	
				a) Sentence	b) Action by Reviewing Authority
Totals	650	741	82		
Jan.....	62	71	6	21.5	32.8
Feb.....	60	72	9	23.0	34.5
Mar.....	57	62	5	16.9	29.0
Apr.....	59	84	9	23.7	35.4
May.....	64	75	7	22.4	33.8
Jun.....	50	55	7	22.3	33.7
Jul.....	42	50	7	18.8	29.1
Aug.....	48	53	8	18.6	30.4
Sep.....	48	53	3	18.5	28.1
Oct.....	44	51	6	24.7	35.9
Nov.....	49	54	8	21.5	32.6
Dec.....	57	61	7	20.0	27.3

51. Court-Martial Rate for European Command

Only slight changes occurred in the court-martial rate for the European Command during 1949. The rates per thousand men per month for the three types of courts-martial are given below:⁷⁵

Month	General Court-Martial	Special Court-Martial	Summary Court-Martial	Total
Jan.....	.5	3.5	10.6	14.6
Feb.....	.5	3.6	9.8	13.9
Mar.....	.4	3.4	9.7	13.6
Apr.....	.5	3.6	7.9	12.2
May.....	.5	3.9	10.9	15.3
Jun.....	.4	3.7	10.4	14.5
Jul.....	.4	2.9	10.2	13.5
Aug.....	.6	4.3	11.7	16.6
Sep.....	.6	4.1	8.5	13.2
Oct.....	.5	4.8	12.8	18.1
Nov.....	.6	4.2	10.4	15.2
Dec.....	.6	4.7	10.7	16.0
Average	.5	3.9	10.3	14.7

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 82.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 83.

CHAPTER III

Discipline of Civilian Employees

52. Jurisdiction over Civilian Arrestees

Policy concerning discipline of civilian employees in the European theater was published in a civilian personnel circular issued in 1946. The circular pointed out that all civilian employees in the occupied zones of Germany and Austria were subject to the jurisdiction of military government courts. In addition, civilians employed by U.S. Army forces in the European theater were subject to U.S. Army courts-martial.¹ Military government courts were concerned with breaches of civil law; courts-martial with breaches of Army regulations or offenses against the Articles of War. Article of War 96 was interpreted to include infractions of standing instructions prescribing that articles sold at post exchanges and U.S. Army sales stores were sold with the understanding that they were for the purchaser's own use or for the use of members of his family and that they were not to be resold, bartered or exchanged. Lists were published advising of prohibited and permitted transactions.² All theater civilian employees were subject to two kinds of action: administrative and judicial. Administrative action in the case of civilian employees was in accordance with War Department and theater civilian personnel regulations. If informal, as for minor offenses, it consisted of a verbal reprimand, or if formal, of a written one. Written admonitions were used where a record was desired and when verbal reprimands had proved ineffectual, or where employment was being suspended and removal contemplated. Every effort was made to maintain discipline among

¹USFET Press Release 1856, 3 Jul 46, sub: Policy on Discipline of Civilian Employees Announced.

²(1) EUCOM Cir 74, 27 Aug 47. (2) USFET Cir 140, 1946, as amended.

civilian employees by normal administrative measures, but judicial procedures were, of course, applicable to those employees who committed offenses too serious to be dealt with by administrative methods.³ Civilians of U.S. nationality employed by USFET were subject to U.S. Army courts-martial. Within the discretion of local commanders, and "to avoid undesirable preferential treatment of civilians over military personnel," minor offenses (such as traffic violation) committed by civilian employees of U.S. nationality, could be tried by inferior courts-martial or could be disposed of by administrative action. The circular stated: "If, and only if, an offense is so serious that a sentence to imprisonment in excess of six months, in addition to any fine imposed, appears probable upon conviction, may trial by general court-martial be directed."⁴

53. Jurisdiction over Non-U.S. Civilian Personnel

In the cases of civilians of non-U.S. nationality, it was provided that offenses committed by civilian employees of German or other enemy nationality would be referred to appropriate authorities of Military Government(MG) for trial by MG courts or for other disposition. Offenses committed by displaced persons (DP's) (non-Germans who entered Germany after 2 September 1939, and prior to 8 May 1945) in the employ of U.S. forces would be referred to the appropriate authorities of MG for trial, subject to existing policies governing the exercise of jurisdiction over DPs. Offenses committed by civilian employees of Allied or neutral nationality, other than displaced persons in occupied Germany or Austria, or in the territory of an Allied government other than their own (e.g., by a British civilian employed by the U.S. forces in France) would be referred to USFET headquarters for disposition. Indigenous civilians employed by U.S. forces in the territory of an ally would be treated as subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals of the country concerned. No civilian employee of other than U.S. nationality might be tried by U.S. Army court-martial without specific authorization from USFET headquarters.

54. Military Justice Procedures

In the early summer of 1947 The Judge Advocate General formulated an interesting corollary to the jurisdiction of U.S. Army courts-martial over all civilians accompanying or serving

³USFET Press Release 1856, 3 Jul 46, sub: Policy on Discipline of Civilian Employees Announced.

⁴Ibid.

the U.S. Army in Germany. He rendered the opinion that former members of the armed forces discharged within the theater to accept civilian employment with the Army were subject to trial by court-martial for offenses committed by them during their term of military service, provided they had been continuously subject to military law. The Judge Advocate General, however, recommended that the number of such trials be held to a minimum. Dependents of United States military and civilian personnel in the European Command (formerly USFET) were also held to be liable to trial by court-martial for nonmilitary offenses. But, again, The Judge Advocate General recommended that such cases generally be referred to military government for trial or other disposition and not be tried by court-martial without express authorization of EUCOM headquarters.⁵

55. The Power of Arrest

While the apprehension of criminal suspects was a function of the theater provost marshal,⁶ theater directives authorized any member of the occupation forces to arrest any person, military or civilian, committing an act harmful to military government at the security of the U.S. forces, or in violation of military government decrees.⁷ The same power was conferred upon members of the Allied forces with respect to violators of the security of the Allied forces or of military government law.⁸ U.S. military police in the United Kingdom were empowered to arrest only American military personnel. In liberated territory they might arrest both U.S. and Allied military personnel without regard to nationality, and, in occupied territory, civilian nationals too, if they had committed or were suspected of having committed an act prejudicial to the interests of the U.S. and Allied countries or their citizens.⁹ The military police might also collaborate with the German police in apprehending violators of German law. On the other hand, the German police were not authorized to arrest members of the U.S. occupation forces, including civilians employed by the latter for any reason whatever.¹⁰ The German police might, where necessary,

⁵EUCOM JA, Rept of Opns, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47.

⁶EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Law, Order and Security, 1945-46, p. 136. SECRET.

⁷Counter-Intelligence Directive for Germany, 12 Apr 45, par. 51 (e).

⁸USFET ltr, 4 Feb 46, par. 3 (b). AG 371.2 GCT - AGO.

⁹EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Law, Order and Security, 1945-46, p. 136. SECRET.

¹⁰Military Government Regulations, Title 9, 1 Feb 46, Part 4, par. 9 - 401.

request U.S. military police to make an arrest, but beyond this they had no power other than to solicit particulars from members of the Allied forces who had witnessed the crime or misdemeanor. Even here, they could not compel witnesses to make depositions or appear before a German court against their will.¹¹ In cases of civil disturbances the chief of the German Police might also request, through the appropriate military government officer, the aid of tactical troops to suppress the disorder.¹² Finally, the German Border Police, who were reorganized in the winter of 1945-46, had the limited authority to detain all persons crossing the German border without the requisite travel orders or documents.¹³ On 11 July 1946 the power to arrest military personnel was also conferred upon agents of the U.S. civilian Criminal Investigation Division working under the theater provost marshal. This exceptional step was taken to augment the forces of law and order in a campaign to prevent the increase of crime in the European theater. Such civilians had to be ex-military agents and U.S. citizens; nationals of no other country could be hired for this purpose.¹⁴

56. Trials by MG Courts

In the case of traffic violations, it had been announced early in July 1946 that civilian personnel of U.S., Allied, or neutral nationalities who were charged with such violations in the theater were to be referred to the nearest MG court for action; cases involving U.S. military personnel would not be tried by military government courts, however, but would be referred to appropriate military authorities for disposition.¹⁵ While U.S. citizens could not be tried by any German court, they could be tried by MG courts for violations of German criminal law.¹⁶

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² USFET ltr, 7 Jan 46, sub: U.S. Troops in Aid of Civil Security. AG 370.4 GEC - AGO.

¹³ EUCOM Hist Div, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Law, Order and Security, 1945-46, pp. 53 - 4.

¹⁴ USFET Press Release 1883, 11 Jul 46, sub: Civilian CID Agents May Now Arrest Military Personnel.

¹⁵ USFET Press Release 1913, 18 Jul 46, sub: Civilian Traffic Violators to Face MG Courts.

¹⁶ See p. 4, Review of draft of this MS, attached to IRS, JAD to C/Hist Div, 21 Feb 51, sub: Hist MS, "Morale and Discipline, etc." SECRET.

57. Suits for Damages

A military government court for civil actions, staffed by U.S. personnel, was opened in the late summer of 1946. Suits for damages arising out of the operation of motor vehicles not owned by the U.S. Government could be brought in this court by U.S., Allied, neutral, displaced persons, stateless, enemy, or ex-enemy personnel. Such suits might be started when two conditions existed: the event which gave rise to the cause of action occurred in the U.S. Zone of Germany, the Bremen Enclave, or the U.S. Sector of Berlin; and one of the parties to the suit belonged to one of the following groups: personnel of the U.S. Army, civilian U.S. nationals subject to military law, civilian U.S. nationals not subject to military law, and visiting nationals of United Nations. All military personnel and those of military government as well as others subject to the jurisdiction of the court were required to recognize and obey all processes and orders of the court. In addition, military officers and officials of military government were directed to aid in making it possible for all litigants to present their cases properly. They were directed "freely to permit" interviewing of witnesses and inspection of pertinent records by proper persons. They were to facilitate the attendance of witnesses in court. Civil actions in this court could be commenced by filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the court, either in person or by letter.¹⁷

58. Establishment of Review Board

On 18 August 1947, an Administration of Justice Review Board was established to hear and investigate complaints against the administration of justice by courts-martial and military government courts. Report was made to the commander in chief, EUCOM. In examining the treatment accorded U.S. citizens, particular attention was paid by the board to criminal investigation, nature and duration of arrest and confinement, guardhouses, availability of defense counsel, treatment of witnesses, conduct and records of trials, court personnel, and actions of appointing and receiving authorities. Periodic reports were submitted to the commander in chief.¹⁸

¹⁷(1) USFET Press Release 2000, 13 Aug 46, sub: MG Court Established for Civil Actions Involving Non-U.S. Government-Owned Vehicles. (2) USFET, DCINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 3, 21 Jan 47, Sec. VI, par. 33.

¹⁸EUCOM GO 90, 18 Aug 47.

59. The Treatment of Civilian Prisoners

Revised regulations governing the treatment of imprisoned civilian employees were issued in December 1947. The new directive established general standards for the manner of arrest and conditions of confinement of United States, Allied and neutral civilian employees who were paid from appropriated funds or non-appropriated funds. Under its terms, civilian employees, until sentenced, were entitled to treatment comparable to that accorded prisoners in the United States accused of similar violations of civil or military law.¹⁹ Employees in confinement awaiting trial could be released and placed under such restrictions as the military post commander deemed advisable. In the case of female civilian employees in arrest or confinement prior to trial, the procedure was to correspond as closely as possible to that ordered by the Department of the Army for WACs charged with offenses of the same degree. Ordinarily, civilian employees were not to be confined prior to trial unless charged with murder, rape, robbery, or other crimes of extreme violence, or when the accused person's past record clearly indicated that physical restraint was advisable. When confinement was necessary, all civilians were to receive identical treatment, no differentiation being made on the basis of grade or group. They were not to be confined in German prisons, and in the case of women the place of confinement, in the absence of adequate Army prison facilities for females, was to be a hospital.²⁰ Prisoners could be required to perform their own house-keeping and fatigue duties, but no other labor was to be required until after sentence. Each prisoner was to be issued a fatigue uniform for optional wear. Laundry and dry cleaning were to be his personal expense, but if he were without funds, facilities were to be furnished for him to do his own laundering. Normal weekly post exchange rations were to be issued against payment by the prisoner. Where he had no personal funds, the prison officer was authorized to request local Red Cross representatives to furnish necessities.²¹

¹⁹OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, The Third Year, 1947 - 48, Vol. II, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47, Ch. IX.

²⁰USFET Press Release 1913, 18 Jul 46, sub: Civilian Traffic Violators to Face MG Courts.

²¹OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, The Third Year, 1947 - 48, Vol. XI, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47, Ch. IX.

CHAPTER IV

The Struggle With Black Marketing

60. U.S. Participation

One of the greatest sources of concern to commanding officers throughout much of the period was the participation in black marketing activities of members of the U.S. occupation forces, including dependents. Although the percentage of imported basic industrial materials, grain stuffs, or Army supplies which got into black market channels was slight, amounting to about 5 percent of the total value of such receipts, deliveries of foreign materials into Germany under these headings were large and continuous. Since they represented almost the only supplies that were moving on the roads and rails of Germany, the 5 percent that was siphoned off into the black market acquired undue publicity among a people who were suffering from great privation. A much more serious leak into the German black market, however, was the merchandise that was imported by Allied personnel as their own private property but which was not consumed and was instead illegally exchanged for German goods; even as late as 1948 this constituted about one fifth.¹

61. The Situation Immediately After the War

The black market activities of U.S. troops reached a peak in the early postwar period, for a number of reasons. Immediately after the war, troops stationed in Germany lacked peacetime civilian luxuries -- a deficiency later partly made up by improved and enlarged post exchange services, -- but they found themselves

¹OMGUS Information Bulletin, No. 128, (10 Feb 48), p. 3ff.

with a surplus of barterable or saleable Army rations. They also succeeded in obtaining from various sources coveted supplies of U.S. "greenback" currency which, in addition to pay received in occupation marks, helped to swell the currency black market. The scarcity on the civil market of everyday necessities, such as food and cigarettes, together with a rapid inflation of the German currency, created a heavy demand for available American supplies. Cigarettes, chocolate, all kinds of Army food rations, as well as vehicles and clothing apparel to which U.S. soldiers and civilians had access through post exchange facilities, were sold to Germans at incredibly high prices in the failing German currency or fetched expensive art objects or other valuables, in spite of prohibitions against all such dealings. The majority of occupation personnel were mainly interested in satisfying certain limited personal requirements or desires, ranging from cameras to cars, from jewelry and silk materials to bicycles and furniture, which they sent home as souvenirs or with which they furnished their army billets. Much more serious, however, were the wholesale black market activities, especially in the realm of currency and cigarettes, which were organized by certain elements among American personnel.

62. Methods of Combatting Black Marketing

A number of methods were used to combat this threat to the discipline and morale of occupation troops and employees. They included, at the beginning, a general tightening of and increase in the number of restrictions and, an especially stringent control of the handling of both currency and cigarettes. Black market activities were later attacked in the bizonal area by the military governments and by German economic, legal, and police authorities to the extent of the forces at their disposal and the powers delegated to them. Various civilian economic offices were charged with the supervision of allocation and distribution of goods, while the German police were instructed to wage war on the black market by means of raids, road and border control and vigilant inspection. Violators were fined by the civil authorities, and contraband goods were confiscated. But even before these controls were organized and developed, the Army had to some degree succeeded in controlling the indulgence of U.S. forces in at least the most objectionable forms of black marketing.²

63. Recommendations of Criminal Investigation Division

After various attempts to deal with black marketing by

²Ibid.

occupation personnel, a detailed list of recommendations was drawn up by the CID, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal. These recommendations pointed the way to a renewed campaign. Based on a survey of black market operations, this list of recommendations included the following actions: prevention of the conversion into dollars of allied military marks not derived from official sources or from the conversion of dollar instruments; prevention of misuse of the Army Postal Service as a means of shipping to the United States articles obtained through black market profits; prevention of the sale on the black market of personal property of occupation personnel, whether brought by the personnel or sent to them after their arrival; prevention of the giving of tips in kind, since such articles often found their way into the black market; halting of pilferage of government property from unit supply warehouses, depots, railways, or dockside, since, apart from other considerations, such stolen articles were usually disposed of on the black market; halting the pilferage or misuse of government property issued to individual soldiers, since army equipment stolen from, stolen by, or given away by soldiers also found its way into the black market; elimination of smuggling and illegitimate transactions in foreign currencies and objects of value, since foreign currency and objects of value brought into Germany illegally were often disposed of on the black market; and, finally, instilling in occupation personnel an understanding of the evils of the situation and the need for eliminating black marketing.³

64. Attempt to Legalize Small-Scale Shopping and the Hiring of Domestic Servants

In an effort to improve discipline by legalizing the general practice of small-scale barter of goods and shopping purchases, the theater judge advocate recommended in April 1946 that provisions of the "Trading With the Enemy Act" forbidding persons serving in or with the United States Army in Europe to engage in business be revised. He pointed out that with the arrival of dependents and the establishment of American communities, such dealings with Germans as the purchase of household goods and supplies or the payment for public or domestic services were on the increase.⁴ A request was made to the War Department for the

³CID, Survey of Black Market Operations. In USFET OTPM Rept of Opns, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, Supporting Documents, Vol. I, pp. 101 - 105.

⁴IRS, USFET JA to COFS, 4 Apr 46, sub: Trading with the Enemy Act. Copy in USFET JA file 250.7, sec. A7.

exemption of members of the occupation forces and their families from the provisions of the act to the extent necessary for the maintenance of a proper domestic economy,⁵ but the request was refused.

65. Reaffirmation of Some Bans and Relaxation of Others

A circular issued by USFET in May reaffirmed the rule against business transactions with Germans on the part of members of the occupation.⁶ In September a more comprehensive circular regarding the application of the act to dependents did bring some relief. As a general policy members of the United States forces were not to utilize their presence in Germany or Austria to disrupt the economies of those countries, and the ban on "engaging in business" remained in effect. The circular prohibited the sale of tangible personal property to Germans and Austrians and prohibited direct barter and exchange of gifts, except for "minor gifts of a socialable or charitable nature which are given without obligation of any kind." However, the circular authorized the purchase from the German economy of certain nonrationed items for personal use or as souvenirs, and declared that dealings with the barter stores were permissible. The employment of domestic servants was also authorized as outside the scope of the act.⁷

66. The Barter Mart Experiment

a. One of the most publicized attempts to combat black marketing by occupation personnel was the opening of official barter marts, the first in Berlin on 10 August 1946 and a second in Frankfurt in October. It was the view of military government that illegal bartering could be prevented only if a legal alternative were provided.⁸ The barter marts were operated on as equitable a scale of values as was practicable in mid-1946. Germans brought in secondhand articles which they wanted to trade, and occupation personnel brought in cigarettes, personal effects, and food items which they had imported from the United States. Expert German appraisers evaluated exchange prices in barter units for both American and German goods, and with these points anything in the marts could be purchased. Although Germans sometimes bought articles brought in by other Germans, Americans seldom purchased goods brought in by other Americans. Items brought to Germany at public expense and

⁵Cable S - 1445, USFET sgd McNarney to AGWAR, 8 Apr 46.

⁶USFET Cir 67, 18 May 46, Sec. III.

⁷USFET Cir 140, 26 Sep 46.

⁸Cable CC - 6673, OMGUS to USFET, 2 Nov 46. Copy in USFET G - 4 Div, Rept of Opns, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 46, p. 160.

sold at post exchanges were not acceptable in the barter marts; however, packaged goods sent from the United States by mail were accepted. Although cigarettes were originally the principal medium of exchange, their use decreased as the markets continued operations. For the first few months cigarettes were given a relatively high barter value to draw them into controlled channels and away from the black market, but their barter value was lowered progressively to make it more profitable for Americans to bring in food, soap, and other items needed by the Germans.⁹ Cigarettes were finally banned for use at the barter mart in Berlin on 1 January 1947 and at the one in Frankfurt a few months later.

b. There were several distinct advantages to the controlled barter system: first, the marts were conducted openly and facilitated an honest exchange of supplies; second, they brought out a considerable quantity of German goods desired by the Americans; and third, they provided a controlled medium of exchange between Germans and Americans of items which appeared to be desired by persons of both nationalities, many of whom did not wish to patronize the uncontrolled black market. From the American point of view, they improved morale by providing items which were needed and which were unobtainable legally elsewhere.¹⁰

67. The Berlin Investigations

a. Because of the proximity of Soviet and U.S. troops, Berlin had become the occupation's chief black market trouble spot immediately following the surrender. In 1945 and 1946 black market prices were considerably higher in Berlin than elsewhere in Germany, and illegal activity was consequently greater. The G - 2 Division, USFET, informed the theater commander of the political implications of the situation with regard to the Russians. Evidence collected from several independent sources in June 1946 indicated that large-scale black marketing and looting on the part of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Berlin included at least one individual recently of general officer rank.¹¹

⁹(1) Ibid. (2) Cable SC - 12022, cite: ETGEC, OMGUS to CG USFET, 14 Aug 46. (3) USFET Press Releases No. 180, 20 May 47, and No. 227, 27 Jun 47.

¹⁰(1) Min, Monthly Conf of CINC with maj comdrs and DMG, 14 Aug 46, p. 5. (2) Cable CC - 6673, OMGUS to USFET, 2 Nov 45. Loc cit.

¹¹Ltr, Brig Gen E. L. Sibert, USFET ACOFS, G - 2 to Gen J. R. McNarney, CG, ET, 10 Jun 46.

b. To determine the truth of the allegations, General J. T. McNarney, the theater commander, directed that a special investigation be made in Berlin. The resulting investigation, a top secret study, made by Col. C. G. Dodge, was completed on 2 August 1946. This investigation disclosed no evidence of large-scale black market activity, either by any individual American or group of Americans. The consensus of the officers questioned was that there was still a black market, but, save for isolated instances, it now involved only small amounts.

c. Inasmuch as the Dodge investigation had disclosed insufficient evidence upon which to base definite disciplinary action, General McNarney merely sent a copy of the report to Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, U.S. Commander, Berlin, for such action as he might deem advisable. General Clay, displeased to learn that an undercover investigation of personnel in his headquarters had been conducted, demanded that the Inspector General conduct another and less objectionable investigation at once. Thereupon, Col. P. L. Baldwin, Inspector General Division, Headquarters, USFET, was designated to initiate a second one.¹²

d. Shortly after completion of the Dodge investigation, other allegations of a serious nature were made by Lt. Col. F. P. Miller, formerly of OMGUS in Berlin, before a special investigating committee of the Senate known as the Mead Committee. Although Colonel Miller's charges primarily concerned the OMGUS intelligence program he also alleged that certain high-ranking OMGUS officials were open to charges of immoral living, dishonesty, and black market dealings.¹³ Colonel Miller's testimony started another series of high-level investigations.

e. When Miller's testimony before the Mead Committee was brought to the attention of the Under Secretary of War (Mr. K. C. Royall), the latter immediately directed that a general officer on duty with the Inspector General at the War Department in Washington make an inspection of conditions in Berlin, since the Miller allegations implied an inadequacy in certain phases of governmental administration and reflected adversely upon the personal conduct of some U.S. Army personnel there.¹⁴ Immediately after receipt of this directive, the Inspector General initiated

¹²Gen Cooke Inquiry into Conditions in OMGUS Alleged by Lt Col F. P. Miller, Memo for the Under Secy of War, 21 Nov 46. Copy in USFET SGS file No. 333.5/28 (1946), Vol. I.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Memo, K. C. Royall, Under Secy of War to IG, 27 Sep 46, sub: Request for Investigation.

an inquiry in Washington. Colonel Miller was again called as a witness and every effort was made to secure more definite information in connection with the broad allegations he had made before the Mead Committee. The testimony indicated that he did not possess the data to support his charges. Fifteen other witnesses named by Colonel Miller who were found to be in the United States were interrogated. While several corroborated in principle the allegations made by Colonel Miller, none would agree with his extreme statements, nor did these witnesses present any concrete facts, their information being based upon unsupported hearsay, common gossip, or their own beliefs.¹⁵

f. On 6 October 1946 the Inspector General's inquiry group, headed by Brig. Gen. E. D. Cooke, reported to General McNarney at USFET headquarters in Frankfurt. The group was informed of the completed Dodge investigation and the Baldwin investigation currently being conducted. From Frankfurt the group proceeded to Berlin to begin investigations in that area. Shortly thereafter, the investigators sent by the Mead Committee arrived. Mr. George Meader, chief counsel for the Senate committee, was informed of the investigations being conducted by Colonel Baldwin; he was also advised that the War Department group would neither duplicate nor inject itself into that investigation, but would confine itself to matters believed of interest to the War Department alone. Mr. Meader accepted this arrangement but stated that the committee's own investigator would conduct an inquiry independent of either the War Department group or Colonel Baldwin.¹⁶

g. In general, the findings of the Cooke investigation reaffirmed the report of the Dodge investigations. The final report of the inquiry group with regard to the black market presented an excellent summary of the temptations faced by Americans and the control measures taken.

68. Introduction of the Scrip Currency System

One of the most serious forms of black marketing had been that in U.S. currency or allied military marks. The problem and the attempts at its solution have been described in a monograph in this series covering the period 8 May 1945 - 30 June 1946 and entitled "Currency Control." The monograph also describes the issuance in September 1946 of a new type of scrip known as military payment certificates (MPC's). The chief feature of this new currency was that in general it could not be converted into other currencies and consequently was of little value to others than the original possessors.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

69. Illegal Possession of Military Payment Certificates

Effective 22 January 1947, military government promulgated an ordinance concerning illegal possession of U.S. military payment certificates. The ordinance listed all categories of personnel authorized possession of scrip and stated that all persons in the U.S. Zone and Land Bremen, not specifically authorized, were prohibited from accepting, acquiring, holding, possessing, purchasing, selling, or exchanging MPCs or engaging in any transactions involving such certificates. Any person convicted of violating any provision of the ordinance was liable to any punishment except death.¹⁷

70. Conversion of Military Payment Certificates

U.S. military payment certificates had held an advantageous exchange value on the German black market from the time of their initial introduction in spite of the fact that scrip carried on its face the words "for use only in United States military establishments by United States authorized personnel in accordance with applicable rules and regulations."¹⁸ Repeated USFET - EUCOM pronouncements that scrip was not legal tender in the same sense as U.S. currency failed to curtail counterfeiting activities by local organizations or to prevent black marketeers from amassing considerable quantities. In order to eliminate such illicit activities, all old scrip was recalled on 10 March 1947 and exchanged for a new issue.¹⁹ CIC reports for the period indicated that the unexpected recall had little effect on the average German, but that many big operators suffered heavy losses.²⁰ As of 11 April 1947, there appeared to be very little scrip circulating in illegal channels. Black market operators complained that it was hazardous to deal in scrip because the price fluctuated and the populace feared another replacement of scrip in the near future.²¹ Shortly

¹⁷Ordinance No. 10, quoted in USFET ltr to maj comdrs, 4 Feb 47, sub: Military Government Ordinance No. 10. AG O10.8 GEI - AGO.

¹⁸Ltr, Gen Huebner, 24 May 49.

¹⁹Procedures for recalling all scrip and issuing a new series are contained in USFET Cir 19, 9 Mar 47, sub: Currency Conversion, rescinded by EUCOM Cir 7, 1 Feb 48, sub: Currency Conversion.

²⁰EUCOM G - 2 Div CI Br, Wkly Rept of Black Market Activities, 28 Mar 47 and 4 Apr 47. Copy in SGS file 319.1/4 (1947).

²¹Ibid., 22 Apr 47. Later in the year, however, scrip again increased in value. Even after currency reforms in June 1948, scrip was bringing as much as DM 15 for \$1 on the black market.

after the currency change a consolidated EUCOM circular was issued on military payment certificates concerning limitations on their use and prohibitions against their unauthorized use.²²

71. Ban on Importation of Cigarettes

By the middle of 1947 the press contained some reports that cigarette money was on the way out in most of Western Europe, except Germany, and that currencies were becoming stabilized.²³ The Paris edition of the N.Y. Herald Tribune, however, continued to carry cigarette advertisements of mail order companies in the United States, and practically unrestricted quantities of American cigarettes continued to arrive through Army post offices (APOs), presumably for use in the authorized barter marts, which had not yet been closed. The steady flow of cigarettes was becoming an increasingly heavy burden on the mail system and many of the imported cigarettes were not being disposed of through authorized barter marts. It was becoming apparent that more drastic action was required if the cigarette economy was to be destroyed. A recommendation that the importation of cigarettes into Germany be prohibited by theater directive had been submitted on 26 December 1946 by a military government committee appointed by General Clay but final action on it was delayed. Early in the next year, the OMGUS Legal Division stated that there was a legal basis for the ban on the importation of cigarettes because they were being introduced as a form of money. The division held that the ruling that no person could have in his possession more than one dollar in U.S. currency constituted a precedent with respect to the prohibition of money imports.²⁴ On 20 May 1947, Headquarters, EUCOM, announced that after 1 June 1947 all traffic in cigarettes by EUCOM personnel, other than legal purchases of rations from post exchanges, would be forbidden in Germany.²⁵ Cigarettes had already been eliminated as items of exchange on the Berlin barter mart as of 1 January 1947. The announcement stated that the Frankfurt barter mart would continue to accept cigarettes only until 1 June.

²²EUCOM Cir 38, 27 May 47, sub: Currency Technique on Payments, Collection, Negotiation, Acquisition, Exchanges, amended by EUCOM Cir 84, 9 Oct 47, Sec. IV, sub: Currency Regulations and EUCOM Cir 97, 28 Nov 47, Sec. III, sub: Currency Technique.

²³Henry J. Taylor, "Cigarette Money on the Way Out!", NY World Telegram, August 7, 1947.

²⁴OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Second Year of Occupation, Jan - Mar 47, Vol. I, Ch. II, p. 52.

²⁵EUCOM Press Release 180, 20 May 47, sub: Import of Cigarettes Illegal after 1 June.

Concerning shipments of cigarettes from commercial sources in the United States, the directive ordering the ban stated that those mailed on or before 27 May would be delivered but that any shipped later would be returned to the sender by the New York APO or the base post offices in the European Command.²⁶ The 20 May announcement stated that the ban was designed to eliminate black market trading in cigarettes. The ban applied to tobacco shipments through the Army post office, international mails and commercial channels, and was to be enforced by the U.S. Post Office and Commerce Departments, with the assistance of occupation authorities.²⁷ Officials felt that though small amounts might continue to arrive in personal packages, such tobacco ordinarily would be used for personal consumption by heavy smokers.

72. Post Exchange Purchases

Cigarettes, and possibly candy, purchased at post exchanges (PXs) remained the chief commodities sold "black" by petty operators throughout the period under review, although big operators among the occupation forces illegally imported scarce items such as coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco from sources in the United States or obtained such items by pilferage. Statistics on EUCOM Exchange Service (EES) transactions from April 1947, when departmental sales were first broken down, through June 1948 indicate that nearly all personnel authorized PX ration cards bought their full quotas of cigarettes and candy each week. Not everyone, of course, smoked a full carton of cigarettes each week, and considerable quantities of cigarettes went into the black market in exchange for cash, in trade for luxury items, and as tips for personal services. In April 1947, \$1,578,000 worth of cigarettes, tobacco, and matches were sold to approximately 204,000 authorized purchasers. In the same month a total of \$936,000 worth of candy and gum was sold. In December 1947, when the number of authorized purchasers had decreased to approximately 175,000, EES sold a total of \$1,541,000 worth of cigarettes and \$1,400,000 worth of candy and gum, then no longer so strictly rationed. At the end of the period under review, when the number of authorized PX customers had decreased to 153,000, sales for twenty-one days came to \$670,000 for candy and \$958,000 for cigarettes.²⁸ Regarding candy, however, it is highly questionable whether any significant portion went into black market channels, since a very large number of Americans in Germany, as in

²⁶EUCOM Cir 41, 2 Jun 47, Sec. I, sub: Export and Import of Tobacco Products.

²⁷EUCOM Press Release 180, 20 May 47, sub: Import of Cigarettes Illegal after 1 June.

²⁸Interv, M. L. Geis with Mr. C. P. Gard, EES Comp, Nuremberg, 30 Mar 50.

the Allied countries during the war, felt a strong urge to give their candy to those in less fortunate circumstances. There were many who regularly gave away their entire candy rations, finding it only natural to hand a candy bar to a child on the sidewalk, a babe in arms, a German driver, the office maid, or the Germans working around their billets or barracks. There are various reasons to believe that such recipients either ate the candy themselves or, in the case of most adults, took it home for their children.

73. Command Letter on Black Marketing

Early in 1948 the campaign against black marketing by occupation personnel was intensified with the issuance of a command letter. Dated 10 January 1948, the letter was intended for distribution to all American personnel in Germany. It pointed out the evil effects of American black marketing upon the good name of the occupation forces, and even declared that the violation of economic regulations was threatening the success of the entire occupation mission. In conclusion it asserted that positive action would be taken against violators. In addition to penalties resulting from action by the courts, administrative action by EUCOM might include removal of offenders from the zone.²⁹ The campaign was carried against black marketing in currency by a public warning issued on 16 January by the Office of the Chief of Finance, Headquarters, EUCOM. This warning pointed to the probability that U.S. currency originating in or passing through black market channels was counterfeit, cited eighteen recent cases involving counterfeit U.S. currency, and recalled the regulations requiring the conversion of all U.S. treasury notes within forty-eight hours of their arrival in the zone, and the rule forbidding all transactions in such currency except for conversion at U.S. Army finance offices.³⁰ Shortly afterward a EUCOM circular gave detailed instructions on future conversions of military payment certificates, and threatened disciplinary action against offenders.³¹

74. Black Marketing in Art Works

A type of black marketing which attracted attention early in

²⁹(1) EUCOM ltr to maj comds, sub: Elimination of Black Market Activities by Individual Members of the Occupation Forces. AG 383.8 GPA - AGO. (2) EUCOM Press Release 807, 13 Jan 48, sub: Black Market Curb Ordered by EUCOM.

³⁰EUCOM Press Release 818, 16 Jan 48, sub: Warning Issued Against U.S. Currency Black Marketing.

³¹EUCOM Cir 7, 1 Feb 48, sub: Currency Conversion.

1948 was traffic in works of art, such as oil-painting reproductions, prints, portraits, and photographs. Dealings were conducted both by independent operators and by organized companies, whose agents throughout the command sought permission to exhibit samples and to solicit orders by house-to-house canvassing. Prices charged were high in terms of currency, but low in terms of United States post exchange or commissary goods. To combat this attempted form of black marketing a EUCOM directive of 19 March 1948 instructed post and unit commanders not to authorize agents of the type described to conduct their activities unless it could be determined that the method of payment was in accordance with current directives, that prohibited goods were not utilized, and that established prices were commensurate with the value of the items to be sold.³²

75. Warning on Misuse of the Army Postal Service

A further step in the campaign against black marketing by occupation personnel was the issuance of a circular pointing out that assisting unauthorized persons to evade existing controls on German means of communication was prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and was prohibited. Personnel were forbidden to act as intermediaries in the transmission of letters or parcels. Parcel post receipts, the circular declared, would be scrutinized to detect violations.³³ Another circular issued soon after attempted to cut down on black marketing in tobacco by forbidding its importation.³⁴

76. Effects of the Campaign

Due to the closing of the official barter markets and to other phases of the campaign, black marketing fell off considerably in the late spring of 1948. The closing of the barter markets was believed to have been particularly effective, because thereafter occupation personnel no longer had any excuse for the receipt by mail from mail order houses abroad of large quantities of such barter items as coffee, fats, and sugar.³⁵

³²EUCOM Wkly Dir 11, 19 Mar 48, Sec. XIX, sub: Black Market Activities.

³³EUCOM Cir 40, 1 May 48, sub: Misuse of Army Postal Service.

³⁴EUCOM Cir 42, 17 May 48, Sec. I, sub: Export and Import of Tobacco Products.

³⁵EUCOM PMD Rept of Opns, 1 Apr 48 - 30 Jun 48, Vol. XII, pp. 24 - 25.

77. An End to Large-Scale Black Marketing

Large-scale black marketing by occupation personnel came to an end for all practical purposes with the currency reform of June 1948. The predictions made long before by all competent observers, that black marketing could not be legislated out of existence but could only be brought to an end by the removal of its economic incentives, proved to be true. As German and foreign goods came into the market with the stabilization of the currency and the accompanying sudden change in Western Germany from the most strictly to the least regulated economy in Western Europe, large amounts of goods came into the market and reduced the profits of black marketing to a point where they were hardly worth the effort and risk involved. The closing of such big loopholes as the official barter markets, the legal use of postal conversion of currency, and the use of the U.S. mails to import limitless quantities of tobacco and other goods for black market purposes also helped to curb the practice. But there can be no doubt that this serious threat to morale, discipline and welfare of occupation personnel was ended mainly as a result of the economic recovery of Western Germany. Black marketing after 1948 was only on a petty scale, and it ceased to be a major problem as far as U.S. personnel were concerned.

CHAPTER V

The Theater Safety Program

78. Need for the Program

Following the cessation of hostilities and the end of combat conditions, nonbattle fatalities and injuries to the military personnel resulting from accidents were abnormally high. While accurate statistics are not available, the theater surgeon reported that in the period 1 January - 30 November 1945 over two hundred thousand American military personnel were hospitalized for nonbattle injuries. Accidental injuries were relatively severe, the average hospitalization per injury being thirty-three days, as compared with twenty in the United States. It was further revealed that in a typical eight-week period more than five hundred soldiers lost their lives because of preventable accidents. Motor vehicle accidents alone accounted for the deaths of 125 persons monthly. While theater troop strength was becoming progressively less, the number of such accidents was increasing. In the five-month period from 1 July to 30 November 1945, about 7,800 motor vehicle accidents were recorded.¹

79. Causes of High Accident Rate

Among the causes listed for the high accident rate were:
(1) lax discipline and indifference of troops, resulting from redeployment, home front public opinion, and a general letup after cessation of hostilities; (2) shortage of supervisory personnel, and rapid turnover of personnel, with frequent changes in command;

¹(1) USFET Theater Comdr's Wkly Staff Conf No. 1, 18 Dec 45, par. 37. (2) TSFET, OTPM, Rept of Opns, 1 Oct 45 - 31 Dec 45, p. 44, and App. A.

(3) shortage of adequately trained drivers and experienced maintenance personnel; (4) operation of obsolete, faulty, and badly worn vehicles; (5) a marked increase in recreational and unauthorized driving; and, (6) reduction of military police road patrols.²

80. The Start of the Program

At the theater commander's request, the War Department assigned two men to the theater to study the accident problem and make plans for improvement of conditions. Of the men assigned to this task, Lieutenant Colonel Grannis had been identified with the Army safety program from its beginning in August 1942, as chief of the Safety Branch of the Provost Marshal General's Office. The other, H. William Heinrich, was one of the leaders in the National Safety Council and chief safety engineer of one of the largest casualty insurance companies in the United States. These men conducted an exhaustive study of the accident problem in the theater, made personal surveys of many installations, and conferred with representatives of general and special staff sections. Their work resulted in the publication of a standing operating procedure on 26 November 1945, which inaugurated the European theater safety program.³

81. Mission and Responsibility

a. The mission of the safety program was to promote efficiency and economy in the attainment of theater objectives: (1) by eliminating hazardous conditions or unhealthful practices that had resulted in personal injuries or occupational diseases to military personnel, prisoners of war, civilian employees of theater forces, and employees of private contractors of special interest to the theater commander; (2) by keeping interruptions to military operations as a result of accidents to a minimum; and, (3) by reducing severity and frequency of damage to motor vehicles, aircraft, and other military equipment.

b. The assistant chief of staff, G - 1, Headquarters, USFET, was charged with staff supervision of the program, while the theater

²(1) Memo, TSFET, OTPM, 31 Jan 46, C/Safety Div to Gen Wessels, TPM. (2) USFET, Theater Comdr's Wkly Staff Conf No. 1, 13 Dec 45, par. 37.

³(1) USFET SOP 72, 26 Nov 45. (2) OTPM, Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 45, pp. 44 - 46.

provost marshal was assigned operational responsibility for carrying out the program through a theater safety director who was to be a component part of the Provost Marshal's Office. The primary responsibility for the operation of the safety program, however, rested with the commanding officers of all military units and installations down to the lowest echelon. All echelons were directed to designate safety officers to discharge the responsibilities for the conduct of the program.

c. An accident reporting procedure was established under which the unit safety officer was to have complete knowledge of accidents of his unit. Consolidated reports were to be prepared at higher levels and forwarded to the theater safety director.

82. Training of Safety Officers

a. One of the most serious obstacles to the successful operation of the program was the lack of adequately trained safety personnel. At the direction of the theater provost marshal, arrangements were made for the establishment of a safety officer's training school. The first session of the school was held at the 6815 Military Police Training School at Romilly-sur-Seine, France, during the period 17 - 21 December 1945. Representatives of all major subordinate commands attended the six-day course, covering forty hours of training. The second improved safety course was conducted at the I&E School in Frankfurt, 14 - 18 January 1946. As a result of these two sessions of the school, fifty-six safety officers were instructed in accident prevention.⁴

b. Because of the constant turnover of personnel, the theater safety director and his staff found it desirable to continue the education and training of safety directors in the field by means of the conference method. Visits were made to major commands for the purpose of holding conferences with all safety directors of the command. In this way, the training program reached a larger number of safety personnel directly. Formerly representatives of commands taught at the school had been obliged to undertake the training of their subordinate personnel in turn.⁵

83. Inauguration of First Traffic Safety Campaign

The reports from safety directors and command provost marshals

⁴(1) USFET, Theater Comdr's Wkly Staff Conf No. 1, 18 Dec 45, par. 37b. (2) OTPM, Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 45, p. 46.

⁵Interv with Mr. Hayden, Safety Section, OPM, 2 Jun 48, Frankfurt a/M.

in the first two months of the program indicated that there was a steady increase in motor vehicle traffic accidents. These reports, confirmed by statistics compiled by the theater surgeon, indicated that vehicle accidents accounted for approximately 45 percent of all accidental deaths reported in the theater. In order to reduce the alarming toll of lives claimed by vehicle accidents, a traffic safety campaign was inaugurated on 1 March 1946 to continue throughout the month.⁶

84. Conduct of Traffic Safety Campaign

Intensive and thorough publicity was given the campaign in order to make all occupation personnel aware of the great need for improved and conscientious safety habits. Effective measures were adopted to make the campaign widely known and successful: three safety posters were printed and distributed; signs and banners inscribed "Death is So Permanent -- Drive Carefully" were posted and displayed at strategic locations; "Safe Driving Pledges" were distributed for signature by all operators of government vehicles; "Safety Slogans" for each day of the month were reproduced at command or unit level and distributed to all drivers, including German civilian drivers. Other media of communication were also utilized. The American Forces Network broadcast safety messages at various times each day. A radio show was also arranged in which two enlisted men asked questions relating to accident prevention, which were answered by the acting theater provost marshal, the acting theater surgeon, and the theater safety director. The Stars and Stripes gave publicity to the campaign as well, the Southern Germany edition carrying daily safety messages on the front page.⁷

85. Results of the Campaign

During the month of the campaign, when 4,429,409 more miles were driven than in February, a sudden and sharp decrease in the number of motor vehicle accidents was noted. Although it was partly attributable to the approach of spring and the greater number of dry days, the safety campaign was regarded as largely responsible for the improvement. The following comparative figures show vehicle accident totals for the first three months of 1946:

⁶USFET ltr, 14 Feb 46, sub: Theaterwide Traffic Safety Campaign -- March 1946. AG 729 GAP - AGO.

⁷(1) Ibid. (2) OTPM, Rept of Opns, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, pp. 17 - 18.

Jan. (31 days)

Feb. (28 days)

Mar. (31 days)

1,053

1,002

812

It was observed that during the last week of March a rise occurred in reported motor vehicle deaths as compared with figures for preceding weeks in the month. This, however, was thought to be due to increased accuracy and thoroughness in reporting accidents rather than to any diminution of safety-mindedness. Nevertheless, too many accidental deaths (eighty-two in March, 40 percent of which were connected with automobile accidents) were being reported and too many government vehicles were being seriously damaged (853 in March) to justify any feeling that the campaign had solved the safety problem within the theater.⁸

86. Later Development of Traffic Safety Program

a. The reported theater vehicle accident frequency rate for April, being 7 percent higher than that for March, dispelled any illusions that may have been entertained that the March Safety Campaign had brought about a permanent improvement in the situation. To lay a more substantial foundation for improved safety in the operation of motor vehicles, a prevention program based on four principles was stressed in June 1946:⁹ (1) a skillful and emotionally stable operator behind the wheel; (2) a safely equipped and properly maintained vehicle in operation; (3) elimination of unofficial and unauthorized movement of vehicles; and (4) preventive traffic regulation enforcement with corrective disciplinary enforcement where indicated.

b. A survey in June, based on April strength reports and reported motor vehicle density, showed that there was one motor vehicle to every six military personnel in the European theater. Accordingly, a reduction in the number of vehicles in operation was recommended to major commands, in order to permit improved maintenance of those in operation, elimination of poor drivers, improved transportation efficiency, savings in transportation costs, and reduction of accident frequency. On 1 July 1946 an

⁸(1) IRS, USFET SGS to G - 4, 19 Apr 46, sub: Safety Situation and attached memo. (2) OIPM, Rept of Opns, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 46, pp. 18 - 19. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁹(1) USFET ltr, 14 Jun 46, sub: Safety Bulletin. AG 729 PMG - AGO. (2) OIPM, Rept of Opns, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47, p. 19.

additional means of dispatch control of vehicles was established, calling for the use of an official dispatch stamp on all trip tickets.¹⁰

c. A continuous maintenance of "Death is so Permanent" signs which had been used effectively in the March 1946 traffic safety campaign and had created a good impression, was ordered. To increase safety consciousness and to highlight hazardous road locations where excessive accidents had occurred, exhibits of wrecked vehicles or signs indicating the number of fatalities or casualties that had happened there were erected.¹¹

d. Public recognition was now accorded for satisfactory maintenance and operation of vehicles in keeping with standards of neatness and safe driving. This took a variety of forms, ranging from letters of commendation to gold stars on a wall plaque. In order to qualify for a driver's award, a driver had to pass the aptitude and standard qualification tests as prescribed in Army technical manuals and perform duty for a minimum of three months as a driver with an accident-free and traffic violation-free record.¹²

e. In July 1946, it was revealed that about 35 percent of all motor accidents in the theater were jeep accidents attributable to the following factors: (1) excessive speed in relation to driving conditions; (2) driving under the influence of liquor; (3) neglect of organization commanders to punish traffic violations; (4) failure of drivers to display deference and courtesy on the road and lack of responsibility on their part; (5) vehicles not in safe driving condition, often lacking safety devices such as rear view mirrors, and good brakes and headlights; (6) overloading and overcrowding; and (7) poor condition of roads. The accident rate for government-owned jeeps was very high as compared with privately owned jeeps. The underlying causes for this situation were believed to be that drivers of government vehicles assumed no pecuniary responsibility for them, that there prevailed general laxity in the enforcement of existing regulations, and that drivers were not being carefully selected and trained. To correct these conditions a new policy of stern disciplinary action was

¹⁰(1) Ibid. (2) C 3, SOP 65, 1 Jul 46.

¹¹USFET ltr, 14 Jun 46, sub: Safety Bulletin. AG 729 PMG - AGO.

¹²USFET ltr, 21 Mar 46, sub: Theater Safety Program. AG 729 PMG - AGO.

adopted in August 1946. Drivers involved in accidents traceable to faulty or reckless driving were to have their driving permits revoked. The permit was also to be revoked in the case of any driver found guilty of any major traffic violation or of three minor traffic violations in any three-month period. In cases of accidents resulting from negligence or reckless driving, drivers found to have been responsible on investigation were to be held financially liable for damage to government vehicles.¹³ Pursuant to this new policy 367 drivers in March 1947 were held responsible for accidents and resulting damages. Disciplinary action by courts-martial was taken against seventy-four of the drivers concerned. During the same month twenty-six drivers' permits were revoked. In the case of civilian drivers twenty-two were dismissed.¹⁴

f. Since a large percentage of replacement drivers and many earlier drivers in the European theater were not experienced motor vehicle operators, a driver training program was also set up in August 1946, including the requirement of one hour per week of re-training of motor vehicle operators. During the first week of October 1946, the first of a series of unannounced traffic campaigns was conducted with the object of revoking permits of incapable, irresponsible, or reckless drivers. Military police were stationed on dangerous road stretches and intersections where good driver judgment was required. All violators were arrested and full publicity was given on the number of daily arrests made, licenses revoked in cases of major traffic violations, and even sometimes for minor violations.¹⁵

g. The presence of large numbers of bicycles, and ridden, led, and driven animals on the roads in the theater presented a serious traffic hazard and necessitated special precautions. In order to prevent accidents and to display proper road courtesies in the presence of hazards, drivers of military vehicles were required under standing operating procedure to exercise such precautions as reduction of speed and yielding the right of way to slower moving traffic, unless otherwise directed by traffic control personnel. These regulations were emphasized in safety bulletins and in drivers'

¹³(1) Memo, USFET IG for COFS, 29 Jul 46, sub: Reduction of Jeep Accidents. (2) USFET ltr, 14 Aug 46, sub: Vehicle Accidents. AG 537.5 GAP - AGO.

¹⁴Theater Comdr's Wkly Staff Conf No. 8, 6 May 47, par. 38.

¹⁵(1) OTPM, Rept of Opns, Aug - Sep 46, p. 97. (2) USFET ltr, 20 Sep 47, sub: Vehicle Accidents. AG 537.5 GAP - AGO. (3) USFET ltr, 13 Aug 46, sub: Driver Training.

training programs.¹⁶ Nevertheless, high speeds and preoccupied Germans roaming streets and roads continued to be a bad combination. In order to slow down drivers in built-up sections and on short stretches of particularly dangerous roadway, community commanders were directed to post maximum speeds within the boundaries of their communities.¹⁷

h. An effort was also made to change the erroneous notion that inclement weather, slippery highways, rutty roads, and the like were the cause of accidents rather than failure of drivers to compensate for poor driving conditions by exercising greater caution. "Defensive" driving in dubious circumstances was recommended and was defined as the "operation of a motor vehicle in a manner which recognizes the limitation of vehicle, physical and highway conditions and the potentially unsafe acts of other drivers and pedestrians and fully compensates for the potential effects of such influences."¹⁸

i. Two additional principles for the accident prevention program were laid down during the third quarter of 1946: (1) thorough and unbiased accident investigation and corrections based thereon; and (2) education in and enforcement of traffic safety rules by domestic authorities. Full responsibility for checking the completeness of accident reports and of taking individual corrective action was charged to safety officers of the unit concerned.¹⁹

j. As regards the traffic safety habits of the domestic population, OMGUS was requested to direct a broad educational and enforcement program among the Germans. Sporadic campaigns, in line with this request, were organized by military government, but dynamic leadership was lacking to follow up initial measures with further efforts. Stricter controls were also imposed. Thus in January 1947 German drivers of military vehicles were placed under the jurisdiction of German police as well as of the military police. Both German and military driving permits were required and both were revoked for traffic violations. Previously, German drivers of military vehicles had disregarded the German police.²⁰

¹⁶(1) USFET SOP 65, 28 Nov 45, par. 5a(1) Sec. II. (2) USFET ltr, 22 Jul 46, sub: Safety Bulletin. AG 729 PMG - AGO.

¹⁷(1) IRS, USFET OTPM to G - 1, 28 Aug 46, sub: High Speed Limits, and Min 5. (2) C 10, USFET SOP 65, 25 Sep 47.

¹⁸(1) USFET ltr, 22 Jul 46, sub: Safety Bulletin. AG 729 PMG - AGO. (2) OTPM, Rept of Opns, Apr - Jun 46, p. 24.

¹⁹OTPM, Rept of Opns, Jul - Sep 46, p. 96.

²⁰Ibid., p. 97; Jan - Mar 47, pp. 96, 97.

87. Motor Vehicle Accident Statistics

Despite all efforts to reduce the motor vehicle accident rate, it rose gradually following the intensive campaign of March 1946 to reach a new high during the winter months of 1946 - 47. After that it sharply declined. This decrease was attributed in large part to disciplinary enforcement and follow-through tactics to ensure adequate punitive measures for drivers responsible for accidents through lack of skill or discipline or through misconduct. Trends in the vehicle accident frequency rate from the beginning of 1946 to the middle of 1947 were as follows:²¹

Accidents Per 100,000 Miles Driven

1946

January	2.84
February	2.43
March	1.77
April	1.89
May	2.14
June	2.15
July	2.25
August	2.26
September	2.22
October	2.52
November	3.03
December	2.71

1947

January	3.04
February	2.99
March	1.90
April	1.77
May	1.85
June	1.63

It was estimated that during the year 1946, 13,320 motor vehicle accidents cost the United States Government approximately \$10,000,000. This figure was based on losses in damaged vehicles and property and economic value of life based on life expectancy variously estimated between ten and twenty thousand dollars. In 1946, there were 1,000 fatalities and 9,132 disabling injuries to members of the occupation forces arising out of motor vehicle accidents. Each of the injuries represented an average of twenty days' lost time for a total of 500 man-years, an approximate replacement loss of about \$1,000,000 for the year. This latter figure did not include costs of medical supplies and services.²²

²¹Ibid., Jan 46 - Jun 47.

²²Ibid., Jan - Mar 47, pp. 92, 93.

88. Gunshot and Stabbing Accidents

For several months following hostilities, troops carried weapons for personal protection. As a consequence, gunshot and stabbing incidents were second in seriousness among accidents. Accordingly, with the inception of the theater safety program, unit commanders were made responsible for the security of all arms and ammunition in the possession of personnel of their respective units.²³ Nevertheless, figures in March 1946 showed that 39 percent of the casualties among U.S. personnel for that month were caused either by gunshot or stabbing accidents. Of all firearms incidents resulting in injuries or fatalities to military personnel, 40 percent were accidents and 60 percent were homicides.²⁴ In view of these facts more stringent measures for the control of weapons were undertaken. A theater directive, issued in April 1946, forbade the illegal possession of firearms or ammunition or carrying of arms. Violations were to be a basis for court-martial. As a further precaution, all nonorganizational firearms and all such souvenirs as weapon-type knives, brass knuckles, and similar items were to be retained under lock in company and similar storerooms. Weapons prescribed by local commanding officers for men on duty or for hunting or sporting events were to be rigidly inspected and properly stored when not in use.²⁵ Special posters were prepared to arouse soldiers to the dangers of indiscriminate handling of firearms and the part they played in theater accident totals. By June 1946, the number of gunshot and stabbing fatalities had been reduced to 17.2 percent of the total number, but the problem was still the second in seriousness among accidents. Continuous checks and inspections of soldiers' quarters for weapons had a good effect in decreasing the number of casualties from these causes. During the third quarter of 1946 gunshot and stabbing accounted for only 11 percent of the total fatalities. However, during the last quarter of 1946, partly because of the growing popularity of hunting, the figure again rose to 25 percent, but it dropped to 15 percent in the first quarter of 1947 and remained at about the same level until 30 June 1947.²⁶

89. Drownings

Drowning fatalities in the theater became a problem during summer months when unsupervised swimming in unauthorized pools

²³USFET ltr, 3 Jan 46, sub: Carrying of Arms. AG 474 GAP - AGED.

²⁴OTPM, Rept of Opns, Jan - Mar 46, p. 2.

²⁵USFET ltr, 29 Apr 46, sub: Disciplinary Control. AG 250 GAP - AGO.

²⁶(1) OTPM, Rept of Opns, Jan 46 - Jun 47. (2) USFET ltr, 22 Jul 46, sub: Safety Bulletin, par. 5. AG 729 PMG - AGO.

increased the number of accidents of this type. Deaths from drowning, for example, increased from five in April 1946 to fifteen in May. Controls were applied to restrict swimming, boating, and aquatic sports to areas which were under supervision. Safety posters were used widely to urge soldiers to swim only in approved pools under lifeguard supervision. Nevertheless, figures showed that drownings comprised about 18 percent of fatalities in June 1947 as compared to 9.2 percent in June 1946.²⁷

90. Other Accidents

Fatalities to personnel under control of the theater commander resulting from miscellaneous causes generally accounted for 20 to 30 percent of all fatalities in each quarterly period. The causes for these accidental deaths included alcohol poisoning, falls, suicides, railway, streetcar and aircraft accidents, electrocutions, and burns.²⁸

91. Safety Education

As part of the drive to curb accidents of all types in the theater, the Safety Section of the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal planned, printed, and distributed "Safety Posters" for each month, emphasizing various safety practices. In order to familiarize drivers with international road signs and symbols, decalcomanias were distributed to all major commands, to be applied to the dashboards of automobiles. A monthly "Safety Bulletin" was published by the Safety Section of the Office of the Provost Marshal and sent to all headquarters and commands having related responsibilities. These bulletins gave suggestions, information, etc. for the attainment of greater safety under the theater program. Other educational efforts along the same lines included the use of films and spot announcements on the radio, as well as the dissemination of various pertinent publications secured from the United States.²⁹

92. Handicaps to the Safety Program

The major problem in carrying out the program was the lack of enough qualified personnel in the field to accomplish the announced safety mission. To considerable degree, therefor, the European

²⁷(1) USFET ltr, 14 Jun 46, sub: Safety Bulletin and same 22 Jul 46. AG 729 PMG - AGO. (2) EUCOM ltr, 17 Jun 47, sub: Safety Bulletin. AG 729.3 PMG - AGO. (3) OTFM, Rept of Opns, Apr - Jun 46, p. 21, 22, and Apr - Jun 47, p. 76.

²⁸OTFM, Repts of Opns, May 45 - Jun 47.

²⁹Ibid.

Command safety program was reduced to the mere reporting of accidents. There was insufficient technical planning, analysis and correction of proven causes of accidents, physical inspection of areas and operations, and the application of engineering, education, and enforcement techniques to the accident problem. A significant weakness in the safety program was the absence of table of organization spaces for safety personnel. As of 30 June 1947 there was indication that the War Department had taken cognizance of this situation and was planning corrective action.³⁰

93. Statistical Summary

Starting in June 1946, consolidated theater accident statistics were compiled from reports submitted by major commands. The following tabulation shows the incidence of accidents for the fiscal year 1946 - 1947:³¹

	Average for <u>1st Quarter</u>	Average for <u>2d Quarter</u>	Average for <u>3d Quarter</u>	Average for <u>4th Quarter</u>
U.S. Military (a)	8.37	9.34	6.26	7.77
Prisoners of War (a)	2.14	2.43	0.33	0.98
Civilian (b)	6.59	5.22	6.10	4.41
Motor Vehicle (c)	2.22	2.59	2.66	1.77

- (a) Disabling injuries per 100,000 man days exposure
 (b) " " " 1,000,000 man hours "
 (c) Accidents per 100,000 miles driven.

³⁰(1) WD ltr, DCOFS to USFET, 2 Apr 47, sub: Army Safety Program, par. 5. (2) OIPM, Rept of Opns, Apr - Jun 47, p. 79.

³¹OIPM, Rept of Opns, May 45 - Jun 47.

CHAPTER VI

Vehicle Registration, Documentation, and Operation

94. Situation Following V-E Day

One matter of importance from the point of view of both discipline and safety was that of the ownership and operation of privately owned motor vehicles. Before V-E Day there had been, theoretically at least, no privately owned automobiles in the hands of U.S. military personnel; every vehicle in the hands of troops had been considered the property of the Army. Immediately after V-E Day many military vehicles, particularly jeeps, were used by troops for personal purposes. Often left stranded by units, vehicles were subsequently appropriated by soldiers for private use, a practice facilitated by the fact that at first very little or no checking was made of car markings. Gradually, however, military vehicles were rounded up and turned over to the custody of appropriate units. With the end of hostilities, other possibilities developed for the private ownership of automobiles. At first the main source was the German economy, but later in one way or another vehicles were "liberated" or requisitioned for personal use. Not all cars, however, were "liberated" outright; many were bought and paid for, generally with illegally acquired marks and black market goods such as cigarettes and other PX items. Since no rules or regulations governed such transactions, many private vehicles were thus lost to the German economy. Legally, no gasoline or oil was available for vehicles privately owned by occupation personnel. Petroleum products (POL), nevertheless, were procured in devious ways. In some instances, an army serial number was illegally painted on a vehicle and gasoline was obtained at Army stations, ostensibly for an Army vehicle. Often German attendants at POL stations were able to supply gasoline for cigarettes or other items. Gasoline was also siphoned from military vehicles and transferred to privately owned

cars. This situation existed for nearly a year following V-E Day.¹

95. Registration Plan

The shortage of transportation, especially for private or recreational purposes, in the months following the end of the war had an adverse effect on troop morale. In order to remedy this shortage, it was decided to dispose of Army surplus stocks of used vehicles. Plans were initiated in the fall of 1945 for the sale of surplus U.S. passenger-carrying vehicles through the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC) in Paris. In September the G-1 Division of Theater Service Forces began exploring conditions under which U.S. surplus vehicles could be sold. On 2 October 1945 the Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Branch of the Theater Provost Marshal's Office declared that prior to the sale of same, it would be necessary to establish U.S. courts to handle litigation, establish a registry, secure personnel for the operation, provide for liability insurance, set up condition test stations and regulations and restrictions for travel outside occupied territory. The proposed civilian vehicle registry was to have responsibility for registering all vehicles owned by individuals of the army of occupation and for issuing license plates and transferring the latter upon sale of the vehicle. Estimates disclosed a projected figure of 30,000 to 45,000 registrations per year. The function of registry would be assigned to the theater provost marshal. A plan was also requested of the Army Exchange Service (AES) to cover the servicing and maintenance of these vehicles.²

96. Need of Control

Meanwhile, the acquisition of cars from the German economy waited on no such rules and regulations. Likewise, in the absence of regulations prohibiting sales of surplus vehicles from U.S. Army stocks, OFLC in Paris undertook during the winter of 1945-46 to sell surplus jeeps and other passenger-carrying vehicles, many of which were in a state of questionable repair and a menace to safety. The loss of life and serious injury resulting from motor vehicle accidents became more and more noticeable. Of 500 fatal preventable accidents to soldiers in a typical eight week period, 42 percent were attributed to the operation of defective cars. A survey of the

¹ Interv with Capt T. J. Donovan, Chief, Motor Vehicle Registry Section, MP Div OPM, 15 Jul 48, Frankfurt a/M.

²(1) IRS, TSFET, G - 1 to OPM, 17 Sep 45, sub: Sale of Surplus Vehicles, & 1st Ind, 2 Oct 45. (2) Ltr, OPM to ACOFS G - 1, 4 Oct 47.

accident problem which to a major degree inspired the theater safety program also pointed to an urgent need for control of private vehicles owned by troops in the theater.³

97. Start of Vehicle Registration

Because of the need for orderly traffic control and protection of the German economy against acquisition of German vehicles by Americans and Allies at black market prices, the Office of the Military Governor, the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, and the several branches of Theater Service Forces were gravely concerned with problems and plans relating to the matter of privately owned vehicles. Before plans for adequate control could be developed, preliminaries had to be handled. Setting up a registry, securing personnel to operate it, arranging for insurance coverage of vehicles, establishing courts to handle litigation, and devising regulations, all took considerable time.⁴ In February 1946, however, a USFET directive was issued restricting the operation of privately owned vehicles receiving POL products from U.S. military stocks in the United States Zone of Occupation to authorized correspondents. In accordance with this directive, the Provost Marshal's Office proceeded to register vehicles of correspondents approved by the Public Relations Division of USFET headquarters. Thus began the actual functioning of the Vehicle Registry Office.⁵

98. Establishment of Vehicle Registry Office

On 27 April 1946 official establishment of a Vehicle Registry Office for all privately owned vehicles in the United States Zones of Germany and Austria was authorized with the publication of the Vehicle and Traffic Code, one provision of which stated that a registry of motor vehicles should be established in the Office of the Theater Provost Marshal. The Vehicle Registry Section of the Military Police Division was set up, headed by a Theater Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The section was the sole registering agency for such vehicles in the theater; it alone issued authorizations for operating them.⁶

³USFET OTPM Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 45, p. 45 and App. A.

⁴USFET OTPM Rept of Opns, Jan - Mar 46, Supp. Doc, Vol. IV, par. 17.

⁵USFET Cir 22, 17 Feb 46.

⁶USFET ltr, 27 Apr 46, sub: Vehicle and Traffic Code. AG 451 GAP - AGO.

99. Provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Code

The Vehicle and Traffic Code made mandatory the registration of all vehicles, motorcycles, and trailers owned and operated by United States military and civilian personnel and visiting nationals of Allied nations. Personnel in the last category were required to have temporary registration of privately owned vehicles; Public Relations Division initiated requests for approval by the Provost Marshal. No certificate of registration was to be granted, however, unless certain significant requirements and regulations were complied with. No private vehicle was to be registered unless the owner first proved his financial responsibility for damages resulting from the operation of such a vehicle. This proof was to be given by presenting, with the application for registration, a current insurance policy in the amount of \$5,000 liability for injury to or death of one person and \$10,000 for injury to or death of more than one person, and \$1,000 property damage liability. No person was to operate a motor vehicle unless a certificate of title thereto had first been obtained. No person was to alter or forge any certificate of title or assignment. No private vehicle owned by United States, Allied or neutral personnel was to be sold or transferred in the United States Zone of Germany to a person other than United States, Allied or neutral personnel eligible to operate private vehicles in such territory. No private vehicle owned by a person employed by, accompanying, or serving with the armed forces could be sold or transferred to a German, Hungarian, Rumanian or Bulgarian national. Upon the sale or transfer of a private vehicle the seller was not to receive a credit entry in his currency exchange control book unless the buyer received an equal debit in his. No person was to own, operate, or sell a motor vehicle on which the engine or manufacturer's serial number had been removed, altered, or defaced. No person was to operate a motor vehicle without an adequate operator's license, and no automobile was to be registered unless it fulfilled proper safety equipment specifications.⁷

100. Revision of Vehicle and Traffic Code

The provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Code were rewritten in September 1946. They now applied to the operation of all vehicles within the United States occupied territories of Germany and Austria except United States military vehicles; vehicles of German and Austrian nationals, displaced persons and other residents of those countries; and vehicles of transients remaining in United States occupied territories less than sixty days. Transient personnel properly registered in another country or zone were issued stickers authorizing motor travel in the United States Zones. The

⁷ Ibid.

major provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Code remained substantially the same thereafter. For registry of vehicles, applicants continued to be required to present documentary proof of ownership and safe condition of vehicle and proof of financial responsibility (insurance) for injury, death, or property damage resulting from operation of the vehicle. Vehicle operators were required to possess driving licenses, certificates of registration and title, and registration plates. Violations punishable by revocation or suspension of registry or driving privileges were enumerated.⁸

101. Amendments of Revised Code

After the September revision of the traffic code, it was amended only in minor particulars. In November 1946 changes were made in speed limits on the highways where lower speeds were not specified on signs in plain view. In January 1947 a theater directive forbade the simultaneous use of United States license and authorized theater registration plates. It had been found that this practice led to confusion of identification, particularly when the car was in motion. Exempted were foreign military or government vehicles or private autos of foreign liaison officers where the autos were required to bear license plates under laws of the government concerned. During March 1947 a directive revised prerequisites for securing an operator's license. The most important change was that a demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of international road signs was henceforth required. In the same month another amendment directed that registration plates be transferred with the vehicle in question through the Office of the Registrar.⁹ Beginning in the first quarter of 1947, German-owned and operated taxis, used exclusively for the transportation of U.S. and Allied personnel, had also to be registered and issued license plates by the vehicle registrar.

102. Control of Purchase and Sale of Vehicles

It has already been noted that one of the purposes in establishing a vehicle registry was to protect the German economy. The regulations respecting titles to vehicles, motor numbers and manufacturers' serial numbers and tampering therewith, and those governing currency control book entries, were all designed to aid in

⁸USFET Cir 124, 4 Sep 46, sub: Vehicle and Traffic Code.

⁹(1) USFET Cir 160, 2 Nov 46, Sec. I. (2) USFET Cir 20, 14 Mar 47, Sec. I. (3) EUCOM Cir 4, 26 Mar 47, Sec. VII. (4) USFET ltr, 30 Jan 41, sub: Motor Vehicle Registration Plates. AG 451.02 GAP - AGO.

curbing black market dealing, profiteering, and illegal sales of cars once belonging to Germans. A theater directive of 17 April 1946 had already specifically forbidden the purchase, lease, or operation of German and Austrian cars by anyone other than German or Austrian nationals. This enjoinder continued to be violated, however, in various ways. For instance, the rules of USFET in this matter did not agree with those of OMEUS; personnel working with military government continued to make free use of German vehicles. An even more flagrant violation of the USFET rules was the persistent and frequent purchase of German cars by U.S. and Allied personnel. In view of the fact that a number of this personnel had acquired cars from Germans prior to the effectuation of the directive of 17 April 1946, it was decided by the authorities to honor claims for ownership of such vehicles. As a consequence, however, many persons backdated bills of sale on automobiles that were purchased after the promulgation of the directive. Others managed to buy German cars through displaced persons, to whom the rules on buying and selling of German motor vehicles did not apply.¹⁰ The Vehicle Registry Office received so many registration applications of this type that some action had to be taken. Accordingly, a theater directive of 31 March 1947 froze the sale of all used cars American as well as German within the United States Zone. This restriction was temporary, but on 22 May a new directive in effect prohibited the purchasing of a motor vehicle which at any time had been owned by a German citizen, German commercial or governmental agency, stateless person, or alien resident of Germany. Applications already in the Vehicle Registry Office prior to 31 March were to be honored, but no others. Finally, these regulations were also to apply to Military Government personnel. This measure dealt the deathblow to black market sales of German cars in the United States Zone.¹¹

103. Restriction on Sale of Non-German Cars

The same directive also placed restrictions on the sale of non-German cars. No transactions were allowed outside the United States area of control. Vehicles imported into or acquired in the United States area of control could not be sold within six months after the date of importation or acquisition, except when the owner

¹⁰(1) USFET Cir 49, 17 Apr 46. (2) Interv with Capt T. J. Donovan, Chief, Motor Vehicle Registry Section, MP Div, OTPM, 15 Jul 48, Frankfurt a/M.

¹¹(1) EUCOM ltr, 31 Mar 47, sub: Sale of Used Motor Vehicles. AG 451 GAP - AGO. (2) EUCOM Cir 31, 22 May 47, sub: Sale of Motor Vehicles. (3) Interv with Capt T. J. Donovan, Chief, Motor Vehicle Registry Section, MP Div, OTPM, 15 Jul 48, Frankfurt a/M.

was under orders for permanent departure from the European Command or in case of emergency as determined by the Office of the Registrar.¹²

104. Vehicle Inspections

Another chief objective in setting up the Vehicle Registry Office was the achievement of orderly traffic control. The requirement providing that vehicles had to meet safety specifications, and the insistence on insurance, went a long way towards assuring better traffic control. In addition, the Vehicle and Traffic Code called for semiannual inspections of all privately owned vehicles. Forty-two official vehicle condition test stations were established in cooperation with the Army Exchange Service in the occupied areas of Germany and Austria. These stations were German garages under contract with Army Exchange Service.¹³

105. Operation of Vehicle Registry Section

The Vehicle Registry Section had no counterpart on any command or lower level. However, in addition to the registrar who was chief of the Motor Vehicle Registry, assistant registrars were appointed in the cities of Berlin, Bremen, Nuremberg, Heidelberg, and Munich. The number of assistant registrars increased to fourteen by 30 June 1947. The registrar and assistant kept all necessary records, issued license plates and certificates upon receipt of applications, and performed all acts in the registration and control of vehicles as required under the Vehicle and Traffic Law. By 30 June 1947, approximately 19,000 vehicles had been registered, 25,800 private operator's licenses had been issued, and Judge Advocate's Office had made approximately 1,600 decisions on titles for the purpose of registration.¹⁴

106. Regulations for Sale of Surplus Vehicles

In order to keep unsafe vehicles off the highways and to ensure ownership and operation of private vehicles by responsible persons it

¹² EUCOM Cir 31, 22 May 47.

¹³(1) USFET ltr, 8 Oct 46. AG 451 PMG - AGO. (2) OTPM, Rept of Opns, Jul - Sep 46, p. 71; Sep - Oct, pp. 82, 86; Apr - Jun, p. 64.

¹⁴(1) USFET ltr, 27 Apr 46, sub: Vehicle and Traffic Code. AG 451 GAP - AGO. (2) Interv with Capt T. J. Donovan, Vehicle Registry Section, OTPM, EUCOM, 15 Sep 47, Frankfurt a/M. (3) OTPM Rept of Opns, Vol. V, pp. 70 - 71; Vol. VI, p. 77; Vol. VIII, p. 63.

was deemed necessary to regulate the purchase and use of vehicles in the European theater by personnel under control of the theater commander. Accordingly, the policies and procedures governing the sale of surplus vehicles were published in June 1946 in a theater standing operating procedure.¹⁵

a. The SOP designated the Army Exchange Service as the sole agency responsible for the procurement and sale of surplus motor vehicles, including jeeps, trucks, ambulances, passenger vehicles, motorcycles, scooters and trailers. All individuals were forbidden to purchase surplus army vehicles except from this source. The Army Exchange Service was also charged with responsibility for supervision of the necessary service and repair facilities. A person desiring to purchase a motor vehicle was required to submit to the Army Exchange Service a request in writing approved by his commanding officer or civilian supervisor, and reviewed by an officer of field grade or civilian equivalent in the next higher echelon. Review of applications was unnecessary if first approval had been given by a general officer or civilian whose rating was equivalent to that of a general officer. All commanding officers and civilian supervisors were directed to be guided by the following principles prior to approval of a purchase request. Request for purchase of vehicles for recreational purposes were to be encouraged but had to include the statement that the vehicle was being purchased solely for the use of the individual and not with intent of resale. Requests for purchase which were obviously of a speculative nature were to be disapproved. The individual purchaser was to be able to pay for the vehicle prior to approval. Requests for purchase on the basis of future availability of funds were to be disapproved.

b. No surplus vehicle could be sold unless it could be placed in first class running condition by agencies to which the purchaser had legitimate access. Although prior to publication of regulations in June 1946, OFLC had sold vehicles marked "Poor," no vehicle could be sold by Army Exchange Service which was classified below "Fair." Pending the establishment of adequate repair services and procurement of spare parts by AES, the Ordnance Service of the command which furnished the surplus vehicle was responsible for its inspection for condition and classification, in accordance with the standards established by the Vehicle and Traffic Code. AES was required to reject any vehicle which did not satisfy inspection. Prior to sale, all Army markings on

¹⁵(1) USFET SOP 85, 8 Jun 46, sub: Sale of Surplus Vehicles to US Military Personnel and Authorized Civilian Employees. (2) USFET SOP 85, 1 Mar 47, sub: Purchase of Surplus Property by US Military Personnel, Civilian Employees, Dependents and US Civilians in the Occupied Zones of Germany and Austria.

vehicles were to be removed, and any vehicles painted olive drab were to be marked with a four-inch stripe across the hood and front fenders, painted in a color contrasting with the olive drab. Purchasers were at liberty to eradicate or paint over this stripe when repainting their cars after purchase. Vehicles could be painted any color that the owner wished, except olive drab, reserved for military vehicles; white, reserved for military police; red, reserved for fire and bomb disposal; and yellow, reserved for Air Force crash trucks and Constabulary. Various combinations of these restricted colors, however, could be used, provided that there was no possibility of mistaking the vehicle so painted for one of those in the above mentioned categories.

c. Army Exchange Service was required to conduct the sale of vehicles in such a manner that before an individual drove away from a purchase, he had to comply with all requirements for registering the vehicle. In the occupied zones AES sold insurance and license plates as required. It did not sell insurance or plates in France. Vehicles sold to persons stationed in liberated areas were licensed with plates of the country in which the purchaser was stationed. For the convenience of purchasers of vehicles, a Provost Marshal's office was established near each location where AES sold vehicles, this office issued registration cards and drivers' licenses and otherwise checked compliance with the provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Code. All sales were made for cash at the time of delivery, payment being made in United States - approved currency of the country in which the vehicle was purchased, and deductions made from the purchaser's currency control book.

107. POL for Private Vehicles

Until publication of the Vehicle and Traffic Code on 27 April 1946, there was no legal way in the occupied areas for owners of private vehicles to obtain gasoline, oil, or lubricants from Army sources, excepting Army-accredited correspondents. Thereafter, persons possessing motor vehicle registry certificates and license plates were authorized to purchase Quartermaster POL coupon books from the Army Exchange Service. Each vehicle owner was limited to one coupon book per month, good for 100 gallons of gasoline. Special authority for additional purchase could be granted only by the Automotive Ration Board. In the liberated areas, POL products could be similarly obtained from Army sources for privately owned vehicles registered with the provost marshal of Western Base Section.¹⁶

¹⁶USFET Cir 77, 28 May 46, sub: Issuance of POL for Privately Owned Vehicles.

108. Subsequent Changes in Issuance of POL Books and in Gasoline Rationing

During the summer of 1946 gasoline ration books were discontinued and plans evolved for the distribution of POL products at AES service stations on an unrationed basis simply upon presentation of certificate of vehicle ownership. To prevent leaks and to discourage black marketing in petroleum products, however, it was necessary to retain a coupon system. Quartermaster (QM) POL books were accordingly placed on sale at post exchanges. Such books were valid at QM and Ordnance service stations. Henceforth, all gasoline and oil dispensing facilities were, under the new plan, available to owners of private vehicles.¹⁷ Early in 1947, EES relinquished to the Quartermaster the function of selling petroleum products to owners of nonmilitary cars. Thereafter until 1949 the EES merely supervised the distribution and sale of QM POL books. These were sold at twenty five cents above cost. On 26 April 1949, however, the chief of staff proposed that EES again be designated the sales medium in the occupied zones for the purveyance of gas and oil for nonmilitary purposes.¹⁸ The transfer was effectuated by August 1949, and thereafter QM POL books were replaced by EES POL books. No immediate increase in price was authorized, although at the end of the year it was found necessary to increase the price of gas by one cent on the gallon. Quartermaster and Ordnance filling stations utilized for the service of privately owned vehicles were transferred to EES.

109. Restoration of Gasoline Rationing in 1949

To discourage abuses of the privilege of unlimited consumption of gasoline, it decided in the third quarter of 1949 once again to institute the rationing system. Owners of private vehicles were henceforth permitted to purchase no more than two EES gasoline coupon books per month (200 gallons). But this was more than ample for normal purposes. A maximum of twenty gallons was also imposed upon any single delivery to the regular tanks of vehicles belonging to authorized persons, but provision was made for the delivery of additional gasoline to spare cans where persons were traveling to points outside the U.S. Zone of Germany. Valid travel orders or other authorization in certificate form was required in such case, stating that the territory through which the car owner intended to drive did not have EES gasoline facilities. Upon approval by the post adjutant, additional gasoline, not to exceed twenty-five

¹⁷USFET AES Rept of Opns, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 46, p. 13.

¹⁸EUCOM EES, Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, pp. 39 - 40.

gallons, might then be delivered.¹⁹ On 1 July 1950 the 200 gallon gas ration was cut to 100 gallons monthly by order of Headquarters, EUCOM, and control of ration issues was strengthened by the entry of each sale of gasoline coupon books in ink on the reverse side of the EUCOM vehicle registration certificate.²⁰ Continued black market activity in gasoline resulted subsequently in further changes in the rationing and sale of gasoline. At the end of November plans were being elaborated, after approval by the commander in chief, for the sale of gasoline for cash rather than for coupons.²¹

110. Military Vehicle Operation

As regards military vehicles, policy and regulations were laid down in a standing operating procedure (SOP) published in June 1945. Provisions applicable to conditions peculiar to the European Theater were emphasized, and attention was called to pertinent army regulation field manuals and technical manuals. Detailed instructions were given regarding operation of vehicles, traffic control, regulation of convoys, safeguarding, maintenance, registration, and marking of vehicles. The SOP was brought up to date in November 1945 and again in March 1947, incorporating changes that had been made to provide more effective control and use of military automobiles. Significant changes included the adoption in April 1946 of a vehicle dispatcher's stamp and rigid control thereof in order to insure against indiscriminate and unauthorized use of trip tickets. In November 1946, a theater directive ordered the licensing of all United States Army general purpose vehicles in use in the theater. License plates were not issued for any vehicle for which the processing unit did not have proper authority. Theater chief of ordnance was responsible for procurement and issuance of license plates. License numbers were prefixed with a distinguishing letter denoting the type of vehicle to which the license plate was applicable. This included all vehicles loaned to quasi-military agencies such as the Army Exchange Service, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association, and the Red Cross.²²

¹⁹EUCOM QM, Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, p. 72.

²⁰EUCOM and USAREUR SAD, Annual Narrative Rept, 1950, p. 187.

²¹Ibid.

²²(1) USFET SOP 65, 30 Jun 45, 28 Nov 45, and 14 Mar 47, sub: Military Motor Vehicle Operations. (2) USFET ltr, 27 Nov 46, sub: Vehicle Licensing Program. 451.02 GDS - AGO.

CHAPTER VII

The Experience with Venereal Disease

111. Significance of the Problem

The incidence of venereal disease (VD) among American forces in the European theater was high in the months following V-E Day, but it would be a mistake on that account to assume that this disease posed a major problem for the Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon. Therapeutic advances in recent years, especially the use of penicillin, enabled theater clinicians to cure gonorrhea and even syphilis promptly in the vast majority of cases. Where initial treatment did not succeed, retreatment almost always had the desired effect. Relapses, moreover, in penicillin-treated cases were fairly uncommon. By 1945 there were many other pathological conditions that entailed longer periods of morbidity and a higher average of permanent disability. If, however, clinically speaking, treatment of venereal disease had ceased to be a serious problem, militarily it remained a nuisance because of manpower and manhours of labor lost through hospitalization and because of the medical expenses incurred. But even this aspect of the problem lost much of its significance when in 1947 treatment for gonorrhea was initiated on a duty status.¹ In addition there were social, moral, and religious aspects of the problem that troubled millions of people who derived only gloomy consolation from the knowledge that immorality and licentiousness have always followed on the heels of war throughout history. The existence of venereal disease among sizeable numbers of American troops on foreign soil was a fact that was in itself repugnant to many

¹C/n 3 (2), D/ Med Div to Hist Div, 21 Feb 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, JA and Med Div, 21 Feb 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945 - 9." SECRET.

Americans. Various circles feared, rightly or wrongly, the consequences for the physical and mental health of the next American generation. To many others the disease rate was a discouraging commentary on the efficacy of the religious and moral training of broad segments of our youth.

112. Postwar VD Rate

A mounting incidence of the disease among American troops in the European theater after V-E Day was observed by the chief surgeon. After the first week in October 1945 the rise was steady and consistent, reaching a rate of 251 per 1,000 per annum for the week ending 21 December 1945. The rate for white troops was high enough, standing at 179, but that for Negro troops was much higher, being 1,029 per thousand.² This rate was based upon 122,953 Form 8 - 122 sex contact histories for the period 6 July - 31 December 1945. The incidence of syphilis alone stood at 27.53 per thousand per annum by the end of the first postwar year.³ By 1946 the rate had risen slightly to 264 cases per thousand per annum, the highest since the entrance of the U.S. into the war. The expression of disease rates in terms of cases per thousand per annum rather than in percentages is admittedly misleading at times for the layman; but the fantastic rise in the VD rate by comparison with the V-E Day figure of 74.94 per thousand per year was cause for justifiable concern on the part of all interested persons whose viewpoint was not strictly medical.

113. Later Fluctuations in the Rate of Infection

Beginning with July 1946 a decline in the rate of venereal disease set in. The rate of 266 for the month of August was followed by 244 for September, and by December of that year the figure was at 224, the lowest in twelve months.⁴ Then from January to June 1947 the rate first rose to 251 and then fell again to 226 in both May and June.⁵ As earlier, the rate of infection in the Negro component of the occupation forces was unduly high. While the white rate, for example, stood at 203 in the peak month of July 1946, the Negro rate was 805, and when the over-all theater low rate of 224

²TSPET OTCS Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 45, p. 55. RESTRICTED.

³Ibid., p. 56

⁴EUCOM OCS Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 46, Preventive Medicine Division Annex. RESTRICTED.

⁵Ibid., 1 Jan - 31 Mar 47; 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47, Preventive Medicine Division Annex.

was reached in December, the white rate being then 175, the Negro rate stood at 660. When in the spring of 1947 the commander in chief, EUCOM placed a greater emphasis on command responsibility for venereal disease control, salutary results shortly appeared in a marked decline in the command rate for all venereal diseases. While during the first nine months of 1947 the monthly rates were consistently over 200, the rate by the last quarter of the calendar year had dropped well below that figure, the reduction being mainly due to the decreased incidence of gonorrhea. Figures for the last half of 1947 were as follows:⁶

<u>Month</u>	<u>Total Rate</u>	<u>Syphilis</u>		<u>Gonorrhea</u>	
		<u>White Rate</u>	<u>Negro Rate</u>	<u>White Rate</u>	<u>Negro Rate</u>
Jul	222	42	175	133	436
Aug	228	45	242	134	435
Sep	206	43	235	120	382
Oct	184	40	234	102	281
Nov	164	45	152	88	224
Dec	149	41	112	85	222

114. Some Reasons for High VD Rate

Theater authorities made conscientious efforts to control the spread of venereal disease among U.S. troops and among the civilian population of Germany. In this campaign the military police were aided by German police who cooperated in making raids on vice areas that were known to be heavily contaminated with venereal disease. Educational precautions, such as the showing of films, the presentation of radio programs, or the giving of informative lectures and weekly instruction were all undertaken. But all encountered the opposition of a league of circumstances which was not easy to vanquish. Promiscuity, immaturity, and the relative youth and irresponsibility of postwar replacements entered into alliance with factors such as the vast reservoir of infected women, the desperate European economic situation that helped undermine feminine virtue, the availability of alcoholic beverages, and the boundless faith which the men themselves placed in the curative powers of penicillin.⁷

115. Military Government Data

In the two years following the cessation of hostilities, milita

⁶Ibid., 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47; Preventive Medicine Annex. RESTRICTED.

⁷(1) USFET OTCS Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 46, p. 51. RESTRICTED. (2) USFET Press Release No. 1888, 12 Jul 46, sub: VD Rate in European Theater Highest Yet.

government gathered considerable data concerning the type of German woman who became infected with venereal disease and transmitted it to occupation troops.⁸ This information was later used as factual background for programs concerned with control of venereal diseases both among the military and civil populations, and especially as indoctrination for troops. Some of the major facts brought to light by military government surveys revealed the following:

(1) Fifty percent of the girls who had been identified as contacts for troops were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, and 80 percent between the ages of fourteen and thirty. Notable was the fact that 80 percent of the women who solicited acquaintance with soldiers had received all their schooling under the Nazi regime and could be regarded as strongly imbued with Nazi doctrines, particularly in matters of moral laxity. This, coupled with the common condition of hunger and privation, disposed many women to promiscuity. Their average youth and their general ignorance of the consequences of venereal infection contributed to the ease with which the disease spread among them.⁹

(2) From 50 to over 70 percent of the women picked up as contacts or in mass raids had no fixed homes, but were "tramps" in every sense of the word, wandering in from distant areas of the U.S. Zone and in many cases coming from the other zones in quest of the "El Dorado" of American generosity. The majority of these who had infected soldiers generally named one or more German men as their original source of infection. Many of them also admitted that they supported German lovers on their "earnings" from soldiers. Military government, therefore, considered such women as an especially dangerous class of clandestine prostitute. Even if such women were not yet infected at the time of initial contact with American soldiers, it was practically inevitable that they would sooner or later become infected. From 40 to 70 percent of female suspects picked up as loiterers around places where troops could be solicited were commonly found upon examination to be infected. Not only were these women a menace to American military personnel, but, it must be remembered, they were a constant threat to the health of the civilian population of Germany.

(3) Many of these women who were illegal entries into the U.S. Zone had come in to obtain barterable commodities from U.S. troops. Their main objective, however, was to secure the assistance, legitimate or otherwise, of some young, immature soldier, in getting to the United States. German authorities frequently reiterated the admonition that many of these women were persons of such known low moral calibre that, were it not for the protection afforded them by

⁸EUCCOM Office of the Chief Chaplain, Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47, Annex M.

⁹Ibid.

some soldier, they would automatically be arrested by the German police.¹⁰

(4) Many soldiers and officers had been reported as going to German physicians for treatment against VD. This was all the more dangerous because German physicians too often lacked the advanced pharmaceuticals available to Army clinics, and ineffectual treatment risked rendering a condition chronic that might normally easily have been cured. The type of physician, German or otherwise, who would disobey regulations for the sake of gain was manifestly a person of low moral character and one who ought not to be trusted with the treatment of diseases which conceivably might have serious consequences.

(5) The control of venereal diseases in the German civilian and displaced person populations had been delegated as a function of the German authorities. These operated in accordance with provisions of Military Government Regulations (MGR) Title 6, Change 4 of June 1947 under the direct supervision of military government.¹¹

116. Types of Anti-VD Campaign

Military authorities had resorted to a variety of combative measures, ranging from educational and recreational to prophylactic and disciplinary. Wide use was made of radio skits on the dangers of venereal disease, of articles in newspapers, and posters displayed in prominent places. Aided by Army chaplains, and the various means of publicity at its disposal, particularly troop information and education (TI&E), the Army organized its first intensive venereal disease control campaign in September 1946,¹² featuring addresses by the theater chief surgeon, the theater chaplain, and the provost marshal. Throughout the period it continued to hold, whenever necessary, special theater-wide programs to combat the conditions which spawned the disease. In addition to waging vigorous informational campaigns against VD, the Army also took severe disciplinary measures against second and third offenders. In some cases confirmed "repeaters" were required to appear before boards, and in a few instances, where the guilty persons had contracted four, five or six separate infections, they were returned to the United States for dishonorable discharge.¹³

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Brig Gen Edward A. Noyes, U.S. Army, Chief Surgeon, "Venereal Disease: Progress Report," EUCOM Medical Bulletin, Vol. IV, No. 4 (Dec 47), p. 16.

117. Information and Education

A practically continuous program was in progress throughout the period, whose aim was the eradication of laxity and indifference in connection with VD. Among large circles of the Armed forces the view prevailed that having venereal disease was no worse than having "a bad cold." This attitude, traceable to the overweening confidence which the soldiers placed in the efficacy of any kind of penicillin therapy, baffled the best efforts of medical men to inculcate a more scientific and sensible approach. Many soldiers considered penicillin safer and less troublesome than prophylaxis, and they were hardly in a position to discriminate between quantitative treatments for gonorrhea and syphilis. They had often to be reminded of the essential differences in symptoms of the two diseases and admonished to be conscientious about follow-up examinations. Confidence in just any kind of penicillin treatment, they were told, was misplaced. The small dosage of penicillin administered for the cure of gonorrhea was inadequate for the cure of syphilis, and in the case of double infection of gonorrhea and syphilis it served only to prevent the appearance of the primary chancre and even at times of the secondary skin eruptions that normally characterize the stages of syphilis. Inasmuch as the limited dosages of penicillin indicated in the treatment of gonorrhea did no more than palliate or mask the early lesions that ought normally to appear from ten to forty days after infection, the men were constantly reminded to have their follow-up examinations and blood tests which were required at the end of three weeks and again at four months after the completion of treatment for gonorrhea.¹⁴

118. Aid of Chaplain Corps

In an effort to eradicate deep-seated emotional or psychological maladjustments that impelled soldiers to fornicate, it was announced on 29 August 1946 that the Chaplain Corps would be enlisted in the theater-wide anti-VD campaign. Chaplains were to assist through discussion groups, sex morality lectures, and chapel activities.¹⁵ In addition, a board called the Venereal Disease Control Board, which had already been formed, collaborated with the Office of the Chief Chaplain. At the recommendation of the Chaplain's Office, the board arranged to reprint an article first published on 12 July 1946, entitled "Now Comes the Battle of Sex," by Chaplain

¹⁴E.g. Ibid., pp. 14 - 16.

¹⁵USFET Press Release No. 2048, 29 Aug 46, sub: Theater Chaplain Corps Enters Anti-VD Drive; Pamphlet Distribution Recommended.

(Capt) Raymond F. Gillis. Prepared in pamphlet form for general distribution to Army personnel in the theater, the article stressed the social approach to the problem. Discussing the pamphlet on 29 August, the theater chaplain stated that VD was fundamentally a symptom of a deeper seated social malady -- sexual delinquency -- and that the only attack on the problem must be made on that basis. From that point of view, he said, promiscuity, either overt or clandestine, was a social crime as much as perjury, larceny, or assault, and to wink at sexual promiscuity and illicit sex relationships on the grounds that they simply reflected a weakness of human nature was as incomprehensible as to tolerate lying or thievery on the same grounds. He also stated that there was a great danger in the toleration of sexual promiscuity in that it inevitably undermined the sanctity and security of the family and thus sapped the foundations of a healthy society. Toleration of sexual irregularities perforce engendered mutual suspicion of infidelity, and this was the underlying reason in the majority of divorces.

119. Lectures by Chaplains

The Chaplains' program to combat VD included lectures on morality and citizenship. These soon aroused the interest of servicemen, and by May 1947 24,595 persons were attending 273 lectures that were being given on the subject.¹⁶ During the last three months of 1947, 1,339 lectures were attended by 126,890 military personnel, while during the first two months of 1948, 217,000 soldiers attended 1,599 morality lectures. This large attendance was, according to the Office of the Chief Chaplain, the main reason for the reduction of the venereal disease rate in the European Command from 166/1,000/year during the last quarter of 1947 to 106/1,000/year during the first quarter of 1948.¹⁷

120. Responsibility of Commanders

In January 1947 Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson sent USFET a letter in which he emphasized command responsibilities for VD control.¹⁸ In September of the same year General Lucius D. Clay,

¹⁶OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946-47, The Second Year, Vol. III, Ch. XXII, p. 75.

¹⁷EUCOM Office of Chief Chaplain, Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47, p. 11, "Weekday Lectures on Citizenship and Morality."

¹⁸Ltr, Robert P. Patterson, Secy of War, to CG USFET, 31 Jan 47, sub: Discipline and Venereal Disease.

commander in chief and military governor, announced that if any unit or military post had a venereal disease rate exceeding the average of the European Command for three consecutive months, the commander would be relieved.¹⁹ Owing to the fact that reports were based on the point where the patient reported for treatment, rather than the point where he was assigned for duty or made the contact, this announcement necessitated a change in manner of computing records of VD statistics, so that military post rates could be justly evaluated. Statistics were thereafter tabulated in a manner which charged each case back to the unit to which the man belonged and to the post where he was stationed.²⁰ The months of November and December 1947 and January 1948 were set as a test period. There were still approximately 740 men in the European Command who had contracted VD three times or more, and commanders were called upon to take necessary action to eliminate such repeaters from the service.²¹

121. Establishment of VD Hospitals for Germans

In compliance with paragraph 6-312.1 of MGR Title 6, Change 4, June 1947, 113 venereal disease treatment hospitals for Germans were set up throughout the U.S. Zone. The hospitals contained adequate facilities for the diagnosis, isolation and treatment of contagious venereal disease cases. In addition, special examination clinics were established in Land ^Wuerttemberg-Baden and the U.S. Sector of Berlin. These hospitals and clinics were the only places authorized to treat infectious venereal disease among Germans, and all other hospitals were strictly forbidden to handle such cases.²² German health authorities, moreover, were henceforth required to take immediate action on all reports of contacts to occupation forces, and trace, apprehend, examine and isolate for treatment all persons who were found to be infected. Furthermore, they were required to institute mass case-finding procedures directed against certain population groups whose venereal disease rate was usually high, or which, by reason of their mode of life, constituted an especially fertile source of infection. Since over 50 percent of the women holding illicit sexual intercourse with troops were vagrants and identification given by the victimized soldier was often inadequate, this was a difficult task.²³

¹⁹EUCOM, 30th Monthly Conf of CINC with Maj Comdrs and DMG, 19 Dec 47.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

122. Prostitution under German Law

Prostitution per se was not considered a violation of German law. In Germany, as in many other European countries, women were traditionally legally permitted to engage in the "oldest profession," provided they reported for inspection to the local health officers twice weekly. Records were kept on all licensed prostitutes by the German police, and failure of a girl to comply with the inspection regulations was punishable at law. So great was the incidence of VD among prostitutes in postwar Germany, however, that military government authorities forbade German health officials to issue any certificate specifically attesting that the bearer was free from the disease. The greatest care, moreover, had to be exercised in screening applicants for social passes,

123. Role of the German Authorities in the Control of VD

The apprehension and examination of suspect females around barracks and other areas frequented by soldiers was the responsibility of the German authorities. The German health officers acting through the civil police carried out arrests and examinations of all suspects, and neither the military police nor any other military agency bore any responsibility for these matters. When the military desired the German police to act in a given case, it lodged a request with the local military government officer. Likewise, any complaints against the civil authorities for laxity or dereliction of duty in the control of venereal disease had to be filed with the military government. All such communications were then conveyed to the local (Kreis) military government liaison and security officer, or, in certain cases, to the military state (Land) public health officer, for action. All contact information supplied by infected soldiers was in this devious fashion referred to the local German health authorities. In cases where information filled in by the soldier on the contact form was not adequate to enable apprehension, the local military VD control officer, acting under authority conferred by the Chief Surgeon's Office, appointed a team to aid in the personal identification and arrest of the female in question. This team consisted of the infected soldier, a military policeman, a German policeman, and whenever possible, a member of the German health department. The actual apprehension, after proper identification of the woman, was made in all cases by the German police, the military policeman being present only to anticipate possible interference by Allied personnel. The German authorities then took the suspect to the local VD hospital, or to the local examination clinic in Wuerttemberg-Baden or Berlin. The military furnished transportation for this purpose. To facilitate proper control of VD, German authorities were also required by military.

government regulations to examine for the disease all new entrants into the U.S. Zone.²⁴

124. Other Weapons in the Campaign Against VD

The VD problem was also attacked by the German priests and pastors who labored in the field of youth indoctrination and strove to raise the level of morality among young people in Germany. Similarly, aid in elevating the morals of German youth was proffered by the Army in the shape of a program that assisted in the development of wholesome intellectual and recreational activities.²⁵ Several new tracts in German dealing with questions of morality and right living and designed to reach both civilian youths and their parents, as well as a bilingual venereal disease pamphlet, were published and distributed among the population.

125. Program in Headquarters Command

In the Headquarters Command in Frankfurt, the rate of incidence was far above that for the Army as a whole.²⁶ Vice raids were widely used as a means of control. Vice squads interviewed thirty-two U.S. and Allied personnel who had contracted VD during the period 7 - 14 January 1947. In consequence, seventeen women, German and DP, were sent to the city hospital for VD checks and treatments.²⁷ During the following week, which had been designated as "Anti-VD Week," raids carried out by the vice squad and German police in the same area resulted in the apprehension of 146 women, who were placed in confinement for VD checks. Of these, fifty were found to have VD.²⁸ During the first half of 1947, the VD rate in Headquarters Command actually increased. The beginning of the second half of 1947 was marked by the receipt of a letter from General Huebner calling attention to the special seriousness of the problem in Headquarters Command and demanding improvement. The commanding general of Headquarters Command then directed his

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵USFET Press Release No. 2048, 29 Aug 46, sub: Theater Chaplain Corps Enters Anti-VD Drive; Pamphlet Distribution Recommended.

²⁶EUCOM Hq Comd, Min of Semi-Monthly Unit Comdrs' Mtg, 3 Jul 47.

²⁷USFET DCINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 2, 14 Jan 47, p. 43, par. 95.

²⁸Ibid., Nos. 3 & 4, 21 & 28 Jan 47, pars. 58 & 90.

staff to consider that the contraction of venereal disease one or more times was sufficient grounds for beginning action to dismiss the offender from the service.²⁹ Partly as a result of this, the latter part of the year showed a steady improvement.³⁰

126. Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation

The venereal disease rate per thousand per annum for assigned and attached units and for the casual personnel of the 7749th staging area was excessively high.³¹ In the fall of 1947 it was as follows:

	<u>Assigned & Attached Units</u>			<u>7749 Staging Area</u>		
	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
Total	<u>190.1</u>	<u>251.2</u>	<u>238.2</u>	<u>495.6</u>	<u>1,266.6</u>	<u>1,639.9</u>
White	184.2	249.4	237.3	254.9	702.9	1,236.3
Colored	265.3	310.5	361.1	3,487.8	7,466.6	3,213.4

127. VD Control Meetings

A series of conferences on VD and its control were initiated at Bremerhaven by the commanding general of the port on 8 September 1947. The meetings were attended by representatives of the German civil, police, and health services of Bremen and Bremerhaven, by military government public health and social welfare officials, the commanding general, provost marshal, military police representatives and the surgeon. The civil authorities at these meetings were impressed with the need for more rigid control measures. At a special meeting held about the same time in Bremerhaven the officers of the port of embarkation were oriented in the moral and spiritual aspects of the problem of venereal disease in the command. On this occasion the commanding general directed that, among other proofs of intemperance, contraction of VD should henceforth be taken into account in recommending individuals for promotion, in making

²⁹EUCOM Hq Comd, Min of semi-monthly Unit Comdrs' Mtg, 3 Jul 47.

³⁰Ibid., 14 Nov 47, par. 3.

³¹OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, The Third Year, 1947-48, Vol. V, Ch. XXV, p. 45.

staff to consider that the contraction of venereal disease one or more times was sufficient grounds for beginning action to dismiss the offender from the service.²⁹ Partly as a result of this, the latter part of the year showed a steady improvement.³⁰

126. Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation

The venereal disease rate per thousand per annum for assigned and attached units and for the casual personnel of the 7749th staging area was excessively high.³¹ In the fall of 1947 it was as follows:

	<u>Assigned & Attached Units</u>			<u>7749 Staging Area</u>		
	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
Total	<u>190.1</u>	<u>251.2</u>	<u>238.2</u>	<u>495.6</u>	<u>1,266.6</u>	<u>1,639.9</u>
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³⁰Ibid., 14 Nov 47, par. 3.

³¹OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, The Third Year, 1947-48, Vol. V, Ch. XXV, p. 45.

efficiency reports on officers; and in ordering the discharge of enlisted men from the service. Another venereal disease control meeting, called by the chief surgeon, was held on 21 and 22 October 1947. It was attended by representatives of the major commands and by military government public health officials. Ways and means of reducing VD rates among both troops and the German population were discussed.³²

128. Reasons for Decline in VD Rates in 1947

During the last half of 1947, as has been indicated, the VD rate showed an encouraging decline. For the first time, moreover, the disease had in the last quarter of the year dropped from first place as the reason for admission of patients to medical installations. The trend was assigned to a shift in emphasis from "what the soldier should do after contact" to "more strenuous efforts to avoid contact in the first place," and to a policy of replacing officers and noncommissioned officers "whose private lives failed to measure up."³³ In his report for the last quarter of 1947 the chief surgeon stated that in connection with the VD control program special stress had been laid upon the discharge of soldiers who contracted venereal disease more than once, upon contact investigation and posttreatment follow-up examinations. Unfortunately the last mentioned method of control had not been as successful as had initially been hoped because the clinical treatment units had not kept adequate records and also because a high percentage of the troops in the European Command had within recent months been transferred. An important factor in the decline in VD rates was believed to have been the new emphasis that had been put on command responsibility for the control of sexual disease.³⁴ But important too were the restraints of fear and shame that had lately been imposed upon transgressors. Numerous admonitions had been published and the men were aware that they could be discharged from the service for as few as two admissions for VD to Army medical installations. Indeed, of the odd 700 men who had contracted VD three separate times since 1 August 1947, at the end of the year 132 had been recommended for discharge, 7 were being held for court-martial, 13 had been redeployed prior to action being taken to eliminate them from the service, while 643 others were still awaiting judgment.³⁵ Many soldiers were

³²Ibid.

³³Stars and Stripes, December 9, 1947.

³⁴(1) OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1947-48, Vol. IV, Ch. XXVI, p. 42. (2) EUCOM OCS Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47. Preventive Medicine Division, p. 4.

³⁵EUCOM DCINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 3, 20 Jan 48, par. 4.

INCIDENCE OF VENEREAL DISEASE AM WHITE TROOPS

RATE/1000/YR

300

TOTAL EUCOM

200

100

0

J

F

M

A

M

J

J

A

S

O

N

D

J

F

M

A

M

J

J


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S


O

1948

1949




INCIDENCE OF VENEREAL DISEASE AMONG NEGRO TROOPS



Source: Hqs E

AL DISEASE AMONG OOPS



INCIDENCE OF VENEREAL DISEASES ALL TROOPS

RATE/1000/YR

300

TOTAL EUCOM

200

100

0

J

F

M

A

M

J

J

A

S

O

N

D

J

F

M

A

M

J

1948

194

Source: Hqs EUCOM, Medical Div, Historical Report for 1949.

500

400

INCIDENCE OF VENEREAL DISEASE AMONG ALL TROOPS

RATE/1000/YR

300

TOTAL EUCOM

300

200

200

100

100

0

0

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D

1948

1949

Medical Div, Historical Report for 1949.

compelled to think twice before running the risk of such drastic punishment or even of exposing themselves to the humiliation that had come to be associated with disclosure of venereal infection.

129. Further Decline in 1948 and 1949

The decline that had begun in 1947 continued in 1948. By March of that year the rate was down to 126/1,000/year, with the further decline again attributable to the decrease of gonorrhea particularly among colored troops.³⁶ After March the decline was only slight, the figures for the last quarter of 1948 being as follows:³⁷

<u>Month</u>	<u>Total Rate</u>	<u>Syphilis</u>		<u>Gonorrhea</u>		<u>Other</u>
		<u>White Rate</u>	<u>Colored Rate</u>	<u>White Rate</u>	<u>Colored Rate</u>	
Oct	109	20	41	79	158	9
Nov	113	19	30	88	136	6
Dec	117	18	42	91	157	5

Again the greatest decline was in the colored rate with a drop from 436 in January 1948 to 171 in November. Still further progress towards reducing the VD rate was made in the command in 1949, as the accompanying chart (Chart 4) will show. A decline of 32 percent was recorded as compared with the 1948 rate of 128. The rate for 1949 as a whole was only 87/1,000/year. The white rate was 33.6 percent lower than the 1948 rate of 116, while that among Negroes showed a lesser decline, falling from 266 to 186 for the year, a drop of 30 percent.³⁸ In the following year, 1950, further declines were recorded, and by February 1951 the Army element venereal disease rate was only 46/1,000/year.³⁹

130. The True VD Rate in the Command

The VD figures cited in Army reports did not tell the whole story. Medical estimates reckoned the true VD rates at from two to three times higher than the published rates. Normally, one case of syphilis will occur in an average population for every six to nine cases of gonorrhea. But in the European Command one

³⁶EUCOM OCS Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47, Preventive Medicine Division Annex. RESTRICTED.

³⁷Ibid., 1 Oct - 31 Dec 48, Preventive Medicine Division Annex. RESTRICTED.

³⁸EUCOM Med Div, Annual Narrative Rept, 1949, p. 55. RESTRICTED.

³⁹EUCOM Memo for CINC, 6 Apr 51, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report, U.S. Army, European Command, for 28 February 1951, p. 3. CONFIDENTIAL.

case of syphilis was reported on the average after 1947 to every three or four cases of gonorrhea. This may be attributed to the fact that latterly penicillin had made its appearance on the German market and that German doctors were known to be able to treat gonorrhea more safely and easily than syphilis. This was supported by the circumstance that considerable numbers of persons reporting to Army clinics for treatment of more serious forms of the disease were discovered on examination to have had earlier improper or inadequate treatment, presumably by German physicians. Other factors that tended to depress the gonorrhea rate in EUCOM and create a false impression were: (1) the penalties in punishment and humiliation that accompanied treatment in Army clinics and that impelled infected personnel to consult German physicians; (2) the low price of penicillin and its availability against prescription on the German market; and (3) the ease in obtaining German treatment and the fact that it commonly ran to only about forty DM per individual.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 3 - 4.

CHAPTER VIII

Religious Activities

131. Types of Activities

Throughout the period from V-E Day to 30 June 1949, religious activities for military and civilian personnel of the European Command were on an excellent basis. Many of the problems which faced soldiers away from home, or in their abnormal status as occupiers of enemy territory, found solution with the aid of religious assistance provided by the U.S. Army Chaplains' Corps. The responsible agency in the European Command was the Office of the Chief Chaplain. Activities included religious services, interviews by chaplains, visits of chaplains to units, clubs, and homes, morality lectures and broadcasts, administering to the sick and wounded, correspondence with relatives of deceased persons, coordination of the religious work of welfare societies, and special services to nonmilitary persons, including displaced persons.

132. Supply of Chaplains

Among the problems concerning chaplain personnel after V-E Day was the matter of supply. In May 1945 there had been approximately 2,400 chaplains in the theater, about 150 fewer than authorized strength. When combat units redeploying to the Pacific had been accorded their full complement of chaplains, the shortage in ETO became aggravated. Prior to V-J Day it had proved difficult to provide adequately for the religious needs of the forces. After V-J Day, however, the criteria governing eligibility for separation from the service resulted in the return to the United States of a larger proportion of troops than of chaplains, and by the end of the year there was for the first time a surplus of chaplains in the European theater. It was then announced that chaplains with eighteen months of overseas duty would be redeployed unless they belonged to a

voluntary category calling for longer service. Two months later, the War Department directed that chaplains over forty-five years of age, or having an efficiency index of less than 3.5 be returned immediately to the United States. Shortly thereafter it was ruled that chaplains who would have two years of overseas duty by 31 August 1946, and did not belong to a volunteer category calling for longer service, were immediately eligible for redeployment. The situation was now reversed; it was foreseen that instead of a surplus of chaplains, as reported three months previously, there would be a shortage amounting to more than 50 percent. A request for 137 chaplains was therefore submitted. By the end of June 1946, however, many chaplains, by changing their volunteer status, had indicated their willingness to remain in the Theater. Thus, replacements were found within the Theater for 103 of the Chaplains requested.¹ Redeployment continued to take its toll of chaplains, causing temporary shortages, but replacements generally arrived in sufficient numbers to fill all requirements. Enlisted men well trained in their duties in the Office of the Chief Chaplain were redeployed like others, and this loss had to be met by concentrated training of replacements. However, as the period advanced, the situation grew fairly stable, and from the middle of 1946 allotment of chaplains for the European Command was generally maintained at the level required by the Department of the Army, and corresponding to similar allotments to troops in the United States.

133. Employment of German Clergymen

Through the efforts of the Office of the Chief Chaplain, beginning in July 1947, local commanding officers were authorized to employ German civilian clergymen to hold services when U.S. Army chaplains were not available.² The ruling specified that the German clergymen should be paid in Reichsmarks obtained from the Finance Office in exchange for military payment certificates collected at services.

134. Ministering to the Religious Needs of U.S. Civilians and Dependents

Much of the time of chaplains was spent in taking care of the religious needs of the many American civilian employees and dependents of United States and Allied personnel not included in the occupational troop basis. Continuous efforts were made in the

¹OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1946-47, The Second Year, Vol. III, Ch. XXII, pp. 68, 69.

²EUCOM Office of the Chief Chaplain Rept of Opns, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, Annex C.

last half of 1947 to obtain an increased allocation of chaplains to the European Command. It was requested that, inasmuch as civilians took up a good part of the chaplains' time, clergymen be assigned to the command in the ratio of one for every 1,200 troops and civilians combined, instead of in the ratio of 1 to 777 soldiers as had been the case prior to July 1947. Although to be sure, the blessed sacraments were being administered to and religious instruction was being provided for civilians, the limited chaplain personnel available were having a hard time providing adequate religious guidance and consolation for their flocks. Records from the Office of the Chief Chaplain in the last quarter of 1947 served to underline the need for more clergymen; it was estimated at that time that by 30 June 1948 there would be in the theater a total number of dependents and Department of the Army civilians equal to seven-tenths of the total troop strength.³

135. Guest Clergymen in the Theater

At various times, religious leaders visited the command to study religious conditions within Germany and Austria and the religious program of the Army.⁴ Many of these churchmen served as guest speakers at military services, conferred with members of the occupation forces, and met with chaplains of their own denominations.

136. Sunday Schools

Following the arrival of dependents in the command, Sunday schools were organized. During the last six months of 1948, 1,016 Sunday school classes were held, attended by 34,437 persons, including troops.

137. Chaplains' Fund

In the way of supplies, the Chief Chaplain's Office provided the occupation forces with many types of requirements for their religious needs, from Hammond Electric organs for unit chapels and Sunday schools to religious movies and text matter. Throughout the period, supplies were generally adequate to meet the needs of personnel. When needed items, however, could not be obtained from the War Department, they could generally be bought on the American market with money from the Chaplains' Funds. These funds were established at the end of 1947, when, on 15 December, authority was

³Ibid., Rept of Opns, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 47.

⁴Ibid., p. 63.

granted unit commanders to establish denominational funds with money obtained from voluntary contributions and grants from the Central Welfare Fund, on condition that chaplains be custodians of such funds, and that the money be spent only for improving religious activities within the organization. When there was a shortage of chaplains in the command, these funds helped pay the salaries of German religious personnel who assisted American chaplains in caring for the spiritual needs of members of the occupation forces.⁵

138. Assistance in Personal Problems of Troops

During the first years of the occupation, the number of personal problems in which the Office of the Chief Chaplain was called upon for help was so great that a special branch, called the Miscellaneous Branch, was established to offer advice and even material aid to troops. An important function of the Miscellaneous Branch was to locate members of the occupation forces in Europe for relatives or friends in the United States. Aside from this, EUCOM personnel received aid from the branch in such diverse matters as assistance to deserving persons in obtaining furloughs, procurement of photographs of graves of soldiers who had fallen in battle, advice on divorce and marriage, and answers to correspondence from enlisted men relating to qualifications necessary for commissioning in the Corps of Chaplains and regulations governing separation from the service in order to complete their theological studies.⁶ As an example of the service rendered to personnel on such matters, the branch wrote over 550 letters on behalf of occupation personnel between 1 January 1948 and 30 June 1948 alone on subjects ranging from inquiries regarding United States personnel in Europe who had not written home to problems on divorce, marriage, and the adoption of German children. As the number of such problems decreased, the Miscellaneous Branch was renamed Personnel and Administrative Branch.

139. Visits to Guardhouses and Hospitals

Chaplains spent much of their time visiting prisoners in guardhouses, or the sick in hospitals. In order that these visits might prove of the utmost value to the troops, beginning in January 1948, a series of five-day courses were given for EUCOM chaplains to give them a better understanding of the real or imagined grievances

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1 Jul - 31 Dec 48, The Fourth Year, Vol. III, Ch. XIX, p. 59.

of personnel with whom they worked.⁷ In January 1948, twenty-two chaplains attended a training conference to perfect their technique in visiting patients in hospitals. They were instructed by a team of doctors and nurses in the principles of neuropsychiatric theory and practice, and took part in a five-day series of lectures on the causes of neuropsychiatric disease, neuroses, psychoses, personality disorders, alcoholism, drug addiction, and other problems. Thirty-three chaplains took part in a similar course in April.

140. Marriage Activities

Under provisions of a circular of 19 December 1946, any German intending to marry U.S. military personnel in the theater had to be interviewed by a U.S. Army chaplain before a marriage application could be approved. The prospective spouse had to be present during the interview.⁸ As a result, chaplains were soon deluged with requests for such interviews. By the first quarter of the calendar year 1947, marriage investigations and interviews had risen to third place in the list of miscellaneous activities of chaplains in the European Command. Most of the work in connection with marriages between Germans and Americans was done by chaplains in the field, taxing the working hours of these men to the utmost. At the end of 1947 chaplains were still concerned over the fact that a disproportionate amount of their time was being consumed by interviews with German fiancées. Some chaplains reported that these interviews even took up the best part of their time and that the heavy tide of German-American marriage applications offered no prospect of an immediate alleviation.⁹

141. Statistics on Marriage

No accurate figures on the number of marriages which took place in the European Command during the period are available, especially as there were several instances of "illegal" marriages at the time that marriage with Germans was forbidden to members of the occupation forces. Such marriages were contracted and solemnized without the requisite authority from the commanding officer of the American concerned and were therefore invalid according to Army regulations, although they remained valid under

⁷OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1947-48, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 48, Vol. III, Ch. XIX, and Ibid, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 48.

⁸USFET Cir 181, 19 Dec 46.

⁹OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1947-48, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 47, Vol. III, Ch. XVI, pp. 73 - 76.

German law. However, marriages at which German clergy did not officiate, officially or unofficially, but which were contracted through American religious facilities were recorded by the Office of the Chief Chaplain. The numbers of marriages at which Army chaplains officiated during the period 1 July 1946 - 31 December 1948 are given in the following tabulation:¹⁰

	1 Jul 46- 30 Jun 47	1 Jul 47- 31 Dec 47	1 Jan 48- 31 Dec 48	Totals
Totals.	<u>1,349</u>	<u>1,419</u>	<u>4,727</u>	<u>7,395</u>
All-American marriages .			363	363
US/Allied and Neutral Citizenship.	1,117	923	213	2,253
US/displaced persons . .			248	248
US/citizens of liberated countries**.			415	415
American/German*	232	496	3,388	4,116

* Theater policy forbidding marriages between Americans and Germans was first modified in a theater circular of 19 December 1946, which outlined conditions under which such marriages might take place.

** The first instance of an American Army officer marrying a Polish DP occurred in July 1946.

142. Reflections on Foregoing Statistics

It will be noticed that there was a change in the types of marriages which took place. For instance, there were no marriages recorded in the early part of the period in which both parties were listed as Americans. On the other hand, there was an enormous rise in American-German marriages, partly due to the gradual relaxation of regulations that had hitherto stood in the way and partly to the specifications of the War Bride's Act. The War Bride's Act permitted German and other foreign brides of American occupation personnel, including the spouses of WAC's and female civilians, to enter the United States on a nonquota basis. Due to the fact that 28 December 1948 had been announced as the date of expiration of the said act, there had been a noticeable last-minute rush on the part of the soldiers to get their brides into the United States before the deadline. Of the 4,116 mixed German-American marriages which took

¹⁰ Figures compiled from marriage statistics of the Office of the Chief Chaplain Repts of Opns, 1946 - 48.

place between 1 July 1946 and 31 December 1948, accordingly 3,888 were solemnized in 1948, and 2,639 within the last six months of that year.

143. Lectures on Citizenship and Morality

In the summer of 1946 venereal disease rates in the theater reached a postwar peak. Following several conferences with chaplains, it was announced on 29 August 1946 that the Chaplain Corps would participate in the anti-VD drive. This activity is described in greater detail in the chapter on "The Experience with Venereal Disease."

144. Broadcasts of Religious Programs

An innovation in 1948 was the broadcasting of religious programs. The first announcement that daily broadcasts of religious programs would be made over the American Forces Network (AFN) was made on 21 January. Programs began over all four stations of AFN, on Sunday 25 January. A forty-five minute program was scheduled for each Sunday and a fifteen minute recorded program for each weekday. Protestant and Catholic services were broadcast on alternate Sundays.¹¹ The regular daily vespers service at 1745 was given by Protestant chaplains on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Saturdays, and by Catholic chaplains on Tuesdays and Thursdays. The program for those of Jewish faith was given on Fridays. Radio chapel, heard every Sunday from 1100 to 1145, and conducted by the chief of chaplains, originated in different cities of the command. Services were broadcast direct from chapels in Bremerhaven, Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich and later on from Bayreuth, Heidelberg, Stuttgart, and Vienna.¹²

¹¹OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1947 - 48, The Third Year, Third Quarter, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 48, Vol. III, The Administrative Services, p. 60.

¹²TI&E Bul, Vol. IV, No. 8, 20 Feb 49, "Personally Yours," p. 11, Sec. IV, "The Chaplain."

CHAPTER IX

The Information and Education Programs

145. Scope of Programs

During the years 1945-49 much emphasis was placed upon information and education programs as factors in improving discipline and morale among occupation personnel. These programs, as they existed during the early part of the period covered by this discussion, have been described in detail in a monograph in this series, entitled "Troop Information and Education Programs, 1 July 1946 - 30 June 1947." At the risk of repetition, however, a cursory survey of what was done along these lines has been included in the present study with the idea of presenting a more complete picture of the entire program of activities aiming at the improvement of discipline and morale in the European Command. The troop information and education programs in the command were broad and varied; most of them were segments of worldwide armed forces programs. They included command schools; United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) courses; newspapers, periodicals, and books; and radio. The programs were carried on locally through education centers and information centers, and most of them were administered by the Troop Information and Education (TI&E) Division, Headquarters, EUCOM. Units had troop information and education officers.

146. Directive on Literacy Training

One of the first problems to receive emphasis in the fall of 1946 was that of illiteracy. In October 1946 a directive¹ was issued

¹USFET ltr, 23 Oct 46, sub: Literacy Training. AG 353 GGT - AGO.

prescribing literacy training for all soldiers who had completed less than the fifth grade or whose Army General Classification Test (AGCT) score fell below the grade of V. Training was to be on duty time and was to have both academic and military features, designed to make the individual a good soldier as well as to teach him to read and write. Those failing to complete the course satisfactorily were to be separated under War Department provisions. Literacy training was to be offered through the consolidated and unit schools described in the following paragraph.

147. Staff Study and Recommendations

In the summer of 1946 the chief educational activities in the European Command were those carried on in command schools and courses of the United States Armed Forces Institute. The command schools were of two types, consolidated schools, and special schools in units with high illiteracy where it was impractical for personnel to leave the unit for training purposes. At the close of 1946 plans were made to expand the education program drastically. A staff study proposed that three consolidated schools at Berlin, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg, and one district school at Bremen be continued as consolidated schools and that the number of such schools be increased to eight, that unit schools be opened wherever essential, and that consolidated schools and unit schools be more closely coordinated than heretofore. In addition, it was proposed that courses be keyed to those offered by the United States Armed Forces Institute and that a board of regents be established under the theater chief of education and information. It would be the duty of the board to carry on a constant review of curricula and to arrange for credit in educational institutions in the United States for work completed in schools in the European Command.²

148. Change of Emphasis to Off-Duty Education

As a result of the staff study, a directive was published in December 1946 which envisaged a primarily off-duty program, and, stressing its value, urged that it receive as much emphasis as the recreational program. The directive also provided for a civilian area supervisor on the staff of each consolidated school to promote cooperation between consolidated and unit schools.

149. Reduction of School Program

By 1 January 1947 new consolidated schools had been opened at

²Staff Study, USFET G - 3 Div, 4 Dec 46, sub: Education Program.

Nuremberg, Munich, and Wiesbaden in addition to those already in operation. But it soon became obvious that the program had been planned on too elaborate a scale. The schools could not be adequately staffed and the TI&E Division had to concentrate on the possibility of using enlisted personnel qualified for teaching positions and on establishing unit schools using such personnel.³ By 1 July 1947 the number of consolidated schools had been reduced to three, located at Frankfurt, Nuremberg, and Munich. Enrollment in consolidated and unit schools, which on 30 April 1947 had reached a peak of 2,887, serviced by 59 U.S. and 139 native instructors, had dropped by 30 June 1947 to 1,824 serviced by 38 U.S. and 113 native instructors.⁴

150. Establishment of Army Education Centers

On 1 July 1947 the consolidated schools were redesignated Army education centers, a name which they retained throughout the rest of the period. An Army education center was any installation operating any part of the troop information and education program, such as a United States Armed Forces Institute study center, a unit school, an advisement center, or a school library. A EUCCOM directive of 1 July 1947 established Army education centers on all military posts in the command. All major commands were instructed to see that posts within their command areas operated such Army education centers and made transportation to them available.⁵

151. Educational Opportunities at Army Education Centers

In a narrower sense, an Army education center was a place where classes could be held and study groups could meet. There was great flexibility of method, depending upon the availability of materials, of teachers, and of students. Almost any practical course of study could be arranged, including group study of USAFI courses. In short, the Army education center was an Armed Forces educational institution streamlined to give the best in education in the time which the soldier could spare. Except for basic education and any subject which the commanding officer might require as necessary training for the soldier's job, enrollment was voluntary, with attendance in off-duty hours. Although USAFI courses could be attended by civilian members of the occupation only if vacancies existed after all soldier applications had been accommodated, TI&E Army education centers frequently offered outstanding

³I & E Service Rept of Opns, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 47.

⁴Ibid., 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47.

⁵(1) Ibid. (2) "Is it Too Late to Learn?" TI&E Bul No. 40, Vol. 3, 3 Oct 48, pp. 8 & 9.

opportunities for free education for civilians and dependents.⁶ The classes were free of charge to Department of the Army civilians and military personnel and their dependents; others could attend by paying enrollment fees. Classes were run on a term-enrollment basis. Whenever a sufficiently large group in any area was interested in starting a new class, an additional subject was added to the curriculum.⁷

152. Educational Advisers

On each military post in the European Command, and at each air base, there was an educational adviser, always a trained civilian educator, who had charge of educational activities. One of the duties of the educational adviser was to advise the soldier on his educational problems. If there was no educational adviser located near a particular unit, the TI&E officer could arrange a visit to one. The educational adviser could help the soldier to decide whether his particular needs might best be satisfied at an Army education center, by enrollment in a USAFI class, or by a combination of both.⁸

153. United States Armed Forces Institute Courses

USAFI courses were a part of a worldwide program, established in 1942 and originally organized along correspondence school lines, to provide individual education for military personnel. USAFI provided educational materials such as manuals, work sheets, books, pamphlets, and examinations. In 1946 there was a selection of 131 correspondence courses and 153 self-teaching courses in high-school, technical, and first year college subjects. University extension courses were offered by fifty-eight colleges and universities cooperating with USAFI. Nonmilitary education of Armed Forces personnel was conducted by each service, using, in general, the facilities of USAFI, which provided courses and texts. Wherever American servicemen and service women were stationed, any one of the services could consider setting up classes under certain

⁶"An Introduction to Germany for Dependent Families of Members of the Occupation," prepared by TI&E, published by P&A and printed by AG.

⁷(1) Ibid. (2) USFET G - 1 (P&A) Div Rep of Opns, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 46.

⁸"Education Centers Cover EUCOM - A Guide to Off-duty Education Opportunities."

conditions.⁹ Enough service personnel had to be interested to assure a class of sufficient size; this might mean as few as a half-dozen students, depending upon circumstances. A competent teacher had to be available but could be either military or civilian. Finally, facilities needed by the students had to be present. For instance, before a class in automobile mechanics could be initiated, there had to be a place where the students could get practical experience. USAFI classes held in the European Command were given free of charge through TI&E, and books were also provided free, on a loan basis. USAFI enrollments in correspondence and self-teaching courses alone totalled 6,642 by the beginning of 1947. Of these, 2,634 were in three-month correspondence courses and 4,008 in self-teaching courses.¹⁰

154. Revision of Curriculum of the USAFI

In July 1946 representatives of TI&E service, returning from USAFI headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, reported that headquarters desired that a survey be made of course and text requirements for the next two years and that courses offered in the European theater be made to correspond as closely as possible to those being offered at Madison. The European branch then drew up a plan which empowered the Information and Education officer of any unit to requisition and administer tests, thereby decentralizing the USAFI system in the theater. In November 1946 the War Department took steps to revise USAFI courses to fit the requirements of younger men by the deletion of certain courses and the addition of others. Attempts were also made to interest hospital patients in courses.¹¹ As a result of all this, enrollments in USAFI courses increased considerably during the spring of 1947. In April 766 students in the theater were enrolled in the USAFI courses; in May, 804; and in June, 884.¹²

155. Publications

The European edition of The Stars and Stripes was the principal service newspaper in the theater. It supplied occupation personnel with the latest news, national and international, albeit limitations of size did not permit comparison in coverage with the larger American dailies. There were, besides, smaller post, ship and Air Force base papers which supplied news of local origin, and entertainment in the form of cartoons and humor columns; among these were

⁹"How Can you Improve Your Education in the Armed Forces?" Armed Forces Talk No. 292, Off of the Secy of Def Wash DC, pp. 4 - 6.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹TI&E Svc Rept of Opns, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 46.

¹²Ibid., 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47.

The Occupation Chronicle and The Heidelberg Post, and numerous unit publications, although these last tended to disappear. On 30 September 1946 seventy-six unit publications were being published in the theater under the guidance of the Information Branch, TI&E, but by 31 December of that year the number had dropped to sixty-six, and by 30 June 1947 only twenty-one unit publications remained.¹³

156. "The Stars and Stripes"

The cardinal journal for theater personnel operated under the supervision of the chief, TI&E, EUCOM. It was written by servicemen and civilians whose knowledge of local conditions equipped them to serve EUCOM personnel better than any stateside journal would have been able to do. The Stars and Stripes was published daily at Pfungstadt (later at Darmstadt) and distributed through subscription channels, as well as through sales at conveniently located special newsstands. Its mission was to present a cross-section of the news of the world, from EUCOM events and summaries of current political and economic developments to sports. At the beginning of the period it maintained numerous news bureaus in Germany, but by the middle of 1949 these were consolidated in main offices at Frankfurt, Berlin, Stuttgart, Heidelberg, Munich and Vienna. It subscribed to all the major U.S. wire services, and used the Armed Forces Press Service (AFPS) and the Ships Editorial Association (SEA).¹⁴ The Stars and Stripes operated on nonappropriated funds, and paid its own way. Profits, if any, were turned over to the Central Welfare Fund. In addition to its news-gathering duties, it acted as a distributing agency for many American magazines and books. Its editorial staff also advised and trained staffs for the many unit newspapers published throughout the command.¹⁵

157. The "Troop I&E Bulletin"

The basis for the subject matter that was broadcast over the radio in what was called the "TIP" (troop information program) hour was the Troop I&E Bulletin. Inasmuch as it was possible to present orally only a part of the information in the bulletin within the radio time allotted, listeners were urged to consult the appropriate

¹³(1) "Why be Informed?" and "Sources of Information - Newspapers" I&E Bul, 25 Dec 49, Vol. 4, No. 51. (2) TI&E Rept of Opns, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 47.

¹⁴(1) Ibid. (2) "The Stars and Stripes," I&E Bul, 20 Feb 49, Vol. 4, No. 8, sub: Personally Yours, p. 14.

¹⁵Ibid.

TI&E Bulletin for further particulars of a given TIP topic. About 16,500 weekly copies of the bulletin were on hand in dayrooms, snack bars and local TI&E offices in the command for anyone who cared to read them. While the bulletin was not designed as a general reading magazine, short articles did appear in it about three times a month of such a nature as to be of interest to great numbers of servicemen and women. The Navy also contributed articles on matters of current interest, which were prepared by private and governmental agencies.

158. Other Reading Matter

Weekly news magazines, available either by subscription or by purchase at post exchanges and Stars and Stripes bookstands, supplied a large volume of supplementary reading matter. However, American magazines, unless available in a European edition, did not arrive at vending stands in the theater until they were from one to two months old. After the currency reform in June 1948, prices for magazines were set at five cents above corresponding stateside prices. Paperbound books were also sold at such newsstands, while larger selections and more durably bound editions of the classics and the latest bestsellers could by 1949 be had in well-stocked book departments in a few of the larger post exchanges. Lastly, EUCOM information centers and special service libraries provided reading rooms for the perusal of magazines and periodicals and circulating privileges in the case of books.¹⁶

159. Radio

The radio was not merely a medium of entertainment in the command; it also offered a stimulating variety of informational and educational programs. Frequent newscasts throughout the day, supplemented by periodic news roundups, afforded a news coverage similar to that in the headlines and leads of newspapers. It was not uncommon for a radio station or a network to devote a half hour, or even a full hour, to some current event or issue or to the discussion of a local, national, or international problem. Commentators explained and offered individual interpretations of the news, while broadcasts of special interest such as presidential speeches, convention proceedings, and major addresses by military or political personages, were beamed directly from the United States by means of a short-wave transmitter.

¹⁶(1) Ibid. (2) "An Introduction to Germany for American Occupation Families," prepared by TI&E, published by P&A and printed by AG.

160. Theater Networks

The American Forces Network (AFN) operated under the chief, TI&E and served the U.S. Zone of Germany, while the Blue Danube Network (BDN) operated under Special Services, U.S. Forces, Austria (USFA). Both were branches of the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS), which produced the only domestic American radio entertainment available to occupation troops. Their mission was to furnish information, education, and entertainment for the occupation forces, but they also provided lighter entertainment through a wide variety of programs of both the "canned" and "live" variety.

161. "Canned" and "Live" Entertainment Programs

The "canned" broadcasts were transcriptions forwarded from the United States. Radio networks in the United States and businessmen who sponsored certain programs permitted the Armed Forces Radio Service to "decommercialize" such programs, record them, and ship them overseas to long-wave stations serving the troops. The "live" programs were produced locally by a staff of service and civilian writers, actors, announcers, producers, and technicians. Original skits and dramatizations, written and produced for the Armed Forces, were made possible through the donation of time and talent by artists of stage, screen, and radio.¹⁷

162. Troop Information Hour

Because most servicemen lived in closely-knit units, the organized discussion period as a means of obtaining and sharing information was especially well adapted to the Armed Forces. Army directives prescribed that one undivided hour a week, called the troop information hour, be set aside for soldiers to discuss problems of current interest. The Air Force prescribed that all of its personnel should receive the equivalent of one hour of information a week, a total of fifty-two hours a year. In the Navy discussion hours were held on a completely voluntary basis. Reference material for the troop information hour in the European Command was supplied principally in the TI&E Bulletin, which treated most of the major local, national, and international issues of the day. Every attempt was made to present a factual and impartial analysis of the subject, and, when a subject was controversial, to open up both sides. Sometimes, because of the nature

¹⁷(1) "AFN and BDN," I&E Bul. 20 Feb 49, Vol. 4, No. 8, sub: Personally Yours, p. 14. (2) "Sources of Information-Radio," I&E Bul. 25 Dec 49, Vol. 4, No. 51, sub: Why be Informed?, pp. 6; 11.

of its topic, a discussion hour was strictly informational with little opportunity for the exchange of opinion. In most instances the value of the hour did not depend entirely upon the content of the printed bulletin or guide or on the discussion leader's presentation, but upon the extent to which the members of the group participated in discussion. Even when official policy was being presented and explained, there was opportunity for questions and for clarifying answers.

163. International Films

The Armed Forces Screen Report was an additional form of transmitting news to the forces. It consisted of monthly features which covered factual subjects of interest to servicemen. All the services produced and distributed informational films stressing mission, pride of unit, and similar topics.

164. Information Centers

Almost all Army, Navy, and Air Force units had information centers. Even when the appellation was different, the aim of the establishment was the same: to furnish to soldiers facts and news, in readily assimilable form, relating to matters of cardinal current interest. An information center might be assigned a special room in an installation, have maps, posters and elaborate visual displays, or it might be only a bulletin board in a corner of the library, day room, or squad room. But regardless of size and equipment, it was another of the links in the educational chain that afforded strength and common purpose to the United States forces in Europe.

CHAPTER X

Recreation and Entertainment

165. The Policy on Recreation and Entertainment

The policy on recreation and entertainment as part of the program for the improvement of discipline and morale was well stated by General Lucius D. Clay, soon after he became Commander in Chief, EUCOM. The soldier, he declared, before a monthly conference with major commanders and the deputy military governor, should have adequate recreation, but should pay for it in order to appreciate it properly. It was not desirable that recreation be made so readily accessible to him that he would become bored with the very thing that was being used to raise his morale.¹

166. Shift in Responsibility

In the middle of 1946 entertainment and recreation were mainly the responsibility of the American Red Cross (ARC), but thereafter these functions were gradually transferred to the Army Special Services Division and its many branches, until by the spring of 1948 the American Red Cross was carrying on only the permanent services provided for in its charter and in U.S. Army regulations. These consisted chiefly of field services and the hospital service. The Red Cross field services, which continued to function with ARC field directors in charge, offered advice, information and referral service to all members of the occupation forces. Field directors also provided, where sufficient urgency existed, communications service to members of the Armed Forces, Department of the Army civilians, and their dependents. The

¹EUCOM, 24th Monthly Conference of the GINC with Maj Comdrs, and the DMG, 18 Jun 47.

directors also continued to offer occupation personnel financial aid in emergencies. The Red Cross hospital service, for its part, was found operating in all U.S. Army hospitals. ARC hospital staffs proffered the same aid as did the field directors. In addition ARC maintained specialized recreational and medical social work-programs and provided trained personnel to teach courses in first aid, water safety, and accident prevention. It also instituted such other services as might be requested from time to time by the commander in chief, EUCOM, in agreement with the Department of the Army and the American National Red Cross. Most other recreational and entertainment facilities, including the Army Exchange Service (AES), later known as the EUCOM Exchange System (EES), and clubs and snack bars, were provided by the Army through Special Services.²

167. Reorganization of Office of the Theater Chief of Special Services

The added burden upon the Special Services Division led to a reorganization on 20 August 1946, when an Operations Branch was set up to supervise the activities of the sections dealing with music, library service, service clubs, special service units, and the Soldier Show Center.³

168. Funds for Recreation and Entertainment

Generous funds were provided from the Central Welfare Fund for the recreation and entertainment program. For instance, at the end of 1947, Central Welfare Fund members approved a quarterly dividend of approximately \$321,000 for unit expenditures, and another \$321,000 as a special holiday dividend for the use of units. The special fund was to be used to promote additional entertainment for EUCOM military and civilian personnel. Special Services was given an allocation of \$658,078.79 from the Central Welfare Fund. Of this amount, \$276,409.27 was for the payment of salaries for Army hostesses in service clubs, \$51,218.58 was for salaries of the seventy-one librarians then running the 250 Special Services Libraries in the European Command; and \$37,918.51 was for salaries for Civilian Actress Technicians, of whom there were at the time thirty-nine in the European Command, with two more en route from the United States. Other grants were made to a number of organizations and activities for recreational and other purposes, including

²EUCOM PID Release No. 945, 5 Mar 48, sub: Permanent ARC Services to Continue.

³USFET, Office of the Theater Chief of Special Services Rept of Opns, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 46, p. 2.

one of \$58,450.86 to Troop Information and Education Division for Army Education Centers.⁴

169. Additional Dayroom Equipment

The recreation and entertainment program received fresh impetus on 10 December 1947 when instructions were issued from the office of the EUCOM commander in chief that positive action should be taken to encourage EUCOM military units to purchase new dayroom equipment from unit funds, at company level. These instructions accompanied General Clay's approval of action taken at the November meeting of the board of directors of the Central Welfare Fund. The EUCOM commander in chief also requested that action be taken by welfare boards and by Special Services to supply unit dayrooms with a sufficient number of current magazines and periodicals, and to establish in the dayrooms, upon request, small fiction and reference libraries. Units at company level were also to be encouraged to equip their dayrooms or local areas with hobby and handicraft shops; Special Services was to act as central purchasing agent for required supplies. To ensure adequate funds for these expenditures, General Clay removed the then current restriction of a \$2.00 quarterly dividend per EUCOM person generally granted by the Central Welfare Fund, and left the amount and frequency of future dividends to the discretion of the board. The commander in chief, however, made it mandatory that 50 percent of all dividends declared be paid into unit funds at the company level, and that a minimum dividend of \$1.00 per person per quarter be paid into such unit funds.⁵

170. Places of Interest and Rest Centers

The American Zone had some of the most popular playgrounds in Europe. The Army Special Services Division took advantage of these to establish three rest centers and several leave centers in certain such areas: these included mountain, lake, fishing and skiing resorts, and bathing centers.⁶ Berchtesgaden, Hitler's famous mountain resort near the Austrian border, was one of the three Army rest centers. It was operated as a year-round vacation resort, with numerous hotels and a ski lodge. Skating and skiing

⁴EUCOM PID Release No. 757, 10 Dec 47, sub: EUCOM Reports on Results of Central Welfare Fund Meeting.

⁵Ibid.

⁶USFET, "An Introduction to Germany - The Occupation Families," G - 1 (P&A) Div, Jan 47, prepared by TI&E and printed by AG.

in the winter at the Koenigsee, where there were ski instructors and equipment; mountain climbing at all seasons; and swimming, sailing, and motorboating in summer were some of the attractions. There was also hunting, particularly boar hunting, and trout, carp, salmon, pike and other fishing. Inexpensive licenses were necessary throughout Germany. Guns could be obtained at the time when licenses were issued, through the post commanders. Garmisch, in Bavaria, was a second popular rest center, with facilities similar to those offered by Berchtesgaden, including sleighing, tobogganing and a funicular for painless mountain climbing. The third rest center was at Chiemsee, also near the Austrian border. In the single month of August 1948, 29,574 persons in the command visited one of the three centers.⁷ Of this number, 1,466 enlisted men went to Garmisch, 7,508 visited Berchtesgaden, and 4,181 chose Chiemsee. In addition to the rest centers, there were many places of interest to be visited in Germany, and trips to these were facilitated by Special Services. Towns renowned for their associations ranged from the home of the Grimm brothers, in Hanau, to the birthplace of Goethe, in Frankfurt.⁸ The homes of Wagner, Liszt, the Rothschild family, and the palaces of Charlemagne, and Frederick the Great were all spots rich in historical memories. Many churches, cathedrals, and cafes or restaurants were also of cultural or special architectural interest. In spite of the ban in force during most of the period on patronage of German catering establishments by occupation personnel, special permission could be obtained to enter the premises for sightseeing purposes only.⁹

171. Tours Outside of Germany

In addition to facilitating vacations and tours in Germany, Special Services sponsored tours on the Continent at reduced rates for soldier personnel. Dependents paid full rates. During a typical year, the Recreation Branch of Special Services was sponsoring tours to ten different countries. As examples of charges for soldiers, in the summer of 1949 one Swiss tour cost \$60 for seven days, and a seven-day tour of Paris cost \$43. Up to October 1948, almost 12,000 persons from the European Command had taken advantage of Special Service tours. Many others

⁷"Rest Centers," TI&E Bul., Vol. 4, No. 8, 20 Feb 49, sub: Personally Yours, p. 8.

⁸USFET, "An Introduction to Germany - The Occupation Families," 1 - 1 (P&A) Div, Jan 47, prepared by TI&E and printed by AG.

⁹EUCOM DCINC's Wkly Staff Conf No. 11, 15 Mar 49, par. 3.

traveled individually, either through the American Express Travel Service or independently.¹⁰

172. German Facilities for Entertainment

Through its Entertainment Branch, Special Services provided a variety of recreation planned regularly for occupation personnel and their dependents. In addition, such German entertainment as ballet, theater, opera, and concerts were available. Seats were obtained either through direct bookings, paid for in marks, or through Special Services booking offices, which purchased blocks of tickets for sale in scrip or marks. German auto and horse racing events were other available attractions.¹¹

173. Athletics

One of the chief activities of Special Services was the organization of athletic events at post, EUCOM, and international levels. Competition in eight major sports was organized throughout the command, including track, field, golf, swimming, tennis, softball, baseball, and football. In addition, bowling alleys, pool and billiard tables, and pingpong equipment were furnished for those interested. Boxing, while not listed as a major sport, brought organized teams together in competition. WACs participated actively in most of these sports. Fencing, badminton, backgammon, and seven-man touch football were provided where interest was shown. Some athletic teams participated in world-wide athletic events, for instance, the swimming and track and field teams which took part in the summer Olympics of 1948. Following the Olympics, the Special Services Division arranged for the teams to give exhibitions in the theater.¹² In most communities there were tennis courts with Special Service equipment for loan and golf courses with German caddies. These facilities were frequently attached to Special Service clubs. Many areas had riding stables; riding was not expensive in the rural areas of the zone. There were ice-skating and roller-skating rinks in a number of areas, the main skating rink being at Bad Nauheim. Others were located at mountain resorts. Special Services loaned and rented out bicycles in addition to athletic equipment for every type of sport which

¹⁰"Travel Tours," EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 8, sub: Personally Yours, p. 8.

¹¹USFET, "An Introduction to Germany - The Occupation Families," G - 1 (P&A) Div, Jan 47, prepared by TI&E and printed by AG.

¹²"Athletics," EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 8, 20 Feb 49, sub: Personally Yours, p. 5.

it sponsored, including golf, football, tennis, soccer, volleyball, basketball, and boxing.¹³

174. Stage Productions

Professional actresses of the Civilian Actress Technician Service (CATS) toured the U.S. Zone with legitimate stage productions arranged through Special Services. In American clubs entertainment varied from dance bands to German, U.S. or Allied floor shows. The floor shows toured the theater under the auspices of Special Services, while German shows were provided for the clubs by German agents. In 1948 there were at one time thirty-one Allied shows appearing before troops in the U.S. Zone, accompanied by Special Service orchestras. The Entertainment Branch booked the appearances of certain star acts from the continent. In addition, the Celebrities Service Section procured high-salaried popular entertainers from the United States for guest star appearances. Among them in 1948 were Jack Benny, Phil Harris, Alice Faye, Mary Livingstone, Danny Kaye, and dozens of others.¹⁴

175. Craft Shops and Club Services

By late summer of 1948 there were in the command a total of 120 craft shops and 100 photo darkrooms, which included both Army service clubs, American Red Cross clubs and separate unit shops.¹⁵ The shops were equipped with facilities for carving, moulding, drawing, and handicraft work. Supplies and instructions were furnished to occupation personnel for indulgence of such hobbies as working with leather, metal, or wood, clay modelling, silk screening and block printing. During July, August, and September 1948, 41,000 persons worked in manual arts and crafts in the various shops. Assisted by the Red Cross, the YMCA and YWCA clubs, the Corps of Chaplains, and Legal Assistance Offices, Special

¹³(1) "Recognizing Human Needs," EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 26, 26 Jun 49, sub: The Army and Air Force Build Character, p. 7.
(2) USFET, "An Introduction to Germany - The Occupation Families," G - 1 (P&A) Div, Jan 47, prepared by TI&E and printed by AG.

¹⁴EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 8, 20 Feb 49, sub: Personally Yours, p. 8.

¹⁵C/n 3(a), D/SAD to Hist Div, 5 Apr 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, AF&SAD, SAD, 14 Mar 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-9." SECRET.

Services aided in the development of new activities in interested communities. In Frankfurt, Berlin and elsewhere drama groups were organized with the help of the YWCA and Special Services, which provided costumes, theatrical props and technical advice for amateur acting companies.¹⁶

176. Libraries and Bookmobiles

Practically every community (post and subpost) in the command had a free library service supplied by Special Services; areas where such libraries were not normally provided were served by mobile libraries known as "bookmobiles." This applied especially in the case of isolated units. There were two general types of libraries in the command, the small field library located in service clubs, barracks buildings, administrative buildings, etc., and the larger libraries (as in Berlin and Frankfurt) in separate buildings, with magazine rooms, reading rooms, and special subject collections of reading material.¹⁷ During the first six months of 1948, a total of some 850,000 books were circulated through the Special Services library system. Seventy-seven trained librarians from the United States, assisted by nonprofessional German personnel, operated 207 libraries, 8 bookmobiles, and 22 library depots. The number of books available for withdrawal was 682,540. Books included cloth-bound volumes, both fiction and nonfiction. New book kits were sent out regularly to keep libraries up to date.¹⁸ EUCOM Special Services also procured newspaper and magazine subscriptions and paper bound books, which were distributed according to publication frequency to each library installation.¹⁹

177. Music

EUCOM Special Services Music Section provided an opportunity for participation in musical activities by members of the occupation forces. It furnished record libraries (classical and popular), musical instruments, musical supplies (reeds, strings, etc.), and "Hit-Kits" (collections of sheet music of current song hits). It

¹⁶EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 8, p. 9.

¹⁷C/n 3 (b), D/SAD to Hist Div, 5 Apr 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, AFI&E, SAD, 14 Mar 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-9." SECRET.

¹⁸"Libraries," EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 8, p. 6.

¹⁹C/n 3 (b), D/SAD to Hist Div, 5 Apr 51 on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, AFI&E, SAD, 14 Mar 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-9." SECRET.

also provided instruments, sheet music, and arrangements for personnel wishing to form bands or orchestras. In July 1948, inventory disclosed that over \$800,000 worth of musical instruments were handled by Special Services in the command.²⁰

178. Movies

Immediately after the war, movies were shown free to occupation personnel in uniform. After 1 July 1946, all 35-mm theaters were placed on a paid admission basis and civilian operators were used.²¹ By the end of the period, movie showings for occupation personnel were available in every community or post and subpost. At all Army theaters tickets for military personnel and their dependents were twenty cents each; civilian tickets were thirty cents. In Frankfurt there was also a British movie house catering to United States and Allied personnel, where prices were slightly higher for the better seats. Here a cross-section of British movies was shown. Movies were one of the most popular forms of all entertainment in the command, estimates showing that the majority of Americans viewed about ten movies a month. In 1948, attendance figures totalled about 750,000 per month at 35-mm theaters and 181,000 per month at 16-mm theaters. The EUCOM Motion Picture Service was responsible for the procurement and distribution of all films, and for the procurement and maintenance of 35-mm sound and projection equipment. It operated 99 35-mm theaters and 156 16-mm theaters and distributed about 200 titles a year. The movies shown were on a level with normal distribution and showings in the United States. While some "B" movies had to be shown, because of the high percentage of these being produced, all "A" movies were procured at the earliest possible date, which was generally coincident with their general release throughout the United States.²²

179. Clubs, Club Facilities and Rest Centers

a. Club Facilities in 1945. At the beginning of the period two kinds of clubs, the Red Cross and the AEF, were found operating in the European Theater. Considerable experience had already been acquired in devising recreational entertainment for troops, therefore, when in June 1945 the Special Service Clubs were instituted. Army hostesses who had first arrived in the theater in December of the preceding year were in June assigned to the operation of the Service Clubs; and as new ones opened, additional personnel were brought from the States to manage them. In addition to Service

²⁰"Music," EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 8, p. 8.

²¹USFET, OSS Rept of Opns, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 46, p. 16.

²²"EUCOM Motion Picture Service," EUCOM TI&E Bul, Vol. 4, No. 8, 20 Feb 49, p. 6.

Clubs, the Army hostesses were shortly assigned to the operation of lavish rest centers, such as those at Garmisch, the Riviera, and in Austria, or of RTO lounges at leave centers and in large cities like Frankfurt.²³

b. Transfer of Red Cross Clubs to the Army. In July 1946 it was announced that the Army would in the future assume the management of all Red Cross clubs. Available War Department funds would be used, as required, to run them, but Red Cross personnel needed to aid in operations would continue in their current positions without salary charge to the Army. Red Cross athletic and recreational equipment then in the theater was to be used by the Army without charge to it until the supply was exhausted. It was further announced that the Red Cross would bear the expenses of free refreshments and food for the patrons.²⁴ Despite this declaration of policy, however, it was not until May 1947, almost a year later, that the first Red Cross club, the "Palmgarten" in Frankfurt, was transferred to Special Services, and the general transfer did not begin until 1 July of that year.²⁵ Under the new policy, snack bars were taken over by the Army, but the basic policy of conducting the clubs was not altered since the change was primarily an administrative one.²⁶ During the early months of 1948 the last ARC clubs were phased out or transferred to Special Services. On 31 March of that year there was only one Red Cross club remaining, namely the "Crown Prince" in Berlin. This was transferred to Special Services in an elaborate ceremony attended by General Lucius D. Clay, Ambassador Robert Murphy, Brigadier General (now Major General) Roy V. Rickard, Miss Pat Abernethy, EUCOM Directing Hostess, Miss Louise Webb, Director of Red Cross Clubs, and other dignitaries. This episode terminated the emergency service that had been instituted in 1942 at the request of the War Department and the EUCOM commander in chief.²⁷

²³C/n 3 (d), D/SAD to Hist Div, 5 Apr 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, AFI&E, SAD, 14 Mar 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-9." SECRET.

²⁴USFET Press Release No. 1942, 26 Jul 46, sub: Army to Operate Red Cross Clubs.

²⁵C/n 3 (d), D/SAD to Hist Div, 5 Apr 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, AFI&E, SAD, 14 Mar 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-9." SECRET.

²⁶USFET Press Release No. 1942, 26 Jul 46, sub: Army to Operate Red Cross Clubs.

²⁷(1) EUCOM Press Release No. 945, 5 Mar 48, sub: Permanent ARC Services to Continue. (2) C/n 3 (d), D/SAD to Hist Div, 5 Apr 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, AFI&E, SAD, 14 Mar 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-9." SECRET.

180. Status of Clubs

Operated by the Recreational Branch of EUCOM Special Services, there were as of 30 June 1948 106 Special Service clubs, staffed by 328 U.S. hostesses.²⁸ Some of the Special Service clubs, such as the palatial Palmgarten Club at Frankfurt, were elaborate affairs. Others were more modest in size. All the clubs provided relaxation facilities for dancing, reading, writing or playing games. The clubs presented floor shows, held dances, staged amateur theatricals, and sponsored trips to points of local interest, in addition to carrying on routine operations such as the operation of coke and coffee bars, and snack bars. Many of the clubs also gave movie showings on the premises. Allied, German, and U.S. guests could be taken into the clubs.

181. Types of Clubs

All clubs could be classified under one or two main headings, according to sources of operating income:

Class A clubs were Army service clubs and American Red Cross clubs; with authorized exceptions, revenue-producing activities were not operated by these clubs but were operated by EES.

Class B clubs were those whose activities were financed by the operation of revenue-producing activities.

182. Club Program

The club program was closely associated with the entire welfare and recreation program, the principal aim of which was to maintain a high standard of morale and discipline among members of the occupation forces. One of the factors which was considered to contribute materially to discipline in the early part of the period was the minimizing of contact between members of the occupation forces and the German or Austrian population in any type of atmosphere which was conducive to disorder or misconduct. For this reason, the command provided adequate recreational facilities which were likely to attract the patronage of U.S. Army personnel and discourage violations of the "off-limits" policy. As the period progressed, it became the aim of the club program to eliminate small unit clubs where possible by consolidating them into large central clubs open either to all officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted men, civilians, or combinations of these categories as applicable. Certain rules were devised to govern

²⁸EUCOM Sp Svcs Div Rept of Opns, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 48, p. 21.

operations. Frequent inspections were made to insure compliance with sanitary requirements, uniform regulations, and applicable directives, and to determine whether the clubs continued to serve a useful purpose. Where there were repeated instances of misconduct in clubs, the post commander was empowered to take appropriate action to correct the situation. Such action could include restrictions on the dispensing of alcoholic beverages or, on other club activities, barring of troublesome persons from clubs, closing them temporarily or indefinitely, or placing MP's or other guard and supervisory personnel either in the club or in the area of disturbance during appropriate hours. In any case, post commanders controlled the consumption of alcoholic beverages by club patrons and, where it was deemed advisable, limited, rationed, or otherwise restricted drinking on club premises.

183. Activities of Clubs

The EUCOM Exchange System operated all revenue-producing activities of the Army Service and Army Red Cross clubs, except in certain instances. Exceptions included snack bars, ice cream bars, soda fountains, beer bars, shoe shine parlors, barber shops, amusement machines, and the like. EES was responsible for procurement, distribution, and sale of beer throughout the command, and procurement by clubs from any other source was prohibited, but EES was not permitted to dispense other alcoholic beverages containing more than 3.2 percent alcohol by weight. As provided in Army Regulations, moreover, the operation of gambling devices by EES was prohibited.²⁹ Certain activities of class "A" clubs, chiefly recreational in nature but not operated by EES, produced revenue which was paid into the local post welfare fund. Such things included dances and entertainment at reasonable charges (when authorized by post commanders) and the operation of outdoor and indoor recreational facilities such as golf courses, tennis courts, swimming pools, recreational boats and skiing and skating activities. However, they did not include the operation of snack bars or the selling of beverages. Class B clubs were permitted to operate activities such as those permitted Class A clubs and, in addition, were allowed to handle the operation of Class B messes, ice cream bars or soda fountains, vending and amusement machines, and facilities for dispensing alcoholic beverages.

²⁹(1) TWX SC - 22449, Hq EUCOM, 26 May 49. (2) C/n 3 (e), D/SAD to Hist Div, 5 Apr 51, on IRS, C/Hist Div to Chiefs, AFI&E, SAD, 14 Mar 51, sub: Historical MS "Morale and Discipline in the European Command, 1945-9." SECRET.

184. The Sale of Liquor

The following policies governed the sale of liquor in clubs. Under no circumstances were clubs permitted to sell any "hard" liquor by the bottle, or any Class VI supplies to be taken out of or to be consumed off the club premises, unless specifically authorized by EUCOM Headquarters. The consumption of Class VI supplies by individuals in clubs was limited, rationed, or controlled in any manner in which the post commander or the club council might prescribe, in order to insure proper conduct of club patrons. Absolutely no liquor stocks of any kind could be on display or in sight in any club. It was mandatory that soft drinks be available and be advertised as such in all clubs where liquor was served. All clubs that dispensed liquor had also to dispense beverages of low alcoholic content such as wines and beer, and such low alcoholic content beverages were to be made available by the glass as well as by the bottle. Under no circumstances might drink be served to persons not seated at tables.

185. Snack Bars and Soda Fountains

Through EES, the Army operated soda fountains and snack bars, in addition to the officers' and enlisted messes, the consolidated messes, and the service clubs. These snack bars and soda fountains served ice cream, pastries, sandwiches, salads in season, and soft drinks. Many were either adjacent to or within the same building as the post exchanges and clothing stores. In most areas, all shopping facilities were lumped together in a convenient group. In some, however, they were more widely scattered, and the individual might have to make separate trips to the commissary, post exchange, etc.

186. Post Exchanges

Of all the facilities operated by Special Services, the entertainment and recreation service for the occupation forces, the EUCOM Exchange Service (EES) was undoubtedly the largest and most widely used. Catering to all U.S. and Allied personnel in the European Command, it stocked most of the requirements normally sold at stateside department stores. It sold a wide variety of things, including food, soft drinks, clothing, cigarettes, toilet articles, jewelry, watches, cameras, binoculars, automobiles, tires, gasoline, candy, film, miscellaneous gifts, radios, fishing tackle, and golf clubs. There was one or more post exchange in nearly every military post or subpost.

Entrance to the EES stores was permitted on presentation of a ration card, issued to everyone, including infants. All

purchases were for cash. In some areas, the clothing post exchange was separate from the main store. In addition to clothing, the larger post exchanges also stocked some household supplies, including reading lamps, china, glassware, towels, dishcloths, sheets, pillowcases, and table linen. In the general-store section of the post exchange, very little was rationed except cigarettes and occasionally some edibles. In most areas, EES operated photograph studios, photo finishing plants, barber and beauty shops, dry cleaning establishments, dressmaking and tailoring shops, bakeries, ice cream plants, laundries, and shoe repair shops. Profits from sales went to the Central Welfare Fund, which used them to provide recreation and entertainment for occupation personnel. In 1948 there were approximately 190 post exchange stores of all kinds throughout the European Command. Prices for services varied, but, according to a survey, at the beginning of 1949 the prices of post exchange merchandise were, in the main, lower than or on a par with those charged by retailers for similar goods in the United States.

Glossary of Abbreviations

Note: This glossary includes all abbreviations used in this volume except those listed in SR 320 - 50 - 1, dated 28 October 1949, and Change 1 thereto, dated 22 August 1950.

AES	Army Exchange Service
AFN	American Forces Network
AFPS	Armed Forces Press Service
AFRS	Armed Forces Radio Service
AGCT	Army General Classification Test
ARC	American Red Cross
BDN	Blue Danube Network
BOTJAG	Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General
C/	Chief
CATS	Civilian Actress Technician Service
Ch.	chapter
chg	charge
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
c/n	carrier note
D/	Director
DCINC	deputy commander in chief
dep	deputy
DM	deutsche (German) mark
DMG	deputy military governor
doc	document
DP	displaced person

EES	EUCOM Exchange Service
ETO	European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
EUCOM	European Command
hist	historical, history
interv	interview
IRS	internal route slip
JAD	Judge Advocate Division
med	medical
MG	military government
MGR	Military Government Regulations
min	minute
MPC	military payment certificate
mtg	meeting
OCS	Office of the Chief Surgeon
OFLC	Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner
OMGUS	Office of Military Government (U.S.)
OTCS	Office of the Theater Chief Surgeon
OTJA	Office of the Theater Judge Advocate
OTPM	Office of the Theater Provost Marshal
p.	page
P&A	Personnel and Administration
par.	paragraph
RM	Reichsmark
RTO	railway ticket office

SAD	Special Activities Division
SEA	Ships Editorial Association
sgd	signed
sub	subject
TI&E	troop information and education
TJA	theater judge advocate
TSFET	Theater Service Forces, European Theater
USAFBI	U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
USFA	U.S. Forces, Austria
USFET	U.S. Forces, European Theater
VCOFS	vice chief of staff
VD	venereal disease
Vol.	volume
WD	War Department
wkly	weekly

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
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